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ABSTRACT 
I briefly restate the structure and essential elements of Rawls’s theory of justice to 
facilitate an understanding of its basic narrative, before examining a few of the 
critiques of his approach to the question of social justice. Then an approach to that 
question is developed, based on an evolutionary psychology (EP) understanding 
wherein knowledge and principles from evolutionary biology are used in research on 
the structure of the human notions of social justice. This leads to an understanding of 
the basic intuitive grasp humans have of the idea of justice from its role in human 
evolutionary history, which is then formulated in two principles of social justice. This 
understanding is thereafter related to the Rawlsian narrative and its critiques in a 
discussion which indicates divergences but also congruencies between the two 
approaches. It is also noted that the EP approach offers some insights that are 
lacking in justice as fairness but are also in fact supportive of some of its conclusions 
and arguments. It is further found that the EP approach has important implications 
for public policy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This project aims to relationally investigate two approaches to the idea of 
social justice. The first approach is the Rawlsian, contractarian, voluntarist approach 
of ‘justice as fairness,’ understood as a modern iteration of Kantian constructivism. 
The second is to investigate, develop, and advance a preliminary theory of social 
justice based on the evolutionarily developed, genetically adaptive, and culturally 
embedded human value notions, as revealed by the research and conclusions of 
evolutionary psychologists. 
This project is less concerned with the principles upon which individuals ought 
to interact and relate to one another within society, that being the preserve of private 
and criminal law. Nevertheless, social justice is viewed as one aspect of the general 
idea of justice. It is justice as applied to the institutional arrangements within the 
foundational structures of society. 
Like justice as fairness, the present project is concerned primarily with the 
principles of distributive justice as they might be applied to the political constitution of 
a society. However, it is inevitable that the wider context of the idea of justice also be 
given some consideration. Social justice is understood in the context of distributive 
justice: social justice relates generally to just outcomes in a society within the context 
of principles governing the interaction between society and the individuals 
comprising it, but distributive justice is primarily concerned with how social rights and 
duties, including the rewards and burdens of life in society, are distributed by the 
principles of its foundational institutions among the members. It thus relates to the 
principles upon which society and the individuals comprising it view and interact with 
each other. In other words, if the foundational principles of a society produce just 
distributional outcomes, then the society can be said to be a socially just one. 
The justice theories of John Rawls and John Harsanyi are based on rational 
choice theory, as Rawls writes in A Theory of Justice (TOJ): “[the] theory of justice is 
a part, perhaps the most significant part, of the theory of rational choice” (Rawls 
2009, 16). But the evolutionary psychology (EP) approach is based on a naturalistic 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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view of morality, exemplified by David Hume and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. It poses 
the question of what the principles of justice might be, such as can be derived from 
our researched human behaviour connected to our norms of justice. 
To formulate such principles, it will be necessary to gain some understanding 
of the role of our justice notions in human evolutionary history. But more than the 
question of what the principles are, this project shares the curiosity of Nietzsche 
concerning the question of what, actually, was the origin of our ideas of “Good” and 
“Evil” (Nietzsche [1913] 2003, 2), without necessarily adopting his conclusions. 
Moreover, it is suggested that a clearer understanding of the origin and natural 
function of these notions will facilitate and guide us in the formulation of a theory of 
social justice. 
The EP view is however, not only predicated on the findings of evolutionary 
psychologists, but also on game theoretic research (Skyrms 1996), (Binmore 2005), 
and (Bowles 2011). Brian Skyrms (Skyrms 1996) especially is relevant, since his 
modeling shows that the two traditions of social contract, namely rational choice and 
evolutionary dynamics, do not reach the same conclusions as to how the present 
implicit social contract could have evolved. Although Skyrms finds points of 
correspondence between the two traditions, he also finds striking differences. 
However, he contends that the explanatory force of the evolutionary dynamics 
approach is superior to that of rational choice theory, and thus by implication 
supports the basic premise of the present project. 
Another game theoretician, Ken Binmore (Binmore 2005), adopts a somewhat 
different game theoretic approach. His idea is to apply Ariel Rubinstein’s theory of 
rational bargaining to, as Binmore calls it, the negotiation problem created by the 
Rawlsian veil of ignorance (Binmore 2005, vii). Like Skyrms and myself, following 
Hume, he sought “naturalistic foundations” for Rawls’s intuitions. and came thereby 
to support an evolutionary explanation of human norms. But he attempts to apply 
these insights to “Rawls’s powerful intuitions about the way human fairness norms 
work” (Binmore 2005, 57).  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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Unfortunately, I believe he mischaracterises Rawls’s original position as a 
negotiation situation; it is in fact a choice situation wherein each participant makes a 
choice of the principles of justice. But Binmore further, wrongly, regards the question 
to be resolved behind the veil of ignorance as the members of a society being asked 
to “envisage the social contract to which they would agree if their current roles were 
concealed from them behind a ‘veil of ignorance’” (Binmore 2005, 15). In fact of 
course, agents of the members of a society, placed behind a veil of ignorance, are 
being asked merely to choose one conception of justice out of a given list of 
traditional conceptions (TOJ 118). 
Although each party in the original position is entitled to make proposals and 
give reasons, there is no sense of negotiation. The result of the original position is 
not an agreed, or negotiated social contract, but a set of agreed principles of justice 
for incorporation into a constitution. But the term “agreed” has a special meaning in 
justice as fairness, in the sense that it indicates that every party draws the same 
conclusion and ‘chooses’ the same conception of justice from the given choices, not 
that there is a “meeting of the minds” as in contract law. The debate, if it can be 
called such, takes place internally in the minds of the parties through the process of 
‘reflective equilibrium’ (TOJ 11-12, 20). 
Binmore also seems to lose sight of Rawls’s statement that he does not 
contend that the concepts of justice and fairness are the same. Indeed, he disavows 
any intention of justice as fairness being the application of any general moral 
conception to the basic structure of society (Rawls 1985, 225). He does not make 
any philosophical claims such as universal truth, or claims about the fundamental 
nature of people (Rawls 1985, 223). He makes a point of explaining the propriety of 
the name “justice as fairness” as follows: “it conveys the idea that the principles of 
justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair” (TOJ 12). The measure of an 
institution being just (or fair) is thus whether or not it satisfies the two principles of 
justice chosen in the original position (TOJ 111). It really has nothing to do with 
general human fairness norms as developed by Binmore. Nevertheless, Binmore 
then argues tangentally to Rawls, by mathematically modeling the development of 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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human fairness norms. He never deals with the two principles of justice, or how they 
might have come about through evolution. 
Both Skyrms and Binmore rely on finding equilibria in human interaction, on 
the basis that evolution would always result in a stable strategy in society, but the EP 
methodology that I follow argues from the premise that the observed fundamental 
behaviours of humans must have conferred some competetive advantage on the 
actors. It is only when the competitive advantage is revealed that we can define the 
underlying reasons, and hence the deeply structured principles of the norms 
underlying the demonstrated behaviour and beliefs. That is the essence of the 
understanding that is attempted by this project. 
 Binmore’s project, like that of Skyrms, is explanatory rather than normative 
and thus does not take my project any further than agreeing, albeit on a different 
basis, that human norms of justice and fairness are embedded in our genes and 
memes thorough biological and cultural evolution. 
 In my project, having developed an outline theory of social justice from the 
EP point of view, I will then analyse it juxtapositionally with Rawls’s justice as 
fairness to relate how the two approaches on the one hand support, and on the other 
hand diverge from each other. This process of analysis and comparison hopefully 
exposes the extent to which the EP approach possesses some important 
explanatory strengths that fill important lacunae in justice as fairness, and whether it 
additionally may offer valuable new, or further alternative insights into our 
understanding of social justice. 
This project is undertaken in the following way: 
Chapter 1: Justice as Fairness: A Social Contract Approach. 
Chapter 1 sets out the essential elements of the Rawlsian approach to the 
idea of social justice. Rawls makes it clear from the start that his theory is “highly 
Kantian” in nature and one thus should appreciate his project within that context. He 
also makes it clear that in fact he is concerned primarily with distributive justice as 
applied to the political constitution of a society. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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The chapter starts by discussing the Rawlsian meaning of justice before going 
on to discuss his criticism of Utilitarianism and its asserted lack of concern for 
distributional justice, this being one of Rawls’s main reasons for rejecting it. Chapter 
1 then continues by considering the social contract tradition, orienting Rawls within it 
and differentiating his views and conclusions from those of a few of the founding 
philosophers of that tradition, such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and J. J. 
Rousseau. 
In examining the fundamental ideas of the Rawlsian approach, the chapter 
attempts to illuminate Rawls’s concept of justice and of the person, traversing the 
arguments and evidence he uses to support it. The exercise is undertaken by means 
of a sequential exploration of the basic and essential elements of the original position 
to create a general understanding and appreciation of the idea of justice as fairness. 
This entails a discussion of the two principles of justice as fairness as well as 
the important processes that lead to the acceptance of these principles in the original 
position, such as “reflective equilibrium” and the “maximin” rule. It discusses the 
special meanings of “contract” and “agreement” in the Rawlsian project, as well as 
those of “rationality,” “equality,” and “reason” as it applies to the parties in the original 
position. This leads on to the final discussion in the chapter of what Rawls envisages 
as a “well-ordered society” in the context of justice as fairness. 
Chapter 2: Critiques and Criticisms of Rawls. 
In this chapter, a closer look is taken at a few selected objections and critical 
analyses of the Rawlsian approach, but which still fall into the broad, standard non-
evolutionary tradition. Rawls’s project is conceived in the Kantian paradigm, but the 
chapter does not deal with criticism from within that paradigm. The discussed 
criticisms are limited to external ones as they are the only ones relevant to my 
present project, which also falls wholly outside the Kantian paradigm. Internal 
criticism from the Kantian point of view of justice as fairness is irrelevant to my 
project, because it does not matter for my purposes whether Rawls’s project is true 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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to its Kantian roots or not, it is only important that Rawls sees it as a “highly Kantian” 
theory in nature. 
Although there has been much criticism of Rawls’s project by many authors, 
only some of the main themes of criticism that seem to go to the essence of the 
Rawlsian project are traversed in the chapter. This includes critiques of the fact that 
the theory of justice is developed on a deontological approach, which asserts the 
priority of right over the good, and the Rawlsian notion of a well-ordered society. The 
fundamental objection to the idea of distributional social justice, offered by Hayek, is 
also discussed and assessed, since my project is itself concerned with the principles 
of distributive justice. 
The discussed critiques are all relevant to themes that are discoursed in the 
process of developing the evolutionary psychology (EP) approach to the idea of 
distributional social justice, although none is directed at justice as fairness from the 
evolutionary psychology approach. Nevertheless, they are offered to illustrate some 
external insights into the Rawlsian project, that become more relevant and useful in 
Chapter 4. 
Chapter 3: The Evolutionary Psychology Approach. 
This chapter establishes the central arguments and considerations 
constituting the EP approach to the question of social justice. Some basic concepts 
are preliminarily discussed, such as the project’s evolutionary psychology 
orientation, the concept of gene-culture coevolution, and the applicability of the 
naturalistic fallacy. The dynamic of the EP view is thereafter discussed as it relates 
to the evolutionary development of human nature, culture, norms, and values. 
The function, dynamic and importance of the development of other regarding 
characteristics such as altruism, cooperation and reciprocity is investigated 
alongside self-regarding characteristics, such as greed and selfishness, to identify 
elements in the human ecology that could give rise to wide-ranging notions of justice. 
The basic features and evolutionary role of the notions of justice are analysed and 
discussed. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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A hypothesis for an EP theory of justice is put forward, which forms the basis 
on which the rest of the chapter is constructed. The chapter continues firstly, by 
discussing an understanding of justice and society as it appears from the EP 
perspective, before investigating that perspective on the subject of social justice 
itself. A discussion follows of what the notions of justice might encompass, given the 
human development experience during especially the Pleistocene period. An 
important element, that is crucial to the discussion, is the process of gene-culture 
coevolution and how that leads to some universal as well as culturally particular 
values, especially due to genetic and epigenetic changes in human populations. 
The question is then discussed as to whether it might be said that humans 
fundamentally have an egalitarian mind and the evidence that suggests such an 
interpretation is canvassed. 
This leads to a preliminary formulation of two principles of distributive social 
justice from the EP perspective. 
Chapter 4: Two approaches: A Relational Analysis 
In this chapter, the two approaches are juxtaposed and analysed relationally. 
The attempt is to relate the philosophical positions of the two approaches to each 
other from the EP perspective. This entails an external critique of Rawls’s project 
from the non-Kantian, EP point of view, thus accepting that moral values do not 
transcend experience and that consequently, prehistoric human and proto-human 
experience, which is known through scientific empirical research, does inform moral 
values and include notions of justice. Cooperativeness is accordingly understood as 
a species-specific adaptive psychological orientation and not based conditionally on 
an a priori agreement of the principles of justice. 
From this perspective, then, a certain divergence of premises and a departure 
of aims between the two approaches appear, which aspects are then analysed and 
discussed. This discussion leads to an assessment, from the EP point of view, of the 
two resulting concepts of justice wherein the EP concept is viewed as teleologically 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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related to its biological roots, while justice as fairness remains deontological within its 
Kantian paradigm. 
It appears that intuition plays a major role in both approaches, but intuition 
from the Kantian perspective is different from the perspective of EP. In the Kantian 
paradigm, intuition is a priori, while the EP approach tries to understand intuition as 
evolutionarily embedded notions of the human psyche, each with a recognisable 
telos, related to evolutionary selection for survival. This understanding allows for a 
reasoned development and response to intuitive notions, that place them in the 
context of having been naturally selected for enhancing human survival. 
The chapter continues by analysing how the EP approach gives rise to a 
multiplicity of possible legislative constructions that allow for different formulations to 
suit the circumstances and cultural particularities of different societies. However, 
sample formulations reflecting the essence of two principles from the EP point of 
view are suggested. 
Under the discussion of relating deontology and teleology, it is suggested that, 
unlike justice as fairness, the EP approach is teleological. Following Sandel’s 
arguments concerning the morally binding force of rights, it is accepted that “rights 
depend for their justification on the moral importance of the ends they serve.” 
(Sandel 1998, 126) These considerations lead to the conclusion that the EP 
developed principles of justice are indeed morally binding on society and its 
members. 
Chapter 5: Public Policy Recommendations, General 
Conclusions and Prospects for Further Research. 
The purpose of the project is stated to be the clarification the idea of social 
justice by exploring the origins and foundations of the idea of justice, not only 
through the writings of John Rawls, but also through the lens of EP to establish some 
understanding of the underlying functions and social importance of the idea of justice 
in society. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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The chapter then considers the implications of the EP approach for public 
policy and distils a number of pertinent issues that relate to actions which would be 
necessary public policy interventions. Three main implications for the direction of 
public policy are suggested: 
• Achieving egalitarian outcomes, and 
• Fostering a culture of pro-social attitudes, and 
• Providing sufficient guarantees and sanctions against free riders on the 
benefits of group living while making little or no contribution themselves. 
It is further suggested that a just institutional framework is an essential 
requirement for just public policies, although many attributes of social justice cannot 
be accomplished by force of law alone. Public servants must thus cultivate prosocial 
attitudes to effect social justice. 
It is argued that, from an EP point of view, public policy cannot maintain an 
attitude of neutrality on moral questions, but must engage such questions actively. 
This is illustrated by the suggested EP policy stance on abortion which is a clear 
moral argument resting on scientific fact, through employing the societal point of 
view. 
It is also suggested that poverty in the face of affluence is not a natural human 
condition. Poverty alleviation is thus not an EP policy option, since the root systemic 
causes of poverty in an affluent society must be removed for such a society to be 
properly termed just. 
This is followed by general conclusions on the project and a discussion on the 
prospects for further research which include possible research on alternative 
economic systems of production and distribution. There are also other fields of 
possible research such as determining to what extent the policies and conditions in 
the happiest countries in the world approximate the basic tenets of the EP derived 
principles of a well-ordered society. 
There is also scope to discover, through traditional law and social norms, in 
how far indigenous societies in South Africa had developed as societies in harmony 
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with the EP approach. Very importantly, there needs to be research on the essentials 
of democratic government and whether the current representative government 
models substantially meet those criteria and expectations. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Justice as Fairness: A Social Contract Approach 
We have also reason to assume that...the striving for justice and 
truth is an inherent trend of human nature, although it can be repressed 
and perverted like the striving for freedom. Erich Fromm (Escape from 
Freedom) 
 
1. Introduction 
John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice marks a pivotal turning point in the most 
recent history of practical philosophy, for he restored long-suppressed moral 
questions to the status of serious objects of philosophical investigation (Finlayson 
2012, 25). In this Chapter I propose to examine his model of a social contract based 
approach to social justice. 
There is a plethora of studies of Rawls’ approach and I do not intend 
duplicating any of them, although there will be unavoidable and extensive overlaps. 
My purpose is a much more restricted one than the usual purpose of reviews of 
Rawls’ project. My ultimate intention is to compare his approach and conclusions to 
that of a proposed gene-culture evolutionary psychology approach to the question. I 
will moot this approach based on existing studies of gene-culture coevolution and 
evolutionary psychology and draw some preliminary conclusions. 
In this chapter I propose to discuss justice as fairness from the point of view 
Rawls sets out as his purpose and aim with the project. The first question I deal with 
is what Rawls means by the term justice, before I move on to present the arguments 
that he raises against utilitarianism. Then I attempt to relate justice as fairness to 
traditional Social Contract Theory. 
In justice as fairness the “original position” of equality plays a pivotal role and I 
discuss this in greater detail to reach some understanding of its precise role in 
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defining the principles of And those for his point of departure, which is that justice is 
the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought (Rawls 2009, p. 
3) justice as fairness, noting also how it corresponds to the state of nature in the 
traditional theory of the social contract, which contract in Rawls’s project is now 
explicitly hypothetical. 
I then deal with Rawls’s idea of a well-ordered society and how it developed 
from his initial view to the one he finally postulates in political liberalism. It is an 
essential element of the Rawlsian project and before concluding the chapter, I 
endeavour to analyse its dynamics as finally set forth in political liberalism. 
2. The Rawlsian Meaning of Justice 
Rawls’s point of departure is that justice is the first virtue of social institutions, 
as truth is of systems of thought (Rawls 2009, 3). Throughout his theory, he 
considers justice only as a virtue of social institutions, to which he gives the technical 
term “practices” (Rawls 1958, 164). For the purposes of the theory he disregards the 
idea of justice insofar as it may be a virtue of particular actions or a virtue of 
particular persons. He deals with justice only as a virtue of practices that result from 
a system of rules. 
But he also argues that his view on justice must be understood in its 
customary sense, as being only one of the many possible virtues of social 
institutions, such as efficiency, preventing harm, and so on. Justice is only part of an 
all-inclusive vision of a good society; there are many other factors that need to be 
considered as well (Rawls 1958, 165). Rawls then proposes to focus on what he 
terms the usual sense of justice: essentially the elimination of arbitrary distinctions 
between people and the establishment within the fundamental laws of society of a 
proper balance between competing claims (Rawls 1958, 165). 
Rawls thus does not intend to deal with the totality of the set of values we 
identify with the idea of justice. His primary objective is to formulate the principles of 
distributive justice. These principles, he argues, should provide a way of assigning 
the rights and duties of citizens, by being incorporated into the foundational 
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institutes: the political constitution and the basic economic and social arrangements 
of society. They should thus not be regarded as add-ons, they should be part of the 
very essence of social arrangements. Furthermore, they define the “appropriate 
distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation” (TOJ 4-7). 
Even before his seminal work in A Theory of Justice, Rawls formulates his two 
principles in an article: 
[First], each person participating in a practice, or affected by it, 
has an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible with a 
like liberty for all; and second, inequalities are arbitrary unless it is 
reasonable to expect that they will work out for everyone's 
advantage, and provided the positions and offices to which they 
attach, or from which they may be gained, are open to all (Rawls 
1958, 165). 
Although the formulation of these principles is Rawls’s own, he argues that 
they are in no way unique. Importantly for this project, he argues that these 
principles have three underlying norms: liberty, equality, and reward for services 
contributing to the common good. 
3. The Critique of Utilitarianism 
In this section I discuss the view that Rawls takes of Utilitarianism and the 
reasons for his rejection thereof. 
Rawls states his aim in setting out his theory as being that he wishes to 
present a preferable alternative to the, at the time of his writing in the late 1960’s and 
early 1970’s, all pervasive approach of Utilitarianism. He believes that the past critics 
of Utilitarianism failed to construct a workable and systematic moral conception to 
oppose it. He says that during much of modern moral philosophy the predominant 
systematic theory has been some form of utilitarianism, of which there are a number. 
But his aim is to work out a theory of justice that represents an alternative to 
utilitarian thought generally, and he includes in his project an alternative to the 
familiar variants of intuitionism and perfectionism. 
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As a benchmark understanding of utilitarianism, Rawls adopts Henry 
Sidgwick’s formulation (Sidgwick 1907). According to Sidgwick the main idea of 
utilitarianism is that society is rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its major 
institutions are arranged to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed 
over all the individuals belonging to it. Utility then is that which gives people 
satisfaction in their lives; satisfaction of their wants and desires. Utility has also been 
identified as happiness, that being considered as having the highest utility. Today 
much research is being done in economics and psychology on the state of 
happiness in many societies, following the general utilitarian philosophy of modern 
economics, although the matters of principle that Rawls and many others have 
raised, remain unresolved. 
In the utilitarian view, according to Rawls, an individual person acts quite 
properly when he acts to advance his own rational ends to achieve his own greatest 
good. It then asks why a society should not act on the same principle applied to the 
group. Would not a group act quite properly when it acts to advance its own rational 
ends to achieve the group’s own greatest good? Thus, what is rational for one 
person can be extended to be rational for a group of persons. And so, Rawls  (Rawls 
2009, 23-24) argues that in utilitarianism 
… one reaches the principle of utility in a natural way: a society is 
properly arranged when its institutions maximize the net balance of 
satisfaction. The principle of choice for an association of men is 
interpreted as an extension of the principle of choice for one man. Social 
justice is the principle of rational prudence applied to an aggregative 
conception of the welfare of the group. 
Rawls then enjoins one to consider the two main concepts of ethics: the right 
and the good, from which also the concept of the morally worthy person is derived. 
Ethical theories, he states, are structured around their definitions of the right and the 
good and how the two concepts are conjoined in each theory.  Teleological theories 
are generally ethical theories that judge right and wrong based on the ‘goodness’ of 
the outcomes of institutions or actions, or more precisely, the view that those 
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institutions and acts are right, which, of the available alternatives, produce the most 
good, or at least as much good as any of the other institutions and acts open as real 
possibilities (Frankena 1963, 13). 
These theories thus relate the two notions of right and the good in the 
simplest way: the good is defined independently from the right, and then the right is 
defined as that which maximizes the good. Thus, any action, policy, or institution that 
maximises the good is also ‘right’. One can then judge the ‘goodness’ of things 
without referencing what is right. This then is the ultimate philosophy of the end 
justifies the means, since the means will be ‘right’ or ‘just’, if the ends are ‘good’. 
According to Rawls then, teleological theories vary in so far as they differ in 
their definition of the good. If the good is defined as the realisation of human 
excellence, we have perfectionism; if as pleasure, hedonism; if as happiness, 
eudaimonism.  Rawls states that he understands the principle of utility in its classical 
form as defining the good as the satisfaction of rational desire. The problem Rawls 
has with this view is that there is no independent definition of the right. There is no 
moral infrastructure that can be referenced to direct one’s institutions or actions to be 
fair and just in the first instance. Rawls rejects utilitarian and other teleological 
theories because, from his perspective, they lack a moral point of view. 
A fundamental concern Rawls has with utilitarianism is that it places no value 
on the distributive aspects of utility. It does not matter to the utilitarian how the sum 
of satisfactions is distributed among the individuals in society. It may well be that the 
vast majority of a population is only somewhat satisfied while most of the satisfaction 
is enjoyed by a small minority of highly satisfied individuals, as long as the total 
satisfaction in society is  then greater than it would be if depriving the high utility 
enjoying population of some of their utility would have little effect on the utility 
enjoyed by the many; total utility in society taken as a whole could therefore be 
diminished by a more equal, or at least, a less unequal distribution. 
For example, the general assumption of standard economics is that income 
has utility and the greater the income the greater the utility, although it is moot 
whether the marginal utility of income decreases, remains stable, or actually 
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increases as income rises – cf. (Bailey 1980), (Friedman 1953), (Easterlin 2005), 
and (Frey 2008). The moot point is however of no consequence in the following 
example. 
The Gini Coefficient is a measure of the equality of distribution of any element 
within a population. It can measure the equality of any distribution, whether it be of 
income, wealth, opportunities or even happiness. It gives a measure of between 0 
(perfect equality) and 100 (perfect inequality).  
According to the World bank report 2005 to 2009, South Africa had a per 
capita income of $10,850 in 2009. This is low compared to, for example, Australia, 
which had a per capita income of $35,980 in the same year, no doubt leading 
utilitarians to conclude that, ceteris paribus, Australians are a lot happier than South 
Africans. But the discrepancy becomes even greater when the distribution of that 
income is considered. The Gini Coefficient for South Africa in 2009 was 63.1, which 
was one of the highest inequalities in the world, while Australia had a Gini of only 
30.5 in 2006. This translates to a much higher degree of absolute and relative 
poverty in South Africa than in Australia. In South Africa, the top 20% of the 
population earned 17.9 times what the lowest 20% earned, while in Australia the 
factor was only 7 times. The Australian example merely underlines the point that a 
much more equal distribution of income is possible even within the same economic 
system. 
While certain ‘common sense’ precepts of justice would clearly judge the 
South African situation to be unjust both absolutely and comparatively, from the 
utilitarian point of view the South Africa/Australia comparison could be improved only 
by increasing South Africa’s relative Gross National Income. But if that were 
achieved without any improvement in the distribution of the income, utilitarians would 
ignore the distributive inequality and still see only the increase in the relative gross 
national product as a great improvement in utility and therefore in the relative 
justness of South African Society compared to the Australian. 
The impaired vision of the utilitarian view is due to the fact that the distribution 
problem falls under the concept of ‘right,’ as Rawls holds (Rawls 2009, 25). If 
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distribution were to be claimed as a ‘good,’ Rawls says that we would no longer have 
a teleological view in the classical sense. For how would it be possible to maximise a 
distribution? A distribution is what it is and if a particular distribution was held out to 
be a good, you could not maximise it, you could only achieve it as near as possible, 
for overshooting it would not be better (more good). As we saw above, a more equal 
distribution of the good may in fact diminish the overall good, or be neutral to the 
total satisfaction in society. It is therefore not an element of concern to the classical 
teleological view, and specifically not to the utilitarian. 
Rawls thus sets up his project to counter the precepts of utilitarianism and 
teleological theories generally and to account for the common-sense conviction that 
justice has priority over the desirability of increasing aggregate social welfare. 
Justice, Rawls consequently maintains, is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth 
is of systems of thought (Rawls 2009, 3). He argues that: 
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the 
welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason, justice 
denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good 
shared by others. 
Rawls intends to show that the common-sense judgements concerning the 
priority of justice is a result of principles which would be chosen in the ‘original 
position,’ which is a hypothetical position intended to demonstrate the choice of 
principles that would be made by rational people, contracting with each other to 
found a just society, in a position of complete equality and bereft of all personal 
preferences. The ‘original position’ is at the heart of Rawls methodology and will be 
dealt with below. 
Utilitarianism therefore lacks moral content in Rawls’ view and he sets out to 
construct a moral deontological alternative. Rawls sees deontological theories 
defined merely as theories that are not teleological. Justice as fairness is a 
deontological theory in the sense that it does not interpret the right as maximizing the 
good (Rawls 2009, 30). Rawls stresses that this does not mean that the theory 
judges the rightness of institutions and then acts ‘right’ without considering the 
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consequences. All ethical doctrines worthy of our attention take consequences into 
account in judging rightness, he says. 
4. Traditional Social Contract Theory 
In this section I discuss the traditional social contract theory and how it relates 
to Rawls’s justice as fairness. Traditional social contract theory fell out of general 
favour especially after the Utilitarianism of Bentham and J. S. Mill. Rawls, in a sense, 
is trying to revive social contract doctrine by employing a new and more hypothetical 
approach to the meeting of the minds which traditionally founds society in the 
contract tradition. How he approached this, and the influence social contract theory 
has on justice as fairness, is discussed in this section. 
To construct such a deontological position as he postulates in (Rawls 2009, 
30), Rawls places his project squarely within the Social Contract tradition as 
represented by Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. He explains that what he has attempted 
to do is to “generalize and carry to a higher order of abstraction the traditional theory 
of the social contract.” (Rawls 2009, 144) 
By doing that he hoped to develop the contract theory to the point where it 
would no longer be open to the more obvious objections often thought fatal to it. 
Rawls does not immediately specify what he regards as the obvious objections, but 
from his project one can infer that he has in mind the objections related, inter alia, to 
the quasi-historicity of the tradition. It is important to underline exactly what Rawls 
has in mind when adopting the social contract tradition, since this brings into focus 
many of the aspects that he adopts in his system that are specifically designed to 
meet these objections. 
In Locke (Ashcraft 2009) and Rousseau (Rousseau 2010) the tradition is that 
there was an imagined time of human existence before society, or at least political 
society, was founded. People were then supposed to have lived in a ‘state of nature’ 
where there was no legal, political, or other authority, no government, no laws and 
no coercion. Every adult person thus had total freedom and power over himself and 
in these aspects enjoyed complete equality with every other person. 
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This situation, the theorists acknowledged, would be rather perilous, as it 
would be everyone for themselves in a free-for-all melee of living. While Hobbes 
(Hobbes 2012) characterised it as a situation of war by every man against every 
man, Locke described it as the ‘inconveniences’ of the state of nature. To avoid 
these inconveniences, he argues, which disorder people's property in the state of 
nature, they unite into societies, the chief purpose of which is to preserve private 
property, 
that they may have the united strength of the whole society to 
secure and defend their properties, and may have standing rules 
to bound it, by which everyone may know what is his. (Locke 
2011 [1690], 32 and 51) 
But Locke agreed that it (the state of nature) would not have lasted very long 
before political society was formed, which is why, he argued, there was a paucity of 
historical records of people in the state of nature and the first formation of civil 
societies. He maintains that 
it is not at all to be wondered, that history gives us but a very little 
account of men, that lived together in the state of nature. The 
inconveniences of that condition, and the love and want of 
society, no sooner brought any number of them together, but they 
presently united and incorporated, if they designed to continue 
together. (Locke 2011 [1690], 38) 
The contract tradition is that people living in the state of nature came together 
as free, equal and autonomous persons and contracted with each other to form civil 
society. The contract was fundamentally that each individual gave up part of her 
freedom to allow a government to make binding laws and each gave up his 
untrammelled power over himself and pooled it in the government so that it could 
enforce law and order and so end the inconveniences of the state of nature. Thus, 
people came out of the state of nature and entered civil society. But the quid pro quo 
of the agreement was that the government would have to govern in the general 
interest of all the citizens taken as a whole, and certainly not in the specific and 
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narrow interests of those who held power. If the government did not hold up its end 
of the bargain the citizens retained their residual power to enforce the contract, even 
by rebellion if all else failed (Locke 2011 [1690], 82-85). 
In Kant and Rousseau, the contract becomes a mere device. Kant’s views are 
grounded in, and a development of Rousseau’s views, especially that for both 
Rousseau and Kant the idea of the social contract played a similar significant role: as 
part of their accounts of the General Will; it was, for them, merely a device to 
demonstrate a point of view legislators should adopt for deciding on laws that 
achieve justice and the common good of citizens (Freeman 2012, 2). Nevertheless, 
they both maintain their fiction concerning the state of nature and a social contract to 
escape from it. 
Rousseau reiterates the contract tradition position that people in a theoretical 
state of nature come together to create a civil state, but he makes it quite clear that 
he means literally every person is a party to the contract. He states unequivocally 
that each of us places our person and all our power, in common with everyone else, 
under the supreme direction of the general will; and as one body we all receive each 
member as an indivisible part of the whole. From that moment, instead of as many 
separate persons as there are contracting parties, this act of association produces a 
moral, collective body composed of as many members as there are votes in the 
assembly – in fact a single public person. This public person, which is formed by the 
union of all persons, Rousseau states, formerly took the name of “city,” and now 
takes that of “republic” or “body politic” (Rousseau 2010, 659-664). 
In Charles Frankel’s introduction to the 2010 edition of On the Social Contract, 
he reasons that Rousseau used the phrase, “the social contract,” not primarily for 
purposes of philosophic analysis but as a way of dramatizing the moral situation 
implicit in the individual’s living in society. Set against the backdrop of an imaginary 
“state of nature,” the distinctive quality of social relations as alone providing the basis 
for moral action emerges more clearly, and the principles which distinguish a 
justifiable society—that is, a true society—are highlighted. “The passing from the 
state of nature to the civil state produces in man a very remarkable change, by 
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substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving to his actions a moral 
character which they lacked before” (Rousseau 2010, 294-303). 
Frankel continues by saying that the use of the social contract in this way 
means that it is not really a contract at all. A contract, he correctly maintains, implies 
mutual promises, and the undertaking by each of the contracting parties of 
obligations which will satisfy some existing interest of the other party to the contract. 
Rousseau’s “social contract,” however, is the exchange of a situation in which there 
is no human morality for one in which there is, and the basis is agreement. It actually 
creates obligations and interests which did not exist before, and obligates the 
individual to a social whole, or to his own mandatory general will, against which he 
has no reciprocal claims. 
One objection to social contract theory that Rawls takes very seriously is the 
idealistic one. In Locke’s doctrine, not all members of society following the social 
compact have equal political rights on whatever basis. This has important 
implications for Rawls in that it demonstrates, inter alia, that previous contract 
theories, such as Locke’s cannot answer the idealist critique levelled at them by, for 
example, Hegel. Rawls interprets Hegel’s objection to contract theory (Rawls, 2011, 
285-286), as being that it confuses society and the state with an association of 
private persons; that it permits the general form and content of public law to be 
determined too much by the contingent and specific private interests and personal 
concerns of individuals; and that it could make no sense of the fact that it is not up to 
us whether we are born into and belong to our society. 
For Hegel, the doctrine of social contract was thus an illegitimate and 
uncritical extension of ideas that are only at home in and limited to (what he called) 
“civil society.” Rawls in reply argues that his ‘justice as fairness’ is consciously 
structured to meet this objection (Rawls 2011, 286). He says he has attempted to 
reply to the Idealist criticisms, first, by maintaining that the primary subject of justice 
is the basic structure of society, meaning the way in which the major social 
institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of 
advantages from social cooperation (Rawls 2009, 7). By major institutions Rawls 
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understands the political constitution and the principal economic and social 
arrangements of society. The basic structure then has the fundamental task of 
establishing what Rawls terms the ‘background justice’ of society. And, Rawls 
continues, while this latter contention may initially appear to be a concession, it 
nevertheless is not: he argues that the original position can still be characterized so 
that it establishes a fair agreement situation between free and equal moral persons 
and one in which they can reach a rational agreement. 
The basic social contract narrative is clearly not historical and neither Locke 
nor Rousseau claimed that it was. But neither was it explicitly contended that it was 
merely hypothetical as is the ‘original position’ in justice as fairness. Locke especially 
went out of his way to argue that the narrative is in essence what happened, or what 
probably happened historically (Locke 2011 [1690], 38-43). 
But the motivation of people in the narrative to come out of the state of nature 
and form civil society undeniably implies an intended historicity, which is clearly 
false. And therefore, nothing is learned about the motivation for the formation of civil 
society, while the underlying ratio, the whole raison d’etre of the ‘contract’ is 
destroyed. If the state of nature and the formation of civil society bear no relation to 
each other in any real way, the coming together of all people with an underlying 
dynamic to enter into an agreement is negated, and there would be no reason to 
contract at all. 
However, to found civil society on a social contract theory is superior, Rawls 
argues, to the dominant tradition of utilitarianism. He suggests that social contract 
theory seems to offer an alternative, systematic account of justice that is lacking in 
the utilitarian view. Of course, Rawls limits the account of justice that he seeks to 
that of distributive justice, not the whole spectrum of the idea of justice as such. He is 
interested in the justice of the basic structure of society; to provide a just way of 
assigning rights and duties through the basic institutions of society and to define the 
just and appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation 
(Rawls 2009, 4). By the ‘basic institutions of society’ he understands the political 
constitution and the principal economic and social arrangements (Rawls 2009, 7). 
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His attraction to the social contract is due to the element of agreement, or 
voluntarism locked up in the idea of contract. What the actual nature of the 
agreement is in Rawls’ theory is a matter that will be referred to later, although it is 
not seminal to the present project. 
5. The Original Position 
The original position is the mechanism that Rawls uses as the springboard for 
people deciding and contracting the principles of social justice. This is the innovation 
in his thought that distinguishes justice as fairness most sharply from traditional 
social contract theory. In this section I will analyse and discuss this seminally 
important idea in some detail to be able later to perhaps distinguish it more clearly 
from the evolutionary psychology approach I develop in Chapter 3. 
Rawls’s guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the basic structure of 
society are the object of the original agreement. These are supposed to be the 
principles that free and rational persons, concerned to further their own interests, 
would accept in an initial position of equality when they are required to define the 
fundamental terms of their future association (Rawls 2009, 11). These principles, 
Rawls states, will be the principles that will regulate all further agreements in that 
society since “…they specify the kinds of social cooperation that can be entered into 
and the forms of government that can be established” (Rawls 2009, 11). This way of 
regarding the principles of justice is what Rawls terms ‘justice as fairness.’ 
In justice as fairness the original position of equality corresponds to the state 
of nature in the traditional theory of the social contract, which is now explicitly 
hypothetical. The position is essentially that of a great meeting of the representatives 
of the people who will constitute the society to be founded. This meeting will be 
presented with a list of conceptions of justice, specified in TOJ by Rawls, from which 
the representatives will choose the theory they regard as the best to found the 
principles of justice upon which their society will be built. The original position is not, 
of course, thought of as an actual historical state of affairs, much less as a primitive 
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condition of culture. It is understood as a purely hypothetical situation characterized 
to lead to a certain conception of justice (Rawls 2009, 12). 
The principles of justice are chosen behind what Rawls describes as a ‘veil of 
ignorance’ in the original position. The essential features of the situation of the 
people in the original position is that no one knows his place in society, his class 
position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of 
natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. Rawls even 
assumes that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their own 
special psychological propensities (Rawls 2009, 530) although they are aware of 
certain general facts about society. 
The veil of ignorance, Rawls says, prevents the parties from shaping their 
moral views to accord with their own particular attachments and interests. They 
should not look at the social order from their own particular situation but must take 
up a point of view that everyone can adopt on an equal footing (Rawls 2009, 516). 
Rawls offers, as a further explanation for these constraints under the veil of 
ignorance, that as far as possible the choice of a conception of justice should not be 
affected by accidental contingencies. He argues that the principles adopted should 
not vary with respect to differences among the parties in these inclinations for the 
same reason that he wants them to be chosen irrespective of individual preferences 
and social circumstances (Rawls 2009, 530). 
There are however certain matters that are not hidden from the people behind 
the veil of ignorance. There is no objection to resting the choice of first principles 
upon the general facts of economics and psychology, for example, that when the veil 
is lifted, they will have conceptions of the good.  Since this knowledge enters the 
premises of their deliberations, their choice of principles is relative to these facts 
(Rawls 2009, 158). There is also a general assumption that the persons in the 
original position are not moved by certain psychological propensities, such as envy, 
the need to dominate others and to be dominated by others. 
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It is notable that Rawls uses the terms ‘chosen’ and ‘accepted’ in the original 
position. This indicates a move away from ‘agreement’ and ‘consent’ as found in the 
earlier social contract theories. 
The original position is not a bargaining situation where the parties make 
proposals and counterproposals and negotiate over different principles of justice 
(Freeman 2012). Nor is it a free ranging discussion where the parties design their 
own conception of justice. Instead, the parties' deliberations are much more 
constrained. They are presented with a list of conceptions of justice taken from the 
tradition of western political philosophy. These include different versions of 
utilitarianism, perfectionism, and intuitionism (or pluralist views), rational egoism, 
justice as fairness, and a group of “mixed conceptions” that combine elements of 
these (Rawls 2009, 124-125). Rawls grants that each of these conceptions 
presumably has its own assets and liabilities; there are reasons for and against any 
alternative one selects. 
The fact that a conception is open to criticism is not necessarily decisive 
against it, nor are certain desirable features always conclusive in its favour. Rawls 
states that the decision of the persons in the original position hinges on a balance of 
various considerations, although he does not immediately spell out what they are. 
But one can deduce that it includes considerations such as the merits and demerits 
of each philosophy based on its appeal to reason, of economics, of facts concerning 
human society and includes an appeal to intuition. 
Very importantly, Rawls states that, in the sense of the above, there is an 
appeal to intuition at the basis of the theory of justice. Yet when everything is tallied 
up, it may be perfectly clear where the balance of reason lies in the choice to be 
made. In other words, the considerations above will create a balance favouring one 
intuitive choice above others. He argues that the relevant reasons may have been so 
factored and analysed by the description of the original position, that one conception 
of justice is distinctly preferable to the others. This is what fundamentally 
distinguishes justice as fairness from intuitionism, which has no point of reference 
beyond intuition. This argument is not strictly speaking a proof, he grants; but, in 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 26 
 
Mill’s phrase, it may present considerations capable of determining the intellect 
(Rawls 2009, 125). 
Freeman argues that the original position is best conceived as a kind of 
selection process (Freeman 2012) wherein the parties' deliberations are constrained 
by the background conditions imposed by the original position as well as the list of 
conceptions of justice provided to them. They are assigned the task of choosing 
principles for designing the basic structure of a self-contained society under the 
circumstances of justice, being the circumstances created in the original position. 
In making their decision, the parties are motivated only by their own rational 
interests. They do not take moral considerations of justice into account except in so 
far as these considerations bear on their achieving their interests. Their interests are 
narrowed down and are defined in terms of their each wanting to acquire an 
adequate share of primary social goods (rights and liberties, powers and 
opportunities, income and wealth, etc.) and achieving the background social 
conditions enabling them to effectively pursue their conception of the good and 
realize their higher-order interests in the moral powers. 
Since the parties are ignorant of their particular conceptions of the good and 
of all other particular facts about their particular society, they are not in a position to 
engage in bargaining. In effect, they all have the same general information and are 
motivated to the same extent by the same interests. 
Rawls’ common theme throughout the original position arguments is that it is 
more rational for the parties to choose the principles of ‘justice as fairness’ over any 
other alternative. He devotes most of his attention to the comparison of ‘justice as 
fairness’ with classical and average utilitarianism, with briefer discussions of 
perfectionism (Rawls 2009, 324-332) and intuitionism. The parties in the original 
position are assigned the task of agreeing to principles that they can all accept. 
5.1. The Two Principles of Justice 
Rawls argues that one may regard a theory of justice as describing our sense 
of justice (Rawls 2009, 46). For by such a description is not meant simply a list of the 
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judgments on institutions and actions that we are prepared to render, accompanied 
with supporting reasons when these are offered. Rather, what is required is a 
formulation of a set of principles which, when conjoined to our beliefs and knowledge 
of the circumstances, would lead us to make these judgments with their supporting 
reasons were we to apply these principles conscientiously and intelligently. Rawls 
stresses that a theory of justice is precisely that, namely, a theory. It is a theory of 
our moral sentiments that sets out the principles governing our moral powers, or, 
more specifically, our sense of justice. 
Rawls’ first tentative exposition of the two principles of justice are first: each 
person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a 
similar liberty for others; and 
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to 
positions and offices open to all. These formulations he develops throughout his 
work and eventually gives the final formulation of the two principles in Political 
Liberalism (Rawls 2011, 291-293) as follows: 
a. Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal 
basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for 
all. 
b. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. First, 
they must be attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they must be to the 
greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society. 
However, this formulation of the two principles cannot be fully and properly 
interpreted out of the context of Rawls’ further discussion. He does deal in detail with 
what is meant, for example, by basic liberties and their special status that gives them 
priority over considerations of the public good and other social values. As it stands 
the first principle merely indicates two things: firstly, that the list of liberties should be 
‘a fully adequate scheme’ of ‘basic liberties’ without defining what ‘fully adequate’ or 
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‘basic liberty’ means. Secondly, whatever liberties may be included in the list, each 
person in society is equally entitled to each one of those liberties. 
It is important to note that the first principle (a) is not intended to indicate a 
priority for liberty as such. Rawls holds that liberty as such is without content and 
therefore lacks meaning. What he proposes is that a list of liberties should be 
included with the ‘justice as fairness’ option, as part of its specification, given to the 
people in the original position. He proposes two possible ways of drawing up the list. 
Firstly, we can take the historical route: we survey the constitutions of 
democratic states and put together a list of liberties normally protected, and we 
examine the role of these liberties in those constitutions which have worked well. 
The second way is to consider which liberties are essential social conditions for the 
adequate development and full exercise of the two powers of moral personality over 
a complete lifetime. 
The two powers of moral personality are firstly, the capacity for a sense of 
justice and secondly, the capacity for a conception of the good (Rawls 2011, 34). 
Rawls realises that, given the constraints of the parties in the original position, they 
would be unable to specify the scheme of basic liberties in full detail by the 
considerations available to them. But he says that it is enough that they can outline 
the general form and content of the basic liberties and understand the grounds of 
their priority (Rawls 2011, 298). 
The further specification of the liberties he leaves to the constitutional, 
legislative, and judicial stages of the constructive process. But in outlining this 
general form and content in the original position the special role and central range of 
application of the basic liberties must be indicated sufficiently clearly to guide the 
process of further specification at the later stages. For example, among the basic 
liberties of the person is the right to hold and to have the exclusive use of personal 
property. The role of this liberty is to allow a sufficient material basis for each citizen 
to have a sense of personal independence and self-respect, both of which are 
essential for the development and exercise of the moral powers of the individual. 
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But there are different conceptions of the right to property. One conception 
extends this right to include certain rights of acquisition and bequest, as well as the 
right to own the means of production and natural resources. On another conception, 
the right of property includes the equal right to participate in the control of means of 
production and natural resources, which are to be socially owned. These two 
divergent conceptions of property rights are not embraced by Rawls in the decisions 
the parties make in the original position, which is why he specifies it as the right to 
personal property. 
He says he does not use these conceptions of property rights that go beyond 
personal property because, in his opinion, they cannot be accounted for as 
necessary for the development and exercise of the moral powers of the individual. 
The merits of these and other conceptions of property rights should be decided at 
later stages when much more information about a society’s circumstances and 
historical traditions is available. Unlike Locke, Rawls obviously does not view these 
and other wider conceptions of property rights as basic; they are intrinsically neither 
just nor unjust, but either can be accepted based on the culture, history and 
circumstances of a particular society. Rights that go beyond the rights of the 
individual personally are thus context dependant in justice as fairness. 
We can ask similar questions of other matters of importance to the basic 
structure, such as the acceptability of slavery, attitudes to women and the limits of 
punishment. Rawls seems not to wish to answer these concerns directly regarding 
the two principles. Instead he asks the question: how might political philosophy find a 
shared basis for settling such a fundamental question as that of the most appropriate 
family of institutions to secure democratic liberty and equality? To this he replies that 
perhaps the most that can be done is to narrow the range of disagreement (Rawls 
2011, 8). 
Very importantly for the present project, he notes that even firmly held 
convictions gradually change:  
religious toleration is now accepted, and arguments for 
persecution are no longer openly professed; similarly, slavery, 
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which caused our Civil War, is rejected as inherently unjust, 
and however much the aftermath of slavery may persist in 
social policies and unavowed attitudes, no one is willing to 
defend it. (Rawls 2011, 8) 
He then argues that political philosophy must start by looking to the public 
culture itself as the shared fund of implicitly recognized basic ideas and principles. 
We hope, he says, to formulate these ideas and principles clearly enough to be 
combined into a political conception of justice that is not at odds with our most firmly 
held convictions. A political conception of justice, to be acceptable, thus must accord 
with people’s considered convictions, at all levels of generality, on due reflection, or 
in what elsewhere Rawls has called “reflective equilibrium” (Rawls 2009, 48-52). 
5.2. Reflective Equilibrium 
The notion of reflective equilibrium is important in the whole theory of justice 
as fairness. It embodies the fundamental process of reasoning behind the veil of 
ignorance and represents the main justification that Rawls gives as to why and how it 
would come about that the principles of justice as fairness would be chosen above 
all other alternatives. 
There is an underlying hypothesis in the theory that the principles which would 
be chosen in the original position are identical with those that we would apply in our 
considered judgements, and consequently, the chosen principles describe our sense 
of justice (Rawls 2009, 48). But Rawls identifies the problem that our considered 
judgements are subject to revision depending on circumstances and arguments 
presented etc. Then we may make considered judgments which seem reasonable 
under the circumstances, although they do not wholly and properly conform to our 
original theory (Rawls 2009, 48 ff.). 
Rawls accordingly argues that the best account of a person’s sense of justice 
is not the one which fits his judgments prior to his examining any conception of 
justice, but rather the one which matches his judgments in reflective equilibrium – 
after examining different conceptions of justice. This state of equilibrium is thus 
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reached after a person has weighed various proposed conceptions of justice and has 
either revised his judgments to accord with one of them or held fast to his initial 
convictions (and the corresponding conception of justice). He is not talking about 
accepting and conforming to a conception of justice that might already be a close fit 
to a person’s judgments; he is concerned with the case where one is presented with 
all possible descriptions to which one might plausibly conform one’s judgments, 
together with all relevant philosophical arguments for each of them. 
Rawls doubts that one might ever fully reach this state, since it would be 
impossible to study each and every possible description of justice, even if all such 
these theories were well-defined, which they are not. The best we can do, he says, is 
to study the conceptions of justice known to us through the tradition of moral 
philosophy and any further ones that occur to us, and then to consider these. This is 
what he explains he does in the case of the original position. He presents the 
persons in the position with specific instances from western philosophy and allow 
them to study each of those and their implications, thereby to come as close to a 
state of reflective equilibrium as possible. 
Justice as fairness can thus be understood as saying that the two principles of 
justice as fairness would be chosen in the original position in preference to other 
traditional conceptions of justice, for example, those of utility and perfection; and that 
these principles give a better match with our considered judgments on reflection than 
these recognized alternatives do. In short, Rawls argues that the principles of justice 
as fairness would be chosen above all others because it most closely conforms to 
our existing considered judgments concerning social justice. 
Recognising that not every individual’s considered judgments will be the same 
as every other’s, he takes for granted that the principles would be either 
approximately the same for persons in a state of reflective equilibrium, or that at 
least that their judgments will differ mainly along a few of the main lines of thought 
represented by the family of traditional doctrines he will present. 
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Rawls wishes us to view his theory of justice as a guiding framework designed 
to focus our moral sensibilities and to put before our intuitive capacities more limited 
and manageable questions for judgment (Rawls 2009, 53). Finally, he says: 
If the scheme as a whole seems on reflection to clarify and to order 
our thoughts, and if it tends to reduce disagreements and to bring 
divergent convictions more in line, then it has done all that one may 
reasonably ask. Understood as parts of a framework that does 
indeed seem to help, the numerous simplifications may be regarded 
as provisionally justified. 
5.3. The Moral Point of View 
As we saw at the start of this chapter, Rawls’ overriding purpose in 
constructing his theory of justice was to present a moral alternative to the teleological 
theories in vogue at the time of his writing. The people in the original position are 
thus placed therein with the specific intent of establishing and promoting the moral 
character of the project they are embarked upon. Rawls states (Rawls 2009, 19) that 
the purpose of the special conditions pertaining to the people in the original position 
is to represent equality between human beings as moral persons, as creatures 
having a conception of their good and capable of a sense of justice. The basis of 
equality is taken to be similarity in these two respects. 
When parties to the contract are described as ‘moral’ persons it is not 
intended to suggest that they are morally good or pure. ‘Moral persons’ is an 18th 
century term that means they are capable of being rational in that they have 
capacities to form, revise and pursue a conception of the good; and also that they 
are capable of being reasonable in that they have a moral capacity for a sense of 
justice – to understand, apply and act upon principles of justice and their 
requirements (Freeman 2012, 4). 
But the idea of the moral point of view goes back to Hume’s account of the 
‘judicious spectator.’ Hume sought to explain how moral judgments of approval and 
disapproval are possible given that people normally are focused on achieving their 
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particular interests. He conjectured that in making moral judgments individuals 
abstract in imagination from their own particular interests and adopt an impartial 
point of view from which they assess the effects of others' actions on the interests of 
everyone affected. Since we all can adopt this perspective in imagination, it accounts 
for our agreement (when we do) in moral judgments (Rawls 2000, Locations 1223-
1236), for they too may be founded not only on moral sentiments we do have (by 
actually taking up the judicious spectator's point of view), but also on sentiments we 
know we would have were we to take up that point of view. 
Later philosophers took up a similar moral point of view, but used it as a basis 
from which to assess and justify moral rules rather than mainly trying to explain how 
they come about. Primary examples of the moral point of view are to be found in 
Rousseau’s general Will, Adam Smith’s impartial spectator and Kant’s categorical 
imperative. It finds expression in Rawls as the conditions of the original position. 
It is important to consider the major elements of the contract in order to reach 
a clearer understanding of what it fundamentally involves, but before that can be 
discussed it will be necessary to interrogate Rawls’s reasoning leading to the two 
principles of justice. 
5.4. The Maximin Rule 
The purpose of the parties in the original position is to decide the basic 
principles of justice that is to govern their society in perpetuity. This is not achieved 
through a debate on all the possible principles of social justice, but on the basis of 
choosing between certain traditional theories of justice (Rawls 2009, 122 ff.) a list of 
which are to be presented to the parties. When all parties agree on the principles, 
the contract can be regarded as concluded. 
Rawls proposes that the parties will make their decision by making a series of 
comparisons in pairs. The two principles would then be accepted once all agree that 
they are to be chosen over each of the other alternatives. Although he grants that 
this procedure might not be ideal, Rawls suggests that “as we run through these 
comparisons, the reasoning of the parties singles out certain features of the basic 
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structure as desirable, and that these features have natural maximum and minimum 
properties” (Rawls 2009, 123). 
Rawls argues that the parties in the original position start off with the general 
conception of justice as fairness that all primary social goods be distributed equally 
unless an unequal distribution would be to everyone’s advantage (Rawls 2009, 150). 
The parties will thus accept an equal distribution of social goods. But, Rawls argues, 
if there are inequalities in the basic structure that work to make everyone better off 
than the benchmark of equality, why should they not be permitted? This, he says, 
leads to the conclusion that the two principles are at least a plausible conception of 
justice. 
Rawls then embarks on a consideration of how to find decisive arguments in 
favour of the two principles in the original position, when the circumstance of the veil 
of secrecy would occlude the knowledge necessary to test them against our 
considered judgment of justice. In reply to this question, he proposes (Rawls 2009, 
152) that “it is useful as a heuristic device to think of the two principles as the 
maximin solution to the problem of social justice. There is an analogy between the 
two principles and the maximin rule for choice under uncertainty.”1 
The maximin rule provides that in making decisions, we should rank 
alternatives by their worst possible outcomes; we should then adopt the alternative 
of which the worst outcome is superior to the worst outcomes of the other 
alternatives. This conservative modus operandi is justified, Rawls argues, because 
the parties will surely be considerably risk averse under the uncertainties of the 
original position and this risk aversion favours the selection of the two principles 
(Rawls 1974, 143). Although the parties do not work from the assumption that the 
worst is what will be the outcome, but their risk aversion might force the parties to 
protect themselves against such a contingency, resulting in the choice of the two 
principles, and this demonstrates the sense in which this conception of social justice 
is the maximin solution. 
                                            
1 To explain the maximin rule, Rawls refers to the following authorities: 
(Baumol 1965, Ch. 24), and (Luce 1957, Ch. XIII). 
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Thus, the two principles will be chosen in the original position because they 
embody the maximin solution to the choices having to be made. Rawls obviously 
assumes that the parties know and accept the maximin rule of choice, or that they 
would intuitively adopt it in choosing between the available alternatives. The original 
position, Rawls suggests, “has been defined so that it is a situation in which the 
maximin rule applies” (Rawls 2009, 155). 
5.5. The Idea of a Contract 
The use of the term ‘contract’ already necessarily implies certain basic 
concepts related to a moral point of view. It implies the coming together of people, 
the contractants or parties to the contract, who then reach agreement on, or consent 
to the subject matter of the agreement, with the purpose of being held bound by the 
agreed terms and conditions for a particular length of time, which may include an 
agreement that it lasts for an indefinite period. For a legitimate, binding contract to 
come into being, there needs to be agreement on all the terms, conditions and 
elements of the agreement. In civil contract law this condition is described as a 
‘meeting of the minds.’ Any confusion, misdirection or ambiguity may thus vitiate a 
putative agreement on the basis that there was no real meeting of the minds, despite 
the outward appearance of an agreement. 
But historically speaking, the idea of a social contract had a more limited role 
than Rawls assigns to it. In Hobbes and Locke, the social contract serves as an 
argument for the legitimacy of political authority. Hobbes argues that in a pre-social 
state of nature it would be rational for all to agree to authorize one person to exercise 
the absolute political power needed to enforce norms necessary for social 
cooperation. Contrariwise, “Locke argued against absolute monarchy by contending 
that no existing political constitution is legitimate unless it could be contracted into 
without violating any natural rights or duties from a position of equal right and equal 
political jurisdiction within a (relatively peaceful) state of nature” (Freeman 2012). 
Rawls on the other hand seeks agreement on the principles of justice originating in a 
situation that represents the predominantly social bases of justice. 
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Rawls asserts that whatever our natural or human rights and duties may be, 
they do not provide an adequate basis for ascertaining the rights and duties of justice 
that we owe one another as members of the same ongoing political society. It is in 
large part due to “the profoundly social nature of human relationships” (Rawls 2011, 
259) that Rawls sees political and economic justice as grounded in social 
cooperation and its reciprocity. For this reason, he steers clear of the idea of a state 
of nature wherein pre-social but fully rational individuals agree to cooperative norms 
(as in Hobbesian views), or where pre-political persons with antecedent natural 
rights agree on the form of a political constitution (as in Locke). For Rawls, the state 
of nature is without moral significance – it is not a state wherein human beings can 
be contemplated, since humans were social beings before they were human. 
5.6. The Parties – Rationality and Reason 
It is Locke’s emphasis on the equality of people that attracts Rawls to the 
Lockean position. He says that: 
it is clear that all the transformations from the state of nature to 
civil society that Locke approves of satisfy this condition of an 
equality of rights. And they are such that rational men concerned 
to advance their ends could consent to them in a state of equality. 
For the role of equal rights in Locke is precisely to ensure that the 
only permissible departures from the state of nature are those 
which respect these rights and serve the common interest (Rawls 
2009, 33). 
But on the related issue of the suffrage in the political society so created, 
Rawls is critical of Locke. He argues that Locke assumes that not all members of 
society, following the social compact, have equal political rights: citizens have the 
right to vote by owning property, so that the propertyless have no vote and no right to 
exercise political authority (Rawls 2011, 287). 
Rawls views this as an inconsistency in Locke, for if the situation of the 
contracting parties with respect to one another suitably represents their freedom and 
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equality in the state of nature, and also that (as Locke holds) God has not conferred 
on anyone the right to exercise political authority, they will presumably acknowledge 
principles that assure equal basic (including political) rights for all throughout the 
later historical process (Rawls 2011, 287-289). Thus, according to Rawls, one 
cannot accept that free and equal people will agree to being less than free and equal 
in the civil society they are agreeing to set up. 
The two closely related philosophies of J. J. Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, 
bring yet other perspectives to the contract. Kant is especially important in the 
modern and Rawlsian context. Rawls himself claims that his theory is basically a 
fleshing out of the philosophy of Kant and states very directly that his theory is highly 
Kantian in nature (Rawls 2009, 147). Indeed, he disclaims any originality for the 
views he puts forward, stating that the leading ideas found in his theory are classical 
and well known. 
Kant, for his part (Hassner 2012), repeatedly acknowledges Rousseau’s 
decisive influence on his political and moral doctrines. The priority of the practical 
over the theoretical, of the moral over the intellectual, the superiority to the scientists 
or philosophers as such of simple souls obedient to the voice of duty, all proceed 
from the Rousseau of the First Discourse and of the Profession of Faith of the 
Savoyard Vicar, just as the notions of liberty as obedience to self-prescribed law and 
of the generalization of particular desires as guaranteeing their legality are taken 
ultimately from the teaching of Rousseau in the Social Contract. Finally, Kant’s 
philosophy of history is oriented explicitly upon Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origin 
of Inequality. 
Kant encompasses all these traditions. According to Hassner (Hassner 2012, 
12094-12098), Kant conceives the constitution of civil society as based on a 
hypothetical original contract by which individuals join together to establish a 
collective will to whose representative they delegate their separate powers of mutual 
constraint. As in Hobbes, only the chief of state may constrain others without being 
himself subject to constraint; but as in Rousseau, each person, because she is 
joined to all, obeys only herself: The general will, both source and product of the 
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original contract, is sole sovereign and legislator, but with the understanding that the 
body of citizens is itself that sovereign. Consequently, civil society is an embodiment 
of a general will, which like Rousseau’s, is not the same thing as the will of all. There 
is frequently much difference between the will of all and the general will, Rousseau 
maintains. The latter regards only the common interest; the former regards private 
interest, and is indeed but a sum of private wills (Rousseau 2010, 838-839). 
Thus, the parties to the contract, hypothetical as it may be, are for Kant as for 
Rousseau, all the individuals who join the common enterprise of society. This is also 
the initial position of Rawls when he says that “in choosing between the principles to 
be adopted, each participant tries as best he can to advance his own interests” 
(Rawls 2009, 142). However, in a later development of his theory, he regards the 
people in the original position as trustees, or representatives of other individuals’ 
interests, who seek to do as best they can for the particular individuals that each of 
them represents. The parties, he argues, are “symmetrically situated in the original 
position so they are to be seen as representatives of free and equal citizens who are 
to reach an agreement under conditions that are fair” (Rawls 2011, 24). 
Rawls explains that the original position is merely an analytical device used to 
formulate a conjecture. The conjecture is that when we ask—“What are the most 
reasonable principles of political justice for a constitutional democracy whose 
citizens are seen as free and equal, reasonable and rational? — the answer is that 
these principles are given by a device of representation in which rational parties (as 
trustees of citizens, one for each) are situated in reasonable conditions and 
constrained by these conditions absolutely” (Rawls 2011, 381). Thus, free and equal 
citizens are envisaged as themselves reaching agreement about these political 
principles under conditions that represent those citizens as both reasonable and 
rational. He uses the ordinary social definition of ‘rational’ as a consistent 
assumption about the parties. Thus in the usual way, a rational person is thought to 
have a coherent set of preferences between the options open to him. He ranks these 
options according to how well they further his purposes; he follows the plan which 
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will satisfy more of his desires rather than less, and which has the greater chance of 
being successfully executed (Rawls 2009, 143). 
But the assumption of rationality that Rawls makes also says that the parties 
have a capacity for justice. This is meant in a purely formal sense: taking everything 
relevant into account, including the general facts of moral psychology, the parties will 
adhere to the principles eventually chosen. They are rational in that they will not 
enter agreements they know they cannot keep, or can do so only with great difficulty 
(Rawls 2009, 145). He in effect does away with the ‘state of nature’ and introduces 
the hypothetical original position with parties duly circumscribed in its stead. 
However, Rawls constrains the rationality of the participants with a special 
exception to the ordinary meaning of rational. He rules, using a special assumption, 
that a rational individual does not suffer from envy; he is not willing to accept a loss 
for himself if only others have less as well. One reason Rawls advances for this 
special assumption is that envy tends to make everyone worse off. In this sense, it is 
collectively disadvantageous; it is a disruptive attitude in his view. His assessment is 
that a true conception of justice will eliminate conditions that give rise to disruptive 
attitudes. Society and its conception of justice will therefore be inherently stable. 
The constraints of the veil of ignorance and rationality can be seen to present 
a problem for Rawls, since the veil of ignorance is supposed to hide from the parties 
in the original position their own conception of the good, and the good is the 
satisfaction of rational desire. It follows that they are each unaware of their rational 
desires. But Rawls insists that the veil of ignorance allows the participants to know 
that they actually do have some rational plan of life, they only do not know the plan 
details, nor the particular ends and interests which the plan is calculated to promote. 
Rawls anticipates the problem of choice under these circumstances through the 
introduction of the idea of ‘primary social goods.’ These are ‘goods’ like rights and 
liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth (Rawls 2009, 92). His 
assumption is that these goods are the things which a rational person would always 
prefer more of rather than less, regardless of what the individual’s detailed rational 
plans may be. 
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We thus have in Rawls a refined culmination of the contract tradition. Like 
Hobbes, Rousseau and Kant, he envisages participation by all the persons who will 
form the society, by representation. The participants are assumed to be rational, free 
and equal moral persons, capable of a sense of justice, all present at the same time. 
The idea is to use the original position to model both freedom and equality and 
restrictions on reasons in such a way that it becomes perfectly evident which 
agreement would be made by the parties as citizens’ representatives (Rawls 2011, 
26). 
Rawls says that as a device of representation, the idea of the original position 
serves as a means of public reflection and self-clarification. It helps us work out what 
we now think, once we can take a clear and uncluttered view of what justice requires 
when society is conceived as a scheme of cooperation between free and equal 
citizens from one generation to the next. It is not designed to reflect a bargaining 
situation or a situation which will give rise to a legally or morally binding agreement 
between the parties. As Freeman explains (Freeman 2012): “the hypothetical 
agreement in the original position does not then bind anyone to duties or 
commitments he/she does not already have.” The point rather of conjecturing the 
outcome of a hypothetical agreement is that, assuming that the premises underlying 
the original position correctly represent our most deeply held considered moral 
convictions, then we are committed to endorsing the resulting principles and duties 
whether or not we actually accept or agree to them. Not to do so implies a failure to 
live up to the consequences of our own moral convictions about justice. 
5.7. Consent, Agreement and Justification 
D’Agostina et al suggest (D'Agostina 2014) that the traditional social contract 
views of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau crucially rely on the idea of consent and they 
identify the element of consent as central to the contract tradition. Hobbes and Locke 
hold that the social contract is binding on each individual because they each 
consented to it originally. As Hobbes states (Hobbes 2012, 1417-1418): “… when a 
covenant is made, then to break it is unjust and the definition of injustice is no other 
than the not performance of covenant. And whatsoever is not unjust is just.” Thus, it 
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is necessarily implied that the parties have the basic normative power to irreversibly 
bind themselves in contract, and the upshot of the social contract was therefore 
obligation – the obligation to obey the law and the authorities so instituted. 
However, according to James Buchanan (Buchanan 1965b), the key 
development of recent social contract theory has been to distinguish the question of 
what generates political obligation from the question of what constitutional orders or 
social institutions are mutually beneficial and stable over time. Rawls states his 
position as being that even though, in justice as fairness, the principles of natural 
duty are derived from a contractarian point of view, they do not presuppose an act of 
consent, express or tacit, or indeed any voluntary act, for them to apply. The 
principles that hold for individuals, just as the principles for institutions, are those that 
would be acknowledged in the original position, not those that were in fact 
acknowledged (Rawls 2009, 115). 
These principles are understood as the outcome of a hypothetical agreement. 
If their formulation shows that no binding action, consensual or otherwise, is a 
presupposition of their application, then they apply unconditionally. In effect, then, 
the obligation or duty to abide by the law and the political constitution does not arise 
from agreement, it arises from natural duty, given a just or reasonably just basic 
structure. As Rawls concludes, if the basic structure of society is just, or as just as it 
is reasonable to expect in the circumstances, everyone has a natural duty to do his 
part in the existing scheme. Each is bound to these institutions independent of his 
voluntary acts, performative or otherwise. Modern social contract theory has thus 
moved away from political obligation at centre stage to that of public justification. 
This move away from obligation rests on a reinterpretation of the idea of 
agreement in contract. One can endorse or agree to a principle without that act of 
endorsement in any way binding one to obey. Social contract theorists as diverse as 
Freeman and Jan Narveson (Narveson 1988, 148) see the act of agreement as 
indicating what reasons we have to agree. The “role of unanimous collective 
agreement” is in showing “what we have reasons to do in our social and political 
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relations” (Freeman 2007a, 19). If individuals are rational, what they agree to reflects 
the reasons they have. 
In contemporary contract theories, such as Rawls's, the problem of 
justification, rather than consent, thus takes centre stage. Rawls's revival of social 
contract theory in A Theory of Justice thus did not base obligations on consent, 
though the apparatus of an “original agreement” persisted. What Rawls says is that 
one conception of justice can be seen as more reasonable than another, or 
justifiable with respect to it, if rational persons in the initial situation would choose its 
principles over those of the other for the role of justice (Rawls 2009, 17). Thus, it 
means that persons in the original position would be required to justify different 
conceptions of justice comparatively, and then rank them accordingly. Eventually the 
question of justification is thus settled by working out a problem of deliberation: we 
must ascertain which principles it would be rational to adopt given the contractual 
situation. 
Consequently, D’Agostino et al., following Rawls, argue that in contemporary 
moral and political theory the social contract is an attempt to solve a justificatory 
problem by converting it to a deliberative problem. At its heart is the “question of 
justification.” But Rawls, in reply to Habermas, published in Finlayson et al, identifies 
justification to be of three kinds, in the following order: first, pro tanto justification of 
the political conception; second, full justification of that conception by an individual 
person in society; and, finally, public justification of the political conception by 
political society. Rawls explains what he means by these justifications by saying: 
In public reason the justification of the political conception takes 
into account only political values, and I assume that a political 
conception properly laid out is complete (PL 2011, 221, 241). 
That is, the political values specified by it can be suitably ordered, 
or balanced, so that those values alone give a reasonable answer 
by public reason to all, or nearly all, questions concerning 
constitutional essentials and basic justice. That is the meaning of 
pro tanto justification. But since political justification is pro tanto, it 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 43 
 
may be overridden by citizens’ comprehensive doctrines once all 
values are tallied up (Finlayson 2012, 56). 
In the second case, being that of full justification, Rawls explains that it must 
be assumed that each citizen has his own political conception of justice and in one 
way or another embeds its justification into his own comprehensive doctrine as being 
either true or merely reasonable. Not all citizens are bound to accept the political 
conception of justice to be fully justified, but he argues that non-endorsement by 
others is not sufficient to suspend full justification for ourselves. 
Consequently, each citizen, individually or with others, must decide how the 
claims of political justice are to be ordered, or weighed, against non-political values. 
The political conception itself can give little guidance on such questions, as it does 
not prescribe how non-political values are to be weighed against political values. In 
this matter citizens must be guided by the precepts of their own comprehensive 
doctrines. 
Third and last, Rawls explains public justification. That is justification by 
political society and he holds that it is a basic idea of political liberalism. It works 
synchronously with three other ideas: that of a reasonable overlapping consensus, 
social stability and legitimacy. 
Public justification happens when all the reasonable members of 
political society carry out a justification of the shared political 
conception by embedding it in their several reasonable 
comprehensive views. This is the basic case of public 
justification. It is one in which the shared political conception is 
the common ground of the citizenry and all reasonable citizens 
taken collectively (but not acting as a corporate body) are in 
general and wide reflective equilibrium in affirming the political 
conception based on their several reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines. Only when there is such a reasonable overlapping 
consensus can political society’s political conception of justice be 
publicly, though never finally, justified (Finlayson 2012, 56-60). 
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Thus, without a reasonable overlapping consensus there is no public 
justification for political society, and such a justification also connects with the ideas 
of stability for the right reasons as well as of legitimacy. This raises the question of 
what is meant by an overlapping consensus. 
Rawls, in his reply to Habermas, asks us to consider the political sociology of 
a reasonable overlapping consensus: since there are far fewer doctrines than 
citizens, the latter may be grouped according to the doctrine they hold. More 
important than the simplification allowed by this numerical fact, is that citizens are 
members of various associations into which, in many cases, they are born, and from 
which they usually, though not always, acquire their comprehensive doctrines. The 
doctrines that different associations hold and propagate — as examples, think of 
religious associations of all kinds—play a basic social role in making public 
justification possible. 
As stated earlier, Rawls holds that democratic society is marked by 
reasonable pluralism.  Thus, it is also part of public justification to show that stability 
for the right reasons is at least possible under this condition. The reason is that when 
citizens affirm reasonable, though different comprehensive doctrines, seeing whether 
an overlapping consensus on the political conception is possible is a way of checking 
whether there are sufficient reasons for proposing justice as fairness (or some other 
reasonable doctrine) which can be sincerely defended before others without 
criticizing or rejecting their deepest religious and philosophical commitments. 
If we can make the case that there are adequate reasons for diverse 
reasonable people jointly to affirm justice as fairness as their working political 
conception, then the conditions for their legitimately exercising coercive political 
power over one another— something we inevitably do as citizens by voting, if in no 
other way— are satisfied (cf. Rawls 2011, 136 ff.). The argument, if successful, 
would show how we can reasonably affirm and appeal to a political conception of 
justice as citizens’ shared basis of reasons, all the while supposing that others, no 
less reasonable than we, may also affirm and recognize that same basis. 
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Consequently, it can then be concluded that despite the fact of reasonable pluralism, 
the conditions for democratic legitimacy are fulfilled. 
The legitimacy of a democratic regime can thus be said to be established 
when there is a publicly shared working political conception, despite the fact that 
people within that democracy hold different religious and philosophical views. 
However, this is not to be confused with finding a compromise between people’s 
views so as to establish that conception. For to justify a Kantian conception of justice 
within a democratic society it is not sufficient merely to reason correctly from given 
premises, or even from publicly shared and mutually recognized premises (Rawls 
1980, 517). The real task is to discover and formulate the deeper bases of 
agreement which one hopes are embedded in common sense, or even to originate 
and fashion starting points for common understanding by expressing in a new form 
the convictions found in the historical traditions by connecting them with a wide 
range of people's considered convictions: those which stand up to critical reflection. 
5.8. A Well-Ordered Society 
The idea of a well-ordered society is closely connected to the above 
discussion; which idea I shall now explore in some greater detail. A well-ordered 
society is how Rawls views the just society that is founded on the principles of justice 
as fairness, and it is also part of the notion of procedural justice that underlies his 
project – the parties are choosing principles of justice for a well-ordered society. It is 
his development of social contract doctrine to explain the stability of the just society. 
It starts off as a society built on just institutions, but how do the citizens enforce 
compliance on a sustainable basis, since the perfect original position does not 
endure after the first agreement where after normal political and legislative activity 
commences? 
To reiterate: a well-ordered society is one “in which (1) everyone agrees to 
and accepts the same principles of justice; (2) these principles are generally realized 
in basic social institutions and are successfully enforced; and (3) all want to comply 
with their requirements out of their sense of justice (Rawls 2011, 35). Rawls admits 
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that this is a highly idealised concept. Nevertheless, “one may think of a public 
conception of justice as constituting the fundamental charter of a well-ordered 
human association” in perpetuity (Rawls 2009, 5). A well-ordered society is “one that 
is effectively regulated by a publicly shared conception of justice and there is a public 
understanding as to what is just and what is unjust” (Rawls 2009, 56). This is the 
view Rawls argues for in TOJ. 
However, in a later development Rawls amends this view. In ‘Political 
Liberalism’ he says that he has had to reappraise his earlier views as a serious 
problem became obvious (Rawls 2011, 163). The serious problem he refers to 
concerned the unrealistic idea of a well-ordered society as it appears in TOJ. Rawls 
explains that an essential feature of a well-ordered society associated with justice as 
fairness is that all its citizens endorse this conception on the basis of what he now 
calls a comprehensive philosophical doctrine. They accept, as rooted in this doctrine, 
its two principles of justice. Similarly, in the well-ordered society associated with 
utilitarianism citizens generally endorse that view as a comprehensive philosophical 
doctrine and they accept the principle of utility on that basis. Although the distinction 
between a political conception of justice and a comprehensive philosophical doctrine 
is not discussed in TOJ, once the question is raised, Rawls opines that it is clear 
“that the text (of TOJ) regards both justice as fairness and utilitarianism as 
comprehensive, or at least partially comprehensive doctrines” (TOJ 162). 
The serious problem thus turns out to be that, in Rawls’s later view,  
[a] modern democratic society is characterized not simply by a 
pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral 
doctrines, but by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines. Not one of these doctrines is affirmed 
by citizens generally. Nor should one expect that in the 
foreseeable future one of them, or some other reasonable 
doctrine, will ever be affirmed by all, or nearly all, citizens 
(PL171).  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 47 
 
Consequently, Rawls argues that “the fact of a plurality of reasonable but 
incompatible comprehensive doctrines—the fact of reasonable pluralism—shows 
that, as used in TOJ, the idea of a well-ordered society of justice as fairness is 
unrealistic. This is because it is inconsistent with realizing its own principles under 
the best of foreseeable conditions” (PL 171-179).  
Rawls thus concludes that the account of the stability of a well-ordered society 
as found in the third part of TOJ, is also unrealistic and must be reconceived. 
Consequently, justice as fairness is now presented from the outset as a strictly 
political conception of justice. 
Rawls suggests that a political conception of justice differs from many moral 
doctrines such as Utilitarianism, for most are widely regarded as general and 
comprehensive views. “By contrast, a political conception tries to elaborate a 
reasonable conception for the basic structure alone and involves, so far as possible, 
no wider commitment to any other doctrine” (PL, 13ff.). The point is that the scope of 
a political conception of justice and other moral conceptions differ. A moral 
conception is general and comprehensive and includes conceptions of the value of 
human life, ideals of a personal character, friendship, et cetera. Comprehensive 
doctrines of all kinds—religious, philosophical, and moral, belong to what may be 
called the “background culture” of civil society. That is the social culture of a society, 
not the political. 
Rawls now saw his project as being limited in scope to the political. He sees 
the problem of political liberalism as being “to work out a conception of political 
justice for a constitutional democratic regime that a plurality of reasonable but 
incompatible comprehensive doctrines—always a feature of the culture of a free 
democratic regime—might endorse” (PL, 197-205). But, he adds, political liberalism 
also assumes “that a reasonable comprehensive doctrine does not reject the 
essentials of a democratic regime” (PL 169). He admits that a society may also 
contain unreasonable and irrational, and even mad, comprehensive doctrines. In that 
case the problem is to contain them within society so that they do not undermine its 
unity and justice. 
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The meaning of a ‘plurality of reasonable doctrines’, among others, is also 
canvassed in the polemic between Rawls and Habermas. The important point noted 
here is that Rawls acknowledges that in any free, democratic society there will be 
several different moral and ethical codes that people adhere to – doctrines that 
prescribe rules, norms and values that comprehensively encompass the totality of 
people’s lives. Such doctrines he refers to as comprehensive ones. He also 
acknowledges that these doctrinal theories vary from those of different religions to 
those of other philosophies of life and range from the entirely reasonable to stark 
raving mad. 
He thus concludes that any theory of justice, fit for a free and democratic 
society, must be able to accommodate the views of any number of reasonable 
doctrines. This is why he emphasises that his ‘justice as fairness’ is not a 
comprehensive theory competing with other comprehensive theories. His theory is 
limited to the political in a way that would not do violence to any particular 
reasonable comprehensive doctrine (PL). He then introduces the idea of an 
overlapping consensus. He argues that to hold out a well-ordered society as a 
possible social world, he adds to the two existing conceptions of the basic structure 
and of the original position, the ideas of an overlapping consensus and of a 
reasonable comprehensive doctrine. A plurality of reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines as discussed above, amount to what he calls Reasonable pluralism with a 
society (Rawls 2011, 43). A stable overlapping consensus of reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines, he holds, gives to social unity its very nature of stability. 
In summation Rawls holds that in the ideal case there are three sufficient, 
although not necessary, conditions for society to be a fair and stable system of 
cooperation between free and equal citizens who are yet fundamentally divided by 
the comprehensive, yet reasonable, doctrines they hold. 
• first, the basic structure of society is regulated by a political conception 
of justice; 
• second, this political conception is the focus of an overlapping 
consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines; and 
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• third, public discussion, when constitutional essentials and questions of 
basic justice are at stake, is conducted in terms of the political 
conception of justice. 
This brief outline fundamentally describes political liberalism and how the 
ideal of constitutional democracy is understood by it (PL, 44). 
6. Conclusions 
Rawls’s two fundamental works on justice consist of the original 1971 Theory 
of Justice and in 1993 Political Liberalism (PL). The two treatises do not give exactly 
the same account of the conception of justice, although Rawls claims that nothing 
substantial changed between them. Nevertheless, it is a question whether the later 
work fundamentally changed the theory expounded in the first. 
Patrick Neal (Neal 1990) expresses the perceived change in the narrative in 
TOJ and Rawls’s later works when he writes: 
As has often been remarked, A Theory of Justice had an impact 
on the Anglo-Saxon intellectual world far beyond that achieved by 
most academic books. One (certainly not the only) reason for this 
was a widespread perception that Rawls was therein attempting a 
project of heroic proportion and classical scope: articulating a 
comprehensive and universal theory of justice founded on first 
principles (Neal 1990, 24). 
Although Neal writes before the publication of PL, PL is merely a compendium 
of lectures and articles (although also including some new material) by Rawls dating 
from April 1980 to 1989, so that his comments are well informed regarding later 
developments in Rawls’s thought. He writes that the later developments of the theory 
are seen by many as a retreat from the heroic ambitions of TOJ and settled for 
“merely” “systematizing and giving expression to the dominant opinions of modern 
liberal democracy.” (Neal 1990, 24) 
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I am of the opinion, however, that the later works must be distinguished from 
TOJ by their intent. Having set out his theoretical basis in TOJ, Rawls then turns to a 
different question, namely how the principles of justice derived as suggested in TOJ, 
might gain political legitimacy in a modern democracy, which is, by the nature of 
human reason, beset by a “plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive 
doctrines” (PL 173). 
This change in intent does not fundamentally change the concept of justice as 
developed in justice as fairness. The choice made in the original position would not 
change as a result of the plurality of reasonable yet incompatible doctrines in society, 
because, in the original position, the parties are unaware of their philosophical and 
religious attachments. Rawls’s original point, namely that free and equal people 
unencumbered by the shackles of preconceived ideas, their life goals, personal 
preferences and such would still choose justice as fairness, remains intact. The three 
universal values of liberty, equality and reward for services rendered for the good of 
society, remains unaffected by the “retreat” into merely systematizing and giving 
expression to the dominant opinions of modern liberal democracy. 
Perhaps the most fitting final words on justice as fairness are contained in 
Rawls’ own summation (Rawls 2011, 9-10), when he states that the aim of justice as 
fairness is practical: it presents itself as a conception of justice that may be shared 
by citizens as a basis of a reasoned, informed, and willing political agreement. It 
expresses their shared and public political reason. But to attain such a shared 
reason, the conception of justice should be, as far as possible, independent of the 
opposing and conflicting philosophical and religious doctrines that citizens affirm. In 
formulating such a conception, political liberalism applies the principle of toleration to 
philosophy itself. 
The social contract tradition as a whole is a move away from the religious 
doctrines that in previous centuries were the professed basis of society. It represents 
an early modern secularisation of political philosophy. It is certainly not the only one, 
since Utilitarianism, Intuitionism and later moral theories also followed the trend of 
secularisation. What the social contract approach exemplifies in its tradition is a 
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constant move away from religious doctrine to principles of constitutional 
government that all citizens, whatever their religious view, can endorse. Despite 
Locke’s religious outlook, his purpose still was to ground civil society on the consent 
of the governed, not the dictates of the Christian religion he avowed. 
Rawls concludes that, given the move to secularisation over time, none of the 
comprehensive philosophical and moral doctrines can today be endorsed by citizens 
generally, and thus these doctrines also no longer can, if they ever could, serve as 
the professed basis of society. Thus, political liberalism looks for a political 
conception of justice that it hopes can gain the support of an overlapping consensus 
of reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines in a society regulated by 
it. 
Of course, the Rawlsian project has elicited much criticism, critique and 
debate. Not all of what has been said for and against the Rawlsian approach and its 
conclusions is relevant to my present project. In the following chapter, some of the 
basic objections and critiques that have been made by prominent theorists will be 
considered insofar as they may be relevant to the present project and contribute to 
an understanding of the evolutionary psychology approach, which will be further 
developed in Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Critiques and Criticisms of Rawls 
 The just, then, is the lawful and the fair, the unjust the unlawful and 
the unfair.      (Aristotle 2012 [350 BC], 47) 
1. Introduction 
The idea of justice linked to fairness has ancient roots. But Rawls gave new 
meaning to, and a new perspective on, the link between the two ideas. It is not 
surprising that when a major intellectual contribution like justice as fairness is 
introduced into settled, generally placid academic waters such as those of social 
justice at the time, it shook the foundations of everybody’s comfort zone, and a lot of 
controversy resulted. So it has been with John Rawls. There is a surfeit of literature 
on Rawls’s work, some supportive and others critical, on virtually every aspect of his 
project to the extent that a lot more has probably been written about justice as 
fairness by others than what was actually written by Rawls himself. 
In this chapter, I will examine some of the more prominent critiques of Rawls’s 
justice as fairness. It is my intention to deal with the critiques on a thematic basis 
rather than chronologically or in any other order. It is after all the themes that Rawls 
raises, such as dealing with the priority of the right, the idea of contract, the original 
position, the veil of ignorance and reflective equilibrium that make his contribution so 
unique. 
As it is impossible to deal comprehensively with any of the issues, I am forced 
to select the critiques that I view as seminal, given the general purpose and scope of 
my own project, to focus on such as will allow me to eventually place an evolutionary 
approach to the question of social justice into some relational perspective to Rawls’s 
theory of justice. 
Of all the great number of possible critiques to discuss, I have chosen those 
of Hayek, Sandel and Habermas. Hayek objects to the very idea of social and 
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distributive justice. I regard his work as seminal of those opposed to the idea of 
social justice. I deal with it since, if valid objections exist against the idea of 
distributive justice, then such objections must be dealt with, or the project 
abandoned. Hayek, as a very prominent and acclaimed academic of the recent past, 
is in my view, the most eminent neoliberal, free market detractor of the idea of social 
justice. We are still living in a neoliberal world where free market ideas seem 
dominant, therefore I regard his critique as essential to deal with for the purposes of 
my project. 
Michael Sandel is, on the other hand, a supporter of the idea of social justice, 
but from a different angle to that of Rawls. Sandel critiques Rawls’s deontological 
approach and supports a teleological one. Although I do not find myself in agreement 
with Sandel’s philosophy on the whole, I believe his criticism of Rawls’s deontology 
is seminal, being based on valid arguments and considerations that speak to my 
project being one based on teleology as well. 
Jürgen Habermas’s contribution is seminal to the question of Rawls’s use of 
reflective equilibrium in the discussion of a well-ordered society. The EP approach 
also develops the idea of a well-ordered society, but bereft of any reflective 
equilibrium. Habermas criticises Rawls’s use of reflective equilibrium where he tries 
to use it as a tool to instil the two principles of justice as fairness into a non-
democratic society. Habermas rejects the idea. It is only required because Rawls 
relies on universal agreement as the basis of his society. The EP approach does not 
rely on universal agreement, but relies instead, on the understandings of justice 
embedded in the psyche of the human mind.  
2. The Notion of Social Justice 
There have been a number of criticisms levelled at the very idea of social 
justice. Hayek particularly has ridiculed, disdained and vilified it. Strangely enough, 
he has also expressed some admiration for Rawls. In this section I investigate the 
critique of Hayek against the idea of social justice to understand what his basic 
objection might be and how that might impact on Rawls and on my own project. 
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The Rawlsian project rests completely on the foundation of society being a 
cooperative system with a primary role for justice in the basic structure of society 
(Rawls 2009, 3).  The principles of social justice, Rawls holds, provide a way of 
assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of society and they define the 
appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation (Rawls 
2009, 4). 
Hayek (Hayek 1982) is fundamentally opposed to the very idea of social -- 
particularly distributary -- justice. He thus seems to place himself thoroughly at odds 
with the Rawlsian project: Dealing with the very general modern acceptance of the 
general idea of social justice, he holds forth that the mere fact that the idea of social 
justice is so widely discussed and accepted obviously does not validate it. Not only 
does he view the notion of social justice as a quasi-religious superstition, he regards 
it as a grave threat to the other values of a free civilisation (Hayek, 1982, 230). 
The philosophical view Hayek takes of justice is based on the premise that 
only human conduct can be called just or unjust (Hayek 1982, 198), not a situation 
that results through no fault of any person or persons. A state of affairs, he thus 
argues, can only be called just or unjust if we can hold someone responsible for 
bringing it about or allowing it to come about in contravention of some predefined 
rule of conduct (Hayek 1982, 199). He maintains that a bare fact, or a state of affairs 
which nobody can change, may be good or bad, but not just or unjust. Consequently, 
nature cannot be just or unjust, nor can a “spontaneous order,” that is not brought 
about by design. 
His main contention is that the free market system is a spontaneous order, in 
that nobody designed it, or brought it about in its fullest extent. It was a system, he 
says, that arose spontaneously among “free [people]” (Hayek 1982, 267- 290) The 
results of a distribution made by the free market is therefore beyond just or unjust. It 
cannot be just or unjust; it is entirely impersonal. 
Hayek is of course a great proponent and defender of the free market system. 
His ire is seemingly directed at social justice mainly because he sees it as negating 
the outcomes of a free market system and equates it fundamentally with socialism, 
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which he condemns cf. (Hayek 1991). He says that it has been the great merit of the 
market system over the last two centuries that it has done away with the arbitrary 
political power of rulers to decide who gets what. This he esteems as the greatest 
reduction in arbitrary power in modern history. 
But now, this greatest triumph of personal freedom, he argues, is at risk to the 
seduction of “social justice,” which notion again threatens to take that freedom away 
from us. And, he adds, it will not be long before the holders of the power to enforce 
‘social justice’ will entrench themselves in their position by awarding the benefits of 
‘social justice’ to those whose efforts resulted in the conferment of that power on 
them to keep those king makers as a loyal praetorian guard which will make it certain 
that their view of “social justice” will prevail (Hayek 1982, 260-261). 
Despite these dire warnings, Hayek acknowledges Rawls’s theory, and grants 
that problems of justice do exist in the design of political institutions, although he 
does not agree that these problems should be classed as problems of social justice. 
But, referring to Rawls, he says: 
I have no basic quarrel with an author who, before he proceeds to that 
problem [of social justice], acknowledges that the task of selecting 
specific systems, or distributions of desired things, as just must be 
‘abandoned as mistaken in principle, and it is, in any case, not capable 
of a definite answer (Hayek 1982, 260-261). Rather, the principles of 
justice define the crucial constraints which institutions and joint activities 
must satisfy if persons engaging in them are to have no complaints 
against them. If these constraints are satisfied, the resulting distribution, 
whatever it is, may be accepted as just (or at least not unjust).’2 
Hayek says that this quote from Rawls conveys essentially (more or less) 
what he is trying to argue. But after careful consideration he decided not to continue 
with a full scale discussion of Rawls’s Theory of Justice, since he had come to the 
                                            
2 He is quoting John Rawls, ‘Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of Justice’, (Rawls 1963, 
102), where the passage referred to by Hayek is preceded by Rawls’s statement that “It is the system 
of institutions which has to be judged and judged from a general point of view.” 
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conclusion that what he might have to say about it would not assist in the pursuit of 
his immediate object, because the differences between them seemed to him to be 
more verbal than substantial and that Rawls and he agree on "the essential point," 
which appears to be that principles of justice apply to the deliberately designed rules 
of institutions and social practices (Hayek 1982, 261), but not to distributions of 
particular things across specific persons – cf. (Hayek 1982, 233) and (Lister 2011, 
3)). 
Lister (Lister 2011) argues that despite Hayek’s vituperative attacks on the 
idea of social justice, he is in fact a closet Rawlsian/egalitarian liberal who reaches 
inegalitarian conclusions only via equivocation and implausible empirical claims. This 
is a surprising, but important argument.  
Lister makes the argument that at the normative level, Hayek is in many ways 
a Rawlsian. It has been noticed in the past that there is an odd proximity between 
Rawls and Hayek. Hayek has, for example, been attacked from both the left and the 
right, while in the middle some have held out hope for a ‘Rawlsekian’ synthesis 
(Lister 2011, 4).  
Lister then argues that Hayek’s conceptual claims are irrelevant to his 
conclusions. He says that Hayek’s fundamental claim is not conceptual. His 
fundamental claim is that social justice is trumped by other values. If we understand 
Hayek’s concept of social, or distributive justice, we see that his critique of social or 
distributive justice has a very narrow target. His claim is that in the spontaneous 
order of a market society it is impossible to ensure distribution according to any 
individualistic pattern of merit or deservingness (Hayek 1982, 501 ff). This accords 
with Rawls’s position that distributions ought not to be done on some form of merit 
(Rawls 2009, 100). 
Hayek’s attack on the idea of social justice is really no more than a defence of 
the free market as he sees it – being, for him, the embodiment of all the highest 
moral norms and values acquired by human beings. Nevertheless, he is not that far 
removed from the idea of distributive justice since he admits that 
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There is no reason why in a free society government should not assure 
to all protection against severe deprivation in the form of an assured 
minimum income, or a floor below which nobody need to descend. To 
enter into such an insurance against extreme misfortune may well be in 
the interest of all; or it may be felt to be a clear moral duty of all to assist, 
within the organized community, those who cannot help themselves. So 
long as such a uniform minimum income is provided outside the market 
to all those who, for any reason, are unable to earn in the market an 
adequate maintenance, this need not lead to a restriction of freedom, or 
conflict with the Rule of Law (Hayek 1982, 249). 
But to this admission he adds the rider that he is here dealing with the 
situation that arises only when the remuneration of workers is fixed by authority, and 
the “impersonal mechanism of the market which guides the direction of individual 
efforts is thus suspended.” 
Implicit in this argument, thus, is that if the market is allowed to act freely, its 
outcomes will always ensure that there is no deprivation or extreme misfortune to 
any individual. This is surely a contentious claim, but the admission does allow one 
to speculate that he is not immune to notions of social justice. Furthermore, he also 
supports the device of social justice that is government funding for schooling (Hayek 
1982, 247). 
As far as equality of opportunity is concerned, Hayek makes a further 
concession to government intervention. He says: 
It is of course not to be denied that in the existing market order not only 
the results but also the initial chances of different individuals are often 
very different; they are affected by circumstances of their physical and 
social environment which are beyond their control but in many particular 
respects might be altered by some governmental action. The demand 
for equality of opportunity or equal starting conditions 
(Startgerechtigkeit) appeals to, and has been supported by many who in 
general favour the free market order. 
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So far as [equality of opportunity] refers to such facilities and 
opportunities as are of necessity affected by governmental decisions 
(such as appointments to public office and the like), the demand was 
indeed one of the central points of classical liberalism, usually 
expressed by the French phrase ‘la carrière ouverte aux talents’ (Hayek 
1982, 246). 
These concessions seem to indicate a strong congruence with Rawls, but 
certainly not an equivalence, since Rawls’s difference principle holds (Rawls 2011, 
291) that “social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. First, they 
must be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality 
of opportunity; and second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged members of society.” Hayek thus seems to agree with the point 
regarding offices and positions being open to all equally as part of government action 
to create equality of opportunity. But whether he would agree that all inequality 
should benefit the least advantaged is doubtful, although the difference principle 
does not fall foul of Hayek’s critique of distribution based on desert, because the 
difference principle is intended to benefit the least advantaged, not the most 
deserving. 
Despite initial appearances, therefore, Hayek and Rawls appear indeed to 
agree on many fundamental points regarding social justice.  However, these 
appearances of congruence may be only superficial.  Lister (Lister 2011, 12-13) 
points out that Hayek must admit that there are different ways of designing the rules 
of the market place that will influence the distributional outcome. For example, the 
rules of property, contract, and inheritance will have substantial impact on the 
resultant distribution of wealth and income. Hayek has as yet provided no reason for 
thinking that the distributive effects of such decisions cannot be judged just or unjust, 
on the contrary, he seems to be committed to accept such interventions, since he 
agrees that principles of justice apply to the deliberately designed rules of institutions 
(op. cit.), which would include property and succession laws. 
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But Hayek also conceded, that if there was a legitimate need for state action 
to achieve some legitimate objective (other than reducing inequality) but different 
ways of achieving the objective, "those that incidentally also reduce inequality may 
well be preferable (Hayek 1960, 87-88);" he gives the example of different ways of 
designing the law of intestate succession. What seems odd about this argument is 
that while he accepts that ways of “incidentally” reducing inequality are preferable, 
while primarily reducing inequality on purpose is not legitimate. Reducing inequality 
is therefore seems to be a good thing as long as it is not done as first purpose. 
Perhaps the most valuable point that Hayek makes concerns the role of the 
market. He argues that it allows people with disparate ends to cooperate in the 
satisfaction of material wants despite their disagreements regarding ends and the 
way society ought to allocate its resources (Hayek 1982, 171). This partially obviates 
the Rawlsian problem of how there can be cooperation whilst there exists in society 
a pluralism of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines. It makes 
cooperation possible at the economic level, but I suggest that at the socio-political 
level it does not contribute to society as a cooperative venture. Therefore, I submit 
that Hayek’s arguments do not credibly destroy or amend the idea of social, or 
distributive justice within society. 
Hayek also criticises the practical implications of distributive justice in equality 
of opportunity, for example. He argues that the only way that such a form of 
distribution can be achieved and maintained is by the government having the power 
to control virtually every aspect of every person’s life (Hayek 1982, 247). His main 
argument is that the distributive outcomes of the free market are not subject to 
judgments about justice or injustice, because they are unintended outcomes, 
facilitated by numerous circumstances which nobody controls directly (Hayek 1982, 
226 ff.). But justice as fairness does not require that people’s lives be controlled in 
their finest detail, as Hayek argues would be required to achieve and maintain 
‘distributive justice.’ There are many adjustments that can be made to social 
institutions as Hayek himself admits, that would result in more equal, or socially just, 
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distributions. The distributive effects of the markets are the result of man-made laws 
and institutions and on that point Hayek and Rawls agree. 
As far as my own project is concerned, the EP approach would support 
institutionalised systems that result in more egalitarian, and thus more just, 
outcomes in terms of its own understanding of what distributions a just society 
requires. Thus, despite the apparent incompatibility of Hayek and Rawls, the 
distance between them is not as great as it may at first appear, and they are in fact 
in agreement on a wide variety of issues. 
3. The Priority of Right 
The priority of the right over the good is basic to the deontology of Rawls’s 
project. It is therefore my intention in this subsection to investigate the criticisms that 
have been levelled at it, the most telling of which I regard as that of Michael Sandel 
(Sandel 1998). 
Rawls asserts that the idea of the priority of right is an essential element in 
what he has called “political liberalism” and it has a central role in justice as fairness 
as a form of that view (Rawls 2011, p.173). It is a fundamental building block of 
Rawls’s project that justice has priority over other values and ends. It is not just 
another value among values, it is indeed the value of values. It especially has priority 
over ends – the ends of people are chosen by them and these choices are 
constrained by the principles of justice. This is the principle and its detractors that I 
propose to discuss in this section. 
Right at the start of TOJ, (Rawls 2009, 3-4), Rawls broadly spells out what he 
means by this priority: 
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of 
thought. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or 
revised if it is untrue; likewise, laws and institutions no matter how 
efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are 
unjust. Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that 
even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason, 
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justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a 
greater good shared by others…in a just society the liberties of equal 
citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not 
subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social 
interests…Being first virtues of human activities, truth and justice are 
uncompromising. 
As far as the choosing of ends are concerned, Rawls argues at (Rawls 2009, 
563), that the main idea is that, “given the priority of right, the choice of our 
conception of the good is framed within definite limits. The principles of justice and 
their realization in social forms define the bounds within which our deliberations take 
place.” And again, at 564 he says that “while there is no algorithm for settling upon 
our good, no first-person procedure of choice, the priority of right and justice securely 
constrains these deliberations3 so that they become more manageable. Since the 
basic rights and liberties are already firmly established4, our choices cannot distort 
our claims upon one another.” In Political Liberalism (PL) he underlines the theme 
again. He says that “in justice as fairness the priority of right means that the 
principles of political justice impose limits on permissible ways of life; and hence the 
claims citizens make to pursue ends that transgress those limits have no weight.” 
(Rawls 2011, 174) 
Although in TOJ, Rawls creates the impression that the priority of right is part 
of a general moral conception, in PL he seems to back away from this idea. He says 
although the idea of a comprehensive philosophical doctrine is not discussed in TOJ, 
it is clear from the text that both justice as fairness and utilitarianism are regarded as 
comprehensive, or partially comprehensive, doctrines (Rawls 2011, 162). He then 
argues that the fact that a plurality of reasonable but incompatible comprehensive 
doctrines will always exist in a democratic society, demonstrates that a well-ordered 
society as used in TOJ is unrealistic. This is due to the fact, he argues, that as a 
                                            
3 Concerning the choosing of ends. 
4 Through the deliberations in the original position. 
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comprehensive doctrine, it is inconsistent with realising its own principles even under 
the best of foreseeable conditions. 
He therefore recasts justice as fairness unambiguously from the outset as a 
political conception of justice, i.e. not competing with comprehensive doctrines. In 
fact, he basically defines what a reasonable comprehensive doctrine is by adding the 
supposition that a reasonable doctrine does not reject the essentials of a democratic 
regime. This basically sets the stage for the later argument about overlapping 
consensus, since all reasonable doctrines essentially accept democratic regimes. 
Since justice as fairness, as a form of political liberalism is now circumscribed by the 
political, it facilitates the conclusion that all reasonable doctrines would overlap to 
find the essentially democratic principles of justice as fairness acceptable (Rawls 
2011, 162-184).  
In Political Liberalism, he distinguishes between a political conception of 
justice and a comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine. The features 
of a political conception of justice, Rawls states, are 
first, that it is a moral conception worked out for a specific subject, 
namely, the basic structure of a constitutional democratic regime; 
second, that accepting the political conception does not presuppose 
accepting any particular comprehensive religious, philosophical, or 
moral doctrine; rather, the political conception presents itself as a 
reasonable conception for the basic structure alone; and third, that it is 
not formulated in terms of any comprehensive doctrine but in terms of 
certain fundamental ideas viewed as latent in the public political culture 
of a democratic society (Rawls 2011, p.175) 
To complete this withdrawal of his originally bold conception behind the 
redoubt of the political, he now argues that firstly, in its general sense, the priority of 
right means that the ideas of the good, which are constrained by the principles of the 
right, being justice, are restricted only to political ideas of the good. Which means, he 
says, that there is no need for reliance on any comprehensive conceptions of the 
good, but only on ideas tailored to fit within the political conception. The political 
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conception, one recalls, is a moral conception for the specific subject of the basic 
structure of a constitutional democratic regime, and in the final analysis is formulated 
in terms of certain fundamental ideas that Rawls sees as latent in the public political 
culture of a democratic society. 
But Sandel argues that the scope of the change, referring to the 1993 edition 
of Political Liberalism, is even more fundamental. He (Sandel 1998, 3642) says that 
for Rawls, the right is prior to the good in two senses and that it is important to 
distinguish them. 
First, the right is prior to the good in the sense that certain individual 
rights “trump,” or outweigh, considerations of the common good. 
Second, the right is prior to the good in that the principles of justice that 
specify our rights do not depend for their justification on any particular 
conception of the good life. 
It is the second of these claims which gave rise to the debate about Rawlsian 
liberalism under the somewhat misleading label, according to Sandel, of the liberal-
communitarian debate. In the 1980s a number of political philosophers took issue 
with the idea that the consideration of justice can be removed from considerations of 
the good. The Rawlsian approach became characterised as rights-oriented liberalism 
and this approach is contested in the writings of Alasdair MacIntyre (MacIntyre 
1981), (MacIntyre 1988), Charles Taylor (Taylor 1985), (Taylor 1989), Michael 
Walzer (Walzer 1983), and Michael Sandel (Sandel 1998). These challenges are 
sometimes described as the ‘communitarian’ critique of liberalism. In various ways, 
those who have criticized the priority of right have contested the notion that we can 
make sense of our moral and political obligations in wholly voluntarist or contractual 
terms. 
In TOJ (Rawls 2009, 563), Rawls links the priority of the right to a voluntarist 
or broadly Kantian notion of the person. He says that the parties in the original 
position regard moral personality and not the capacity for pleasure and pain as the 
fundamental aspect of the self. They do not know what final aims persons have, and 
all dominant-end conceptions are rejected. Thus, according to this conception we are 
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not simply defined as the sum of our desires, as utilitarians assume, nor are we 
beings whose perfection consists in realizing certain purposes or ends given by 
nature, as Aristotle held (Aristotle 2012 [350 BC]). Rather, Rawls says, we are free 
and independent selves, unbound by antecedent moral ties, capable of choosing our 
ends for ourselves. As Sandel puts the point: 
This is the conception of the person that finds expression in the ideal of 
the state as a neutral framework. This conception of the person, and its 
link to the case for the priority of the right, finds expression throughout A 
Theory of Justice. Its most explicit statement comes toward the end of 
the book, in Rawls’s account of the ‘good of justice’. There Rawls 
argues, following Kant, that teleological doctrines are ‘radically 
misconceived’ because they relate the right and the good in the wrong 
way (Sandel 1998, 3675). 
Those philosophers who dispute the priority of the right take issue with 
Rawls’s conception of the person as a ‘free and independent self, unencumbered by 
prior moral ties.’ They argue that a conception of the self, given prior to its aims and 
attachments could not explain certain important aspects of our moral and political 
experience. Certain moral and political obligations that we commonly recognize – 
obligations of solidarity, for example, or religious duties – may claim us for reasons 
unrelated to an actual choice freely made. 
The full extent of the withdrawal of the claims of the project now becomes 
more evident. Not only is the priority of the right no longer a general moral norm, it 
now only applies to questions of the good relating to the ‘basic structure,’ that being 
essentially the constitution of a democratic regime. It thus seems the right is prior to 
the good only for the purposes of the constitution of the just society. In Political 
Liberalism, Rawls now argues that the case for liberalism is political, not 
philosophical or metaphysical (Rawls 2011, 27). Sandel (Sandel 1998, 3713) argues 
that this means that the priority of the right over the good is not merely the 
application to politics of Kantian moral philosophy, but frames a practical response to 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 65 
 
the well-known fact that people in modern democratic societies typically disagree 
about the good. He says that: 
Political liberalism assumes that, for political purposes, a plurality of 
reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal 
result of the exercise of human reason within the framework of the free 
institutions of a constitutional democratic regime (Rawls 2011, 172). 
Since people’s moral and religious convictions are unlikely ever to 
converge, it would thus be more reasonable to seek agreement on 
principles of justice that are neutral with respect to such controversies. 
That is fundamentally the origin of Rawls’s revision of TOJ in the lectures that 
comprise Political Liberalism. Central to Rawls’s revised view is the distinction he 
now makes between political liberalism and liberalism as part of a comprehensive 
moral doctrine. Comprehensive liberalism affirms liberal political arrangements in the 
name of certain moral ideals, such as autonomy, individuality, or self-reliance. Unlike 
comprehensive liberalism, political liberalism remains neutral in the moral and 
religious controversies that arise from comprehensive doctrines to maintain 
impartiality. Political liberalism, for instance, does not take a general position on, 
what Rawls holds out to be the three basic questions of moral epistemology and 
psychology (Rawls 2011, 329): 
• Is the knowledge or awareness of how we are to act directly accessible 
only to some, or to a few (the clergy, say), or is it accessible to every 
person who is normally reasonable and conscientious? 
• Again, is the moral order required of us derived from an external 
source, say from an order of values in God’s intellect, or does it arise in 
some way from human nature itself (either from reason or feeling or 
from a union of both), together with the requirements of our living 
together in society?  
• Finally, must we be persuaded or compelled to bring ourselves in line 
with the requirements of our duties and obligations by some external 
motivation, say, by divine sanctions or by those of the state; or are we 
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so constituted that we have in our nature sufficient motives to lead us 
to act as we ought without the need of external threats and 
inducements? 
Rawls states that both Hume and Kant accept the second alternative in each 
of these three questions, but political liberalism takes no position. This is because it 
leaves each of the three questions to be answered in their own way by different 
comprehensive doctrines, and in doing so it brackets out our comprehensive moral 
and religious ideas from our political ones. 
Sandel argues that political liberalism’s insistence on bracketing our 
comprehensive moral and religious ideals for political purposes, and separating our 
political identities as citizens from our personal identities is not justifiable. Although 
one may grant the importance of securing social cooperation based on mutual 
respect, what is to ensure that this interest is always so important as to outweigh any 
competing interest that could arise from within a comprehensive moral or religious 
view? 
One way, Sandel suggests, of ensuring the priority of the political conception 
of justice (and hence the priority of the right) is to deny that any of the moral or 
religious conceptions it brackets could be true. This is a position Rawls disavows 
throughout, in that he emphasizes that political liberalism does not depend on 
scepticism about the claims of comprehensive moral and religious doctrines. So, 
Sandel asks, if we allow that one or some such doctrines could be true, how can we 
ensure that none will ever generate values sufficiently compelling to morally 
outweigh the political values of toleration, fairness, and social cooperation based on 
mutual respect?  Thus, Sandel argues that Rawls’s rejection of the possibility of 
founding the right on the good is unjustified. 
Rawls (Rawls 2011, 146 & 155) maintains that “political values normally 
outweigh whatever non-political values conflict with them,” but Sandel demonstrates 
his point convincingly through two real-world examples – the contemporary debate 
over abortion rights, and the famous historical debate over popular sovereignty and 
slavery, between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas. 
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The debate about abortion rights cannot be merely bracketed out of political 
life, Sandel says. A political liberal might reply that the political values of toleration 
and the principle of equal liberty for all are sufficient grounds for concluding that 
women should be free to choose for themselves whether to have an abortion or not; 
government should not take sides in the moral and religious controversy over when 
human life begins. 
But if the Catholic Church is right about the moral status of the foetus, and 
abortion is tantamount to murder, then there is no reason why the other 
considerations, important as they might be, should prevail. Sandel (Sandel 1998, 
3869) argues that the political liberal’s case for the priority of political values must 
then become an instance of just-war theory; he or she would have to show why 
these values should prevail even at the cost of some 1.5 million civilian deaths each 
year in the US. There is no real opportunity for neutrality; the comprehensive moral 
and religious doctrines must be engaged. For if abortion is not outlawed and is legal, 
then it is not neutral to do nothing – formal neutrality prefers the abortionist case. On 
the other hand, if abortion is already unlawful, then to do nothing is to prefer the anti-
abortion case. Some response to the debate appears to be an inescapable 
requirement under all circumstances. 
Thus, political liberalism finds itself in an impossible position. It cannot remain 
neutral in the debate and at the same time it cannot take up a position against any 
one of the comprehensive doctrines, because it defines itself as not being a 
comprehensive doctrine. Thus, the argument that political liberalism can be confined 
to the strictly political without engaging in any moral debate that originates elsewhere 
outside the political appears to be no more than a chimera. 
But an even clearer case for the overriding of political values by moral 
considerations is the 1858 Lincoln-Douglas debate. Sandel relates the debate as 
follows: 
Douglas’ argument for the doctrine of popular sovereignty is perhaps the 
most famous case in American history for bracketing a controversial 
moral question for the sake of political agreement. Since people were 
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bound to disagree about the morality of slavery, Douglas argued, 
national policy should be neutral on that question. (Sandel 1998, 3883). 
The doctrine of popular sovereignty Douglas defended did not judge slavery 
right or wrong, but left the people of each territory free to make their own judgments. 
The only hope of holding the country together, Douglas argued, was to agree to 
disagree, thereby bracketing the moral controversy over slavery and respecting “the 
right of each state and each territory to decide these questions for themselves” 
(Angle 1958, 374) 
Lincoln and the Republican party viewed slavery as morally wrong and 
insisted that it ‘be treated as a wrong.’ One way of treating it as a wrong was to 
“make provision that it shall grow no larger” (Ibid 390). The debate between Lincoln 
and Douglas was primarily not about the morality of slavery, although that was the 
moral question underlying the debate. But Douglas’ view about slavery as such did 
not really play a role in the debate. The actual debate was about whether to bracket 
the moral controversy for the sake of political agreement. 
Lincoln’s words (Ibid p.388-9), which are almost as much of a reply to Rawls 
as they were to Douglas, were: “I say, where is the philosophy or the statesmanship 
based on the assumption that we are to quit talking about it (the immorality of 
slavery), and that the public mind is all at once to cease being agitated by it? Yet this 
is the policy ... that Douglas is advocating – that we are to care nothing about it! I ask 
you if it is not a false philosophy? Is it not a false statesmanship that undertakes to 
build up a system of policy upon the basis of caring nothing about the very thing that 
everybody does care the most about?” 
Sandel comments that to the extent that political liberalism refuses to invoke 
comprehensive moral ideals and relies instead on notions of citizenship implicit in the 
political culture, it would have had a hard time explaining in 1858 why Lincoln was 
right and Douglas was wrong (Sandel 1998, Loc. 3938). He says the modern 
abortion and 1858 Lincoln–Douglas debates illustrate the way that a political 
conception of justice must presuppose some answer to the moral questions it 
purports to bracket. I agree with Sandel that in cases such as these, the priority of 
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the right over the good cannot be sustained, insofar as it requires neutrality on 
fundamental moral questions. 
But Sandel points to a further difficulty. The original reason for asserting the 
priority of the right over the good is based on the Kantian conception of the person. 
The right must be prior to the good because the self is prior to its ends. But, for 
political liberalism, the asymmetry between the right and the good is based not on a 
Kantian conception of the person but instead on a certain feature of modern 
democratic societies. Rawls describes this feature as the “fact of reasonable 
pluralism” (Rawls 2011, 289). For political liberalism, then, the priority of the right is 
based on the ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’ about the good. 
Sandel however argues that this is insufficient to sustain the position. There is 
no reason in principle why there will not be similar disagreements about justice. The 
‘fact of reasonable pluralism’ about morality and religion creates an asymmetry 
between the right and the good only when coupled with the assumption that there is 
no comparable ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’ about justice. Yet, as we have seen 
Sandel argue, there is no basis for such an assumption. 
At the heart of political liberalism’s claim for the priority of the right over the 
good, Sandel argues, is the question that if moral argument or reflection of the kind 
Rawls deploys enables us to conclude, despite the persistence of conflicting views, 
that some principles of justice are more reasonable than others, what guarantees 
that reflection of a similar kind is not possible in the case of moral and religious 
controversy? If we can reason about controversial principles of distributive justice by 
seeking a reflective equilibrium, why can we not reason in the same way about 
conceptions of the good? If it can be shown that some conceptions of the good are 
more reasonable than others, then the persistence of disagreement would not 
necessarily amount to a ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’ that requires government to be 
neutral. If it is possible to reason about the good as well as the right, then Rawlsian 
political liberalism’s claim for the asymmetry between the right and good is 
undermined. 
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In conclusion, it seems that the priority of the right, although it is fundamental 
to justice as fairness, becomes a problematic issue in political liberalism that detracts 
from the value of that project as a proper account of social justice. The idea of justice 
appears inextricably intertwined with that of morality, and morality and politics cannot 
be separated (Bellah 1995/1996). The whole idea of seeking consensual agreement 
on justice is beset with complications (Knight 1998). 
The EP approach concerned with the morality of justice and does not require 
neutrality on moral issues in society. It is essentially a teleological theory that does 
not raise the issue of the priority of the right, although it does deal with how the right 
and the good are related to each other. It will be argued that it also does not fall foul 
of Rawls’s general criticism of teleological theories, but these are matters that I will 
deal with in detail in later chapters. 
4. Reflective Equilibrium 
Rawls’s idea of a well-ordered society was discussed in Chapter 1. In this 
section, I shall look at the critique brought against the Rawlsian idea of a well-
ordered society, especially as argued by Jürgen Habermas (Habermas 2015). 
Habermas takes issue with Rawls on the ‘self-stabilisation’ (stabilisation 
based on the socialising force of life under just institutions) of a well-ordered society. 
He reminds us (Habermas 2015, 1714 ff.) that in section 86 of TOJ (Rawls 2009, 567 
ff.) Rawls takes pains to demonstrate the “congruence of the right and the good.” But 
we must keep in mind that the parties that agree on “reasonable principles” in the 
original position are artificial entities, that is, constructs; they must not be identified 
with flesh-and-blood citizens who would live under the real conditions of a society 
erected on principles of justice. They also are not identical with the reasonable 
citizens presupposed in the theory, whom one also expects to act morally and thus 
to subordinate their personal interests to the obligations of a loyal citizen. While their 
sense of justice may ground the desire to act justly, this is not, Habermas argues, an 
automatically effective motivation like, for example, the desire to avoid pain.  
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Habermas then argues that it is for this reason that Rawls is constrained to 
rely on a “thin theory of the good”5 to show that just institutions would create 
circumstances under which it would be in each citizen’s well-considered interest to 
pursue his own freely chosen life plans under the same conditions that allow others 
to do likewise. This means that, in a well-ordered society, it would always be good 
for every individual to satisfy the requirements of justice. In Hegel’s words, the 
individual’s morality (Moralität) would find its ethical (sittliche) context in the 
institutions of a just society. Rawls’s theory of the self-stabilization of a well-ordered 
society is therefore based not on the coercive force of law but on the socializing 
force of a life under just institutions, for such a life simultaneously develops and 
reinforces the citizens’ disposition in favour of justice. 
Habermas proceeds by saying that there is a contestable assumption 
underlying the self-stabilisation theory. The underlying assumption of the theory is 
that the well-ordered society with its just institutions already exists. It is a different 
matter, he suggests, when one has an imperfect society which you want to transform 
into a just one. At this second stage, we face “rather the question of how the 
normative concept of a well-ordered society can be situated in the context of an 
existing political culture and public sphere in such a way that it will in fact meet with 
approval on the part of citizens willing to reach an understanding” (Habermas 2015, 
1755-1757). In other words, we need to be able to convince citizens that have not 
been conditioned by living within a just society to accept the precepts of the just 
society. Habermas states that it is at this point in what he refers to as the “second 
stage of argumentation” about the theory where Rawls’s concept of “reflective 
equilibrium” becomes ambiguous. 
Reflective equilibrium, he states, designates a method that is already 
supposed to work at the stage of theory construction. In theory construction, 
reflective equilibrium works, according to Habermas, as is characteristic of 
                                            
5 In TOJ (Rawls 2009, 395) Rawls argues that to establish the principles of the right, it is 
necessary to rely on some notion of the good, which is a full theory of the good stripped to its bare 
essentials, which he refers to as the thin theory of the good. The goods in the thin theory would 
include liberty, opportunity, and a sense of our own worth (p.398). 
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reconstructive theories in general: “one draws on a sample of exemplary expressions 
with the purpose of explicating the intuitive knowledge that subjects use to generate 
these expressions” (Habermas 2015, 1760-1761).6 
But applying reflective equilibrium in the second stage, as Rawls does, where 
the theory of justice and the context of the society within which it is to be embedded 
are reflexively situated, reflective equilibrium assumes a different, and ambiguous 
role. In this context, its purpose would be to explain how and why the theory’s 
theoretical propositions merely articulate the normative substance of the most 
trustworthy intuitions of our everyday political practice, as well as the substance of 
the best traditions of our political culture, the normative substance of the most 
trustworthy intuitions of our everyday political practice, as well as the substance of 
the best traditions of our political culture. Reflective equilibrium is supposed to 
demonstrate to the citizens of the society to be transformed that the principles of 
justice as fairness reflect only the most reasonable convictions actually held by the 
population. This generally accords with what Rawls himself argues when he says 
that “The aim of political philosophy, when it presents itself in the public culture of a 
democratic society, is to articulate and to make explicit those shared notions and 
principles thought to be already latent in common sense; or, as is often the case, if 
common sense is hesitant and uncertain, to propose to it certain conceptions and 
principles congenial to its most essential convictions and historical traditions” (Rawls 
1980, p.518).  
“Reflective equilibrium” is Rawls’s appeal to our best normative intuitions: in 
the first case, he uses it in the context of justifying his theory before philosophical 
experts, and in the second case, he uses it in the context of a public defence of, and 
the political advocacy for, the theory before citizens of an actual community. In the 
latter context however, if the citizens are already living in a liberal democratic polity, 
then appealing to the normative substance of the most trustworthy intuitions of their 
                                            
6 Note again throughout what follows, the reliance on intuition, which is an important matter I 
shall deal with in chapter 3. 
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everyday political practice, as well as the substance of the best traditions of their 
political culture, might be sufficiently persuasive to allow them to accept the theory. 
But this argument lacks any element of universality. It seems merely to underwrite 
what people in modern democracies already fundamentally embrace, except to say 
that 
In a pluralistic society, the theory of justice can expect to be accepted 
by citizens only if it limits itself to a conception that is post metaphysical 
in the strict sense, that is, only if it avoids taking sides in the contest of 
competing forms of life and worldviews. In many theoretical questions, 
and all the more so in practical questions, the public use of reason does 
not lead to a rationally motivated agreement (Einverständnis) 
(Habermas 2015, 1788-1791). 
Habermas is really saying that in a society where there is a plurality of 
mutually incompatible comprehensive doctrines, reflective equilibrium will not 
achieve universal acceptance unless it remains neutral on moral issues that arise 
from such incompatible comprehensive doctrines. This obviously parallels the 
discussion in the previous section, and Habermas appears also to doubt the efficacy 
of reflective equilibrium as a practical means of achieving a rationally motivated 
agreement between citizens of an existing democracy. 
The ambiguity of the two stages of Rawls’s application of reflective 
equilibrium, namely the process of theory development and that of embedding the 
theory in a particular society, remains problematic. This leads Ronald Dworkin to 
search for less contingent ways of embedding normative theories. He wants to avoid 
having the effectiveness of liberal principles depend on latent potential 
understandings that can be awakened in people from traditions they just happen to 
inherit from societies they happen to be born in. He argues that 
A political conception of justice, constructed to be independent of and 
neutral among different ethical positions people in the community hold, 
is perhaps more likely to prove acceptable to everyone in the 
community than any conception that is not neutral in this way. If we 
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were statesmen intent on securing the widest possible agreement for 
some political theory, which could then serve as the basis of a truly and 
widely consensual government, we might well champion a political 
conception for that reason.… But we need more from a theory of justice 
than consensual promise; we need categorical force. Liberals insist that 
political decisions be made on liberal principles now, even before liberal 
principles come to be embraced by everyone, if they ever will be 
(Dworkin 1990, 17). 
The essence of Habermas’s criticism comes down to the fact that Rawls tries 
to justify his theory through agreement rather than some morally powerful necessity, 
both in the first instance of theory development and in the second instance of 
embedding it in a specific society. 
 My own impression is that Rawls relies totally on an underlying latent human 
intuition that implicitly accords with liberal principles. Nowhere does he discuss or 
even suggest where this intuition might originate, but he nevertheless employs it 
both explicitly and by implication.  
The EP approach specifically investigates the possible origins and content of 
normative intuitions. It tries to answer the questions that arise as to how these 
intuitions might have become embedded in the human psyche and what role they 
might thus have played in human survival that allowed for the evolutionarily selection 
of such traits. But Rawls’s reliance on some underlying basic human intuition and 
understanding regarding justice goes deep into his project. 
In the original position, according to Rawls, the parties, situated as they are 
without regard to any personal agendas and so on, unanimously agree on the two 
principles of justice as fairness. There is a necessary underlying assumption to arrive 
at such a conclusion; the assumption must be that there is an inherent human 
understanding of justice that we would all realise if only we were shorn of our 
personal predilections, ideas of the good life and personal interests. These are what 
is hidden by the veil of ignorance. Once rid of those notions and distractions, and 
aided by the process of “reflective equilibrium” we will all discover deep within 
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ourselves the recognition of the principles of justice for what they are. We will 
discover that the principles of justice as fairness are in fact those which we already 
believe in and intuitively know to be true. This unspoken, unexplored supposition is 
so fundamental to Rawls that it is striking that he in no way enquires into it. This is 
where I believe the strength of the EP approach will become apparent. 
Similarly, when we are faced with embedding the theory of justice in a 
particular society, Rawls uses the device of reflective equilibrium to get past the 
specifics of their reasonable pluralism to lay bare the arena of an “overlapping 
consensus,” which again Rawls must presume to exist, because it is not 
demonstrated that there will always be such a consensus, even in an existing 
democratic society, and how great that arena might be. But Rawls accepts it, and 
can do so only based on a presumption of an underlying human understanding of the 
basic principles of justice congruent with the two principles of justice as fairness. 
Habermas seems to be arguing for a practical and empirical process of 
constitution making. He argues for a process where a normative theory is enlisted for 
reconstructing the development of the constitutional state in real societies, which 
theories can then play a role in the critical description of how actual political 
processes should be structured. Habermas thus can be said to take a practical route 
to the possible transformation of a society, while Rawls, despite some claims to the 
contrary, remains aloof of the actual problems posed by finding agreement in a 
socially realistic situation. 
As also discussed in Chapter 1, Rawls thus uses the device of reflective 
equilibrium to explain how it comes about that the two principles of justice as fairness 
are selected by the parties in the original position. Habermas agrees that this a 
perfectly suitable device for theory building, but it becomes ambiguous when Rawls 
tries to use it as a way to find acceptance for the two principles in an existing society 
that is to be transformed. Habermas argues that this has no real prospect of 
success. 
Furthermore, Habermas argues that in order to have some prospect of 
success, the theory would have to maintain a neutral position regarding the other 
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moral doctrines in society. This brings us back to the discussion in the previous 
section to the effect that such neutrality is neither always possible nor always 
desirable. This is also the essence of Dworkin’s critique to the effect that liberalism 
requires a moral platform to contest social issues. 
The EP approach does not rely on convincing parties, or citizens, to come to 
any agreement. Instead it relies on the notions of justice embedded in the human 
psyche during the common human experience during the Pleistocene period. In 
chapters 3 and 4 I will develop this theme more fully, but suffice it to say at this 
juncture that reflective equilibrium and other devices of gaining public agreement 
plays no role. It will be attempted to show that despite much human contradictory 
behaviour, there lies a substrate of commonly understood notions of social justice in 
each of us. These notions can be appealed to in a society to embed a just 
institutional order. 
5. Conclusion 
I am not persuaded by Hayek’s argument that the idea of social justice is a 
dangerous chimera. Although he is hard pressed to find enough words and 
expressions to totally condemn the idea of social justice, he is not that far removed in 
fact from the position of Rawls. I am persuaded by Lister’s argument that Hayek is in 
fact a closet Rawlsian/egalitarian liberal, despite his inegalitarian conclusions. There 
is nothing in his arguments to persuade me that the conclusions I draw from the EP 
approach are contestable on any grounds that he has presented. 
The communitarian debate, as exemplified by Sandel is another matter. I am 
persuaded by Sandel that to insist upon the right being prior to the good and 
founding the Liberal state as a morally neutral entity in society cannot be considered 
desirable. There are undoubtedly moral norms that impact on politics and that makes 
neutrality sometimes impossible and at other times reprehensible, such as when no 
action is taken on the grounds of state neutrality on questions as fundamental as 
slavery, or the treatment of women as prescribed by some comprehensive moral 
doctrine, or religion. 
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In my present purpose, then, I shall be inclined to favour the stance of Rorty 
(Rorty, 1988 – see above) who insists that liberalism should not be committed to a 
philosophical account of the human self, but only to a historic-sociological description 
of the way we live now (Ibid. p.265). Rorty endorses a pragmatic approach, and 
denies that liberal political arrangements require a philosophical justification, or 
‘extra-political grounding’ in a theory of the human subject. I can only add that I shall 
ground my arguments not only on historic-sociological considerations, but primarily 
on the principles of scientific evolutionary psychological and anthropological findings. 
Instead of a philosophical account of the human self, I shall attempt to found the 
theory on an evolutionary science-based account of humans as we find them; 
humans as they are. 
I am also persuaded by Habermas that there are serious criticisms to be 
made of the Rawlsian theory as far as the well-ordered society is concerned, 
especially after his retreat from universality. It appears that the whole issue of 
reflective equilibrium is complicated for Rawls by the necessity of achieving 
consensus in two stages: at the outset in the original position and then later, in 
seeking to embed his theory in an existing society. 
In my project, I intend also to define how a well-ordered society should in 
essence be structured. In this case it will not be complicated by consensus seeking 
but will be based on the principles of our evolutionarily embedded principles of 
justice. 
In the next chapter, a start will be attempted on the development of the 
evolution based theory of justice. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Evolutionary Psychology Approach 
‘The hard truth is this: There is no moral meaning hidden in the bowels 
of the universe. . ..’       Bruce Ackerman, 1980 
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some 
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and 
render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it 
except the pleasure of seeing it. 
Adam Smith, 1759, The Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
Introduction 
My topic in this chapter is that of social justice, approached from the 
evolutionary psychology point of view. Evolutionary psychology is an approach to 
psychology, in which knowledge and principles from evolutionary biology are used in 
research on the structure of the human mind. It is not an area of study, like vision, 
reasoning, or social behaviour. It is a way of thinking about psychology that can be 
applied to any topic within it (Cosmides 2006, 1). 
By social justice I mean justice as embedded within the broadly defined 
human society and as it is expressed to a greater or lesser extent within civil 
societies through their institutions. In this chapter I hope to show that the common 
human evolutionary experience that moulded our norms, our values and our 
psychological predispositions, offers valuable insights that lead to a theory of 
distributive social justice and its principles that better explain, accommodate and give 
effect to the intuitive human understanding of social justice. 
Before I can deal with substantially developing the theory, there are some 
preliminary matters that require attention and some elucidation. I therefore begin by 
shortly discussing the scientific literature basis of the theory I propose to develop, 
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before I then deal with the evolutionary psychology approach I take in this study. 
Thereafter I deal with the idea of gene-culture evolution, which forms an important 
and fundamental element in the development of my project. Given the nature of the 
argument I shall put forward, it is necessary for me to deal also with an important 
possible objection to my project, stemming from the naturalistic fallacy. After dealing 
with the naturalistic fallacy, I then carry on with the discussion that hopefully leads to 
a preliminary theory of justice approached from the evolutionary psychology 
perspective. 
I propose to deal with the topic by firstly, setting out the hypothesis that 
underlies my project. I shall then attempt to break down the broad topic into sub-
topics to examine and discuss the concepts and ideas that are indispensable to 
support or falsify the hypothesis. I therefore propose to look at what precisely the 
hypothesis implies for a view of justice and society, and, given the hypothesis 
answer the question of what the subject of justice would be. 
After that I propose to discuss, referring to the relevant research and scientific 
studies, the normative behaviours and beliefs that humans generally accept as being 
just, specifically regarding distributional justice. This leads on to the question of what 
the basic human disposition is, whether it is egalitarian, or a socially dominant one, 
or perhaps some combination of the two, to discover whether humans have an 
inherent bias to prefer certain kinds of distributions to others, and if so, what. To 
support these results, I shall examine some of the studies of early humans that might 
explain why, and how, it came about that we have the preferences that we do. 
My ultimate purpose then is to discover and formulate a theory of distributive 
justice that is grounded on an EP view of the human psyche. On this basis, I then put 
forward a tentative expression of the principles that derive from this theory. 
1. The Scientific Literature Basis 
The scientific studies that found my hypothesis and the preliminary theory that 
I present in this chapter are associated with gene-culture coevolution as proposed by 
Lumsden and Wilson (Lumsden, 1981), which is currently a sub-discipline within the 
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wider subject of evolutionary biology. Gene-culture coevolution studies the close 
interaction between genetic evolution and the evolution of culture, and how that 
complex gives rise to human norms and values. 
In the 1970s many early researchers started working on the parallels between 
genetic and cultural evolution, initiating the mathematical modelling of gene-culture 
coevolution. I broadly follow the works of, inter alia, Edward O. Wilson, Charles 
Lumsden, Robert Boyd, Peter Richerson, Christopher Boehm, Luigi Cavalli-Sforza 
and Marcus Feldman and indeed of Charles Darwin himself, all of whom recognise 
the intimate evolutionary interactions between genes and human culture. 
However, all the authors in evolutionary psychology do not necessarily 
support the concept gene-culture coevolution. Two of these are Richard Dawkins 
and Steven Pinker. These, and other academics come from a wide variety of 
disciplines as divergent as biology, anthropology, zoology, ecology, genetics, 
psychology, economics and mathematics. There is today a plethora of research that 
has been done on the subject and it is a field of very active research. 
I am aware of detractors of the discipline of evolutionary psychology as well, 
as will more fully appear from the next section.  
2. The Evolutionary Psychology Orientation 
I find it necessary at the start of this chapter to give a succinct, but hopefully 
sufficient explanation of what I understand the EP orientation to be and why, given 
the controversies that have often surrounded it, I have selected it as the basis for the 
development of a theory of social justice. 
The fundamental basis for EP is laid down by Darwin (Darwin 2015 [1859]) in 
his theory of natural selection, when he suggests that evolutionary theory can be 
applied to psychology: 
In the future I see open fields for far more important researches. 
Psychology will be securely based on the foundation already well 
laid by Mr. Herbert Spencer, that of the necessary acquirement of 
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each mental power and capacity by gradation. Much light will be 
thrown on the origin of man and his history (Darwin 2015 [1859], 
8280-8282). 
Darwin’s basic biological argument is well known, to the effect that if variant 
traits that aid an organism’s survival and reproduction are inherited by offspring from 
their parents, then such traits would be transmitted to future generations at greater 
rates than the alternatives. This would result in such traits becoming more 
numerous, possibly to the point of universality, in the gene pool. The Darwinian 
model of speciation via natural selection has proved to be the single most powerful 
conceptual framework in biological sciences (Carey 2011, 98). These principles have 
historically been applied to anatomy and physiology, but there is now widespread 
acknowledgement that they are also powerful explicators of the origins of 
psychological, strategic and behavioural adaptations in non-human animals as well 
as in humans (Alcock 2005), and (Buss 2005). 
From these considerations, a very important EP claim is made: the existence 
of a universal (species-specific) human nature. This claim is presently under scrutiny 
from developmental psychologists and neuroscientists who stress the malleability of 
the human brain, emphasizing how experience tunes and regulates synaptic 
connectivity, neural circuitry and gene expression, leading to remarkable plasticity in 
the brain’s structural and functional organization (Bolhuis 2011). 
Emphasis is being placed on organisms as constructors of their environments. 
There is thus a complex interaction between genetically inherited information, 
epigenetic7 influences, and learning in response to constructed features of the 
physical and social environment. Gene-culture coevolution may well turn out to be 
the characteristic pattern of evolutionary change in humans over recent time spans. 
These developments seemingly do not nullify the basis of universality, but 
allow for an explanatory basis for the great human cultural diversity on top of a 
universal base. Gene-culture dynamics are typically faster and stronger and operate 
                                            
7 relating to or arising from non-genetic influences on gene expression. 
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over a broader range of conditions than conventional biological evolutionary 
dynamics (Bolhuis 2011, 4). 
These developments brought evolutionary psychology into contestation with 
the basic tenets of what is known as the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM). 
Cosmides and Tooby (Cosmides 2006) describe the SSSM as originating both 
before and after Darwin. They say that, in terms of that model it was, and still is, a 
widely-held view among some philosophers and scientists that the human mind 
resembles a blank slate, virtually free of content until written on by the hand of 
experience. British Empiricists and their successors produced elaborate theories 
about how experience, refracted through a small handful of innate mental 
procedures, inscribed content onto the mental slate. 
The SSSM view also seems often to be accompanied by some form of 
genetic determinism, such as demonstrated by Steven Rose and Stephen Jay Gould 
- quoted by Radcliffe-Richards (Radcliffe-Richards 2000, 104). Both are said to 
argue that if we are genetically predisposed to behave in certain ways, then: 
2.1. It is inescapable for us to end up behaving in the way our genes predispose 
us to, and 
2.2. Our predisposition cannot be changed in any way, and 
2.3. We cannot be blamed for acting the way we do. 
These claims are not made by EP. EP’s answer to genetic determinism is 
best given by Richard Dawkins (Dawkins 2006, 5154): 
In fact, genes ‘determine’ behaviour only in a statistical sense 
(see also pp. 37–40). A good analogy is the widely conceded 
generalization that ‘A red sky at night is the shepherd’s delight’. It 
may be a statistical fact that a good, red sunset portends a fine 
day on the morrow, but we would not bet a large sum on it. 
Just like the weather, people’s behaviour is influenced by a multitude of 
factors which make a prediction of the outcome somewhat problematic. As Dawkins 
puts it in another work (Dawkins 1982, 9-32), there would be general agreement that 
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“human nervous systems are so complex that in practice we can forget about 
determinism and behave as if we had free will” – this is essentially the same 
conclusion Dennett (Dennett 2003) comes to when he argues that even if our 
decisions come down to the interactions between highly complex sets of particles, 
that would not justify us in throwing out the idea of free will. 
Radcliffe-Richards summarises the debate within Darwinism as between the 
SSSM “blank slate” approach and the EP “gene-machine” approach. She contends 
that the debate is driven by a fear of the real danger, namely that the Darwinian 
explanation might spread further than biology, beyond the range of organic evolution. 
Although virtually all scientists today accept that Darwinism can give a complete 
account of what we are biologically, the disagreement is about the extent to which a 
Darwinian understanding of our evolution can provide insight into the details of our 
character, motivations, beliefs, and values, as is claimed by researchers in EP 
(Radcliffe-Richards 2000, 51). 
This debate cannot be resolved in the present project, nor do I intend to 
attempt it. I do not intend either defending or attempting to develop the discipline of 
evolutionary psychology. But I do intend to make use of, and base the present 
project on the generally accepted findings (within the discipline) and arguments of 
EP. This decision obviously involves me in making a choice between the SSSM 
blank slate and EP gene-machine versions of Darwinism, in which I choose the 
latter. 
My choice is predicated not merely on an intellectual predilection for 
understanding the human condition on the EP approach, but rather on the real 
consideration that if one accepts that human evolutionary history does not provide 
insight into the details of our character, beliefs and values, then the blank slate, 
SSSM version does not have any possible insights to offer into our notion of justice. 
3. Gene-Culture Coevolution 
Culture can be understood as non-genetically transferred information, or as 
Chudek and Henrich define it, information stored in people’s brains, nervous systems 
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or bodies that affects behaviour and got there through some social learning process, 
broadly defined (Chudek 2011, 219). The question thus arises whether there is any 
cross-pollination between culture and genes. For one thing, if the Kantian cognitive 
framework were to hold to some extent, one would expect to find at least some 
innate culture-associated capacities; a framework for absorbing, understanding and 
cultivating culture. Boyd and Richerson (Boyd 2005) contend exactly that. 
There is an inevitable feedback, they say, between the nature of human 
psychology and the kind of social information that this psychology is designed to 
process. They state that the equipment in human brains, the hormone-producing 
glands, and the nature of our bodies play a fundamental role in how we learn and 
why we prefer some ideas to others. They argue that culture-making brains are the 
product of more than two million years of more or less gradual increases in brain size 
and mounting cultural complexity (Richerson 2005, 134-194). During this period, 
evolving culture must have increased the reproductive success of our ancestors; 
otherwise, the features of our brain that make our highly-developed culture possible 
would not have evolved. 
It thus appears evident that there is an active feedback loop between cultural 
development and genetic biology in humans. For example, the suggestion by 
Fredrick Simoons in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s (Simoons 1969), (Simoons 
1973) proposed that that the ability of adult humans to digest lactose evolved in 
response to a history of dairy farming, was explored by Feldman and Cavalli-Sforza 
in 1989. They found a clear coevolutionary link between dairy farming and genes for 
lactose absorption (Feldman 1989). Simoons's hypothesis was controversial at the 
time, but subsequent genetic data confirm that adult lactose digestion is controlled 
by a single dominant gene, and careful statistical work indicates that a history of 
dairying is the best predictor of a high frequency of this gene (Richerson 2005). 
One can therefore conclude that culture and genes coevolve. Culture creates 
long-lasting changes in the living environment of humans. Genes thus evolve in an 
environment that is culturally constructed, i.e. dairy farming, hunting with projectiles, 
cooking food, et cetera. If this environment is stable for thousands of human 
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generations, such as in the case of the Human Egalitarian Syndrome (described by 
Boehm), it generates selection on genes (Boyd 2005, 4), and (Boehm 1997). 
Feldman and Cavalli-Sforza began the mathematical modelling of gene-
culture interactions as far back as 1981 when they introduced a simple dynamic 
model of cultural transmission into the nature-nurture debate (Cavalli-Sforza 1981). 
Although mathematical modelling that explores the relationship between biological 
and social processes in humans, making predictions about the behaviour of 
individuals or the patterns of society, typically tended to evoke strong reactions 
among scientists, not all reactions were negative by any means. Nevertheless, a 
significant number of the anthropological community were suspicious, and 
sometimes downright hostile to the idea. 
Fundamentally the objections seemed to fall more in the political plane than in 
the scientific. Although some contend that the subject is too complex for 
mathematical treatment, the negative impetus came mainly from suspicions of the 
motives and objectivity of those scientists conducting the modelling: such models 
may be abused to confirm or hide prejudice; the work may have been conducted 
without the required scientific rigor, or done in ignorance of valid anthropological data 
(Laland 1995). 
But the scientific method surely allows any methodology to be proven flawed, 
any theory to be falsified and all results open to review. It is difficult to see under 
those circumstances why detractors were not able to channel their objections into 
such avenues. The matter seems to be much less contentious today with modern 
gene-culture coevolutionary theory using mathematical modelling being generally 
recognised as a useful and valid tool for the human sciences. Gene-culture 
coevolution does not, as part of its intrinsic structure, assume that genetic factors 
determine human behaviour directly (Laland 1995, 22). Dawkins states quite 
unambiguously that genes in fact ‘determine’ behaviour only in a statistical sense as 
quoted above (Dawkins 2006). 
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Boyd and Richerson make the argument that much of cultural variation can be 
understood as products of human evolutionary history. It is essential to note that 
cultural adaptation in humans is cumulative: 
Humans learn things from others, improve those things, transmit 
them to the next generation, where they are improved again, and 
so on, leading to the rapid cultural evolution of superbly designed 
adaptations to particular environments (Boyd 2005, 4). 
Very importantly, thus, individuals do not merely passively receive their 
culture, they actively interact with it, amending, changing and developing it. At the 
same time, this process leaves the door open for the development of maladaptive 
ideas and practices. All cultural evolution is therefore not prosocial, especially where 
in hierarchical societies, unequal power relations tend to develop (Narvaez 2014). 
Maladaptive ideas tend equally to accumulate and can lead to societies where 
maladaptive ideas and practices, such as slavery, genocidal violence, racial and 
religious bigotry, prevail. 
Although the term “coevolution” was coined to refer to systems in which two 
species are important parts of each other's environments leading to evolutionary 
changes in one species inducing evolutionary modifications in the other, the term 
has been extended by analogy. In the case of human gene-culture coevolution there 
obviously aren’t any two species involved, but the twin pools of cultural and genetic 
information carried by human populations are intimately connected and involved with 
each other. The one cannot but affect the other. Genetic evolution created a 
psychology that allows the cumulative cultural evolution of complex cultural 
adaptations. In some environments, this process led to the cultural evolution of 
dairying traditions, which in turn led to the selection of the gene that allows whole-
milk lactose consumption by adults, in the example above. 
Culture affects the success and survival of individuals and groups; as a result, 
some cultural variants spread and others diminish, leading to evolutionary processes 
that are every bit as real and important as those that shape genetic variation. In 
answering the fundamental questions of how humans came to be the way they are, 
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culture has to be given its proper role, since “culture is part of human biology” (Boyd 
2005, 4).  
Richerson and Boyd (Richerson 2005) conclude that culture is neither nature 
nor nurture, but some of both. It combines inheritance and learning in a way that 
cannot be parsed into genes or environment, while genetically evolved psychological 
biases steer cultural evolution in genetic fitness-enhancing directions. Culturally 
evolved traits, they say, affect the relative fitness of different genotypes in many 
ways, in support of which they quote three examples: 
• Culturally evolved technology can affect the evolution of 
morphology. For example, modern humans are much less robust 
than earlier hominid species. Paleoanthropologists have argued 
that this change was due to the cultural evolution of effective 
projectile hunting weapons. Before projectile weapons, robust 
genotypes were favoured because people killed large animals at 
close range, but once they could be killed at distance, selection 
favoured a less robust (and less expensive) physique. 
• The availability of valuable culturally evolved information may 
lead to selection for enhanced capacities for acquiring and using 
that information. Language provides the canonical example. There 
is no doubt that the human vocal tract and auditory systems have 
been modified to enhance our ability to produce and decode 
spoken language, and we seem to have special-purpose 
psychological machinery for learning the meaning of words and 
grammatical rules. Selection could not have produced these 
derived features in an environment without spoken language. The 
most plausible explanation is that simple culturally transmitted 
language arose first, and then selection favoured a special-purpose 
throat morphology to generate speech sounds and a special-
purpose psychology for learning, decoding, and producing speech, 
which in turn gave rise to a richer, more-complex language, and led 
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to yet more modifications of the traits that allow language 
acquisition and production. 
• Culturally evolved moral norms can affect fitness if norm 
violators are punished by others. Men who cannot control their 
antisocial impulses are exiled to the wilderness in small-scale 
societies and sentenced to prison in contemporary ones. Women 
who behave inappropriately in social circumstances are unlikely to 
find or keep husbands. “… we will argue,” they say, “that 
coevolutionary forces have radically reshaped innate features of 
human social psychology” (Richerson 2005, 2684-2685). 
Christopher Boehm proposes a similar hypothesis (Boehm 1997). He argues 
that the well-documented egalitarian social traditions of human forager groups 
drastically influenced and modified the Darwinian selection mechanics, at the 
phenotypical level. He states that these cultural traditions have the effect that the 
selection effects on individuals are vitiated while group effects are being amplified. 
Thus, the hypothesis is that the far-reaching political invention of hunter-gatherer 
egalitarianism fundamentally, and profoundly affected Darwinian selection 
mechanics (Boehm 1997, S101). 
In particular, Boehm identifies three separate selection results on human 
phenotypes of what he terms the “egalitarian behavioural syndrome:” 
• It dampened phenotypic variation of individuals within groups; 
• it amplified phenotypic variation between members of groups; 
• it enabled a moralistically watchful species to control the antisocial 
behaviours of individuals who carried genes for free riding. 
The syndrome thus consists of three basic, culturally developed behavioural 
elements, namely the moralistic suppression of status rivalry, morally enforced 
consensual decision making, and the policing of free riders. These three cultural 
practices substantially empowered the genetic selection of traits making for altruism 
and cooperation. Of course, for such cultural practices to affect selection mechanics 
for the selection of behavioural traits at the level of genes, they would have to be in 
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place consistently for thousands of generations. This condition is met, since 
prehistoric humans maintained egalitarian behaviour consistently for many, probably 
hundreds, of millennia (see Mithen 1990, Knauft 1991, and Boehm 1999). 
There is no reason to suppose that there is any difference between the 
genetic data held by members of the human species at the level of the genotype. But 
clearly, according to Boehm’s analysis, there will be great phenotypical variation 
between individuals in different groups, but less variation between individuals of the 
same group. All this results from the political-cultural practice of in-group 
egalitarianism. This pattern of differentiation probably engendered group identity 
development that coincides with phenotypical and cultural features, perhaps to some 
extent explaining between-group antagonism. Chudek and Henrich take the matter 
even further when they write that 
Converging lines of theoretical and empirical research indicate 
that culture has shaped the human genome by driving the 
evolution of both our brains and bodies along trajectories not 
available to less cultural species (Chudek 2011, 218). 
The genetically induced conceptual machinery appears to be universal in the 
human population. But it is a different matter when we approach genetic data at the 
phenotypical level. Then the differences become obvious, such as the large 
phenotypical diversity of humankind, related perhaps in one way or another to rich 
cultural diversity such as the polyglot of languages, religions, customs and beliefs 
that people harbour. These differences would be the outcome of the different 
environments, challenges, obstacles and opportunities these groups faced during the 
long history of the extended groups and how they reacted to and came to terms with 
these matters. 
4. The Naturalistic Fallacy (NF) 
This refers to the putative rule that one cannot deduce an “ought” from an “is,” 
or that normative and descriptive spheres must remain separated. The ban 
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essentially prohibits any attempt to deduce an evaluative conclusion from premises 
that are entirely non-evaluative (Williams 1985). 
The term was coined by G. E. Moore, but David Hume is widely regarded as 
its originator. This understanding of Hume has even on occasion led to its being 
called “Hume’s Law”, but this may rest on a misinterpretation of Hume (MacIntyre 
1959) (Binmore 2005). The value and correctness of NF has been the subject of 
much debate, and it is no longer met with the wide agreement that it once was 
(Barrett 1991), (Arnhart 1998), and (Tullberg 2001). 
Although there has been much debate about what Hume meant, his main 
concern seems to be that no statements about plain matters of fact entail any 
evaluative claims. Could one say, for example, that because people are sometimes 
selfish, or angry, they ought sometimes to be selfish, or angry? The point is that it 
would be impossible to derive or justify the “ought” statement from the mere “is” 
statement about the facts of human selfishness or anger. Of course, the “ought” 
statement can be justified by expressing an implied evaluative premise to the effect 
that it is sometimes good to be selfish or to be angry. This premise could in turn be 
defended by giving reasons why there may be, under certain circumstances, good 
reasons to be selfish, or angry, for example when someone tries to take advantage 
of your good nature.8 
However, in this section I do not want to concern myself with the general 
applicability or correctness of the fallacy. The issue of the NF only arises from the 
nature of this present project, which deals with the idea of justice from empirically 
developed (fact based) social science. The project is really conducted in two phases.  
The first phase is that of analysis and discovery, which is the process in 
Chapter 3 and is directed at proving and analysing the first part of the hypothesis 
presented. The purpose in this chapter is to discover what the characteristics of 
                                            
8 See the discussion of the is/ought and open question argument by Geoff Sayer-McCord in the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (McCord 2014, 8). 
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social behaviour and social conditions are that people desire and would generally 
describe as just. It is an attempt to assert that “justice” is not only a normative value, 
but can objectively be seen as a term used to describe a non-discrete set of actions, 
attitudes and conditions, which constitute facts of which we approve and therefore 
find desirable, and thus value. Chapter 3 then is an attempt to objectively view that 
which humans would generally value as “just.” 
Consequently, the first part of the project is not one in normative ethics, which 
concerns questions such as what is good, or what is bad, how ought we to behave, 
or what the laws are that we ought to have. It is more a study in metaethics since it is 
concerned with what it means when we say something is socially just and whether 
such a “claim [corresponds] to facts about the world and how we know or manage to 
talk or think about such facts” (Schroeder 2015, 1). The resultant theory is thus not a 
normative theory as defined by Rosalind Hursthouse: 
roughly, a normative theory is taken to be a set (possibly one 
membered in the case of utilitarianism) of general principles 
which provide a decision procedure for all questions about how to 
act morally (italicisation in the original) (Hursthouse 2013, 650). 
Finally, in Chapter 3, I attempt to deductively and inductively distil from the 
discussion the principles underlying those actions and social conditions we identify 
as just. Such identified principles are not facts in themselves, but rather form 
normative statements derived from the facts by a combination of deductive, but 
mostly, inductive reasoning. Inductive reasoning, according to Brian Arthur, is a 
process whereby we look for patterns in complicated, or ill-defined, situations. We 
simplify the problem by constructing “temporary internal models or hypotheses or 
schemata to work with” (Arthur 1994, 406). Deductions are then made from the 
hypotheses to determine the action required. 
The above approximates the process that takes place in this project. Although 
in Chapter 3, I start with the hypothesis, this is merely for the sake of clarity. The 
hypothesis results from the considerations in the discussion following it in the 
chapter. Then the principles themselves are deduced from the hypothesis. The 
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principles can therefore be said to be merely descriptive of the underlying principles 
of what humans generally understand under the term “social justice.” They are not 
prescriptive in themselves, they are descriptive of the normative “ought” rules 
actually locked up in the complicated psyche of humans. They refer to the first part of 
the hypothesis. 
I therefore argue that this project is, in the first instance, not simply the 
derivation of an “ought” from an “is.” It is a much more complicated exercise in 
inductive and deductive reasoning that is not subject to the putative rules of the NF. 
As Arthur sums up inductive reasoning: “It is not antithetical to "reason," or to 
science for that matter. In fact, it is the way science itself operates and progresses” 
(1994: 407). 
But the second phase of the project appears in Chapter 4 and deals with the 
second part of the hypothesis. The question that there presents itself is whether the 
principles, discovered in Chapter 3, can indeed be said to be morally binding, and if 
so, why? The theory that presents itself from the considerations discussed in this 
project, namely that the human ideas of justice developed from behaviours and 
conditions that proved themselves to be conducive to human survival for thousands 
of generations, and that consequently, just laws and just actions can be judged with 
reference to the derived principles, is clearly teleological in nature as argued in 
Chapter 4. 
The implied normative premise that links the “ought” and the “is” in this case, 
is that it is good and right to align the fundamental laws and social arrangements of 
society with the developed psyche of the humans within it, due to the social benefits 
to be gained. These benefits include stronger social bonding, a more peaceful 
society, and greater potential health and happiness that can be experienced by 
every individual. 
This conclusion thus relates to the second part of the hypothesis proposed in 
Chapter 3.  
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5. The Hypothesis 
The theory of social justice that I will outline is based on the hypothesis that: 
5.1. our notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, are norms and values 
instilled into the human psyche during the process of our evolutionary 
development as modern human beings. Consequently, it is suggested that 
these norms and values must have added survival value for our ancestors, so 
that human groups that contain a substantial number of individuals who 
uphold such values, would outcompete groups that lack them. The 
hypothesis then is that human beings generally have a psyche attuned to 
these norms and values, and that the great majority would uphold most of 
them, and very few would likely find any of them repugnant. 
5.2. Given these premises, the theory holds that the closer the principles of our 
founding civil institutions match our evolved notions of justice, the stronger 
our social bonding, the more peaceful our society, and the greater the 
potential health and happiness that can be experienced by every individual 
will be. In other words, the theory suggests that a civil society founded on 
principles derived from our evolved notions of justice will be a well-ordered 
society in the grammatical meaning of the phrase. 
Following from these hypotheses, and given the evolutionarily developed 
human disposition that I shall argue for, the derived principles of social justice will 
likely involve an appositely egalitarian distribution of social goods9 among the 
members of society. The evolved notion of social justice, which I hope to quote 
persuasive authority for, suggests an egalitarian social structure and distribution of 
social goods, which include both positive and negative liberty, access to social 
assets and their produce. 
I turn to this argument in the following section. 
                                            
9 Meaning such goods as rights, liberties, duties, physical goods, offices, opportunities, 
penalties, punishments, privileges, roles, status, and so on – cf. (D'Agostina 2014). 
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6. Justice and Society 
Before I can begin my main argument, I find it necessary to define some basic 
terms. I want to make clear what, for the purposes of my project, I mean by the term 
‘society’ and by the term ‘justice’. I will also attempt to make clear how, in my view, 
they stand in relation to one another. 
‘Society’ has at least two meanings pertinent to this discussion. The first is 
human society as it exists planet-wide, considering the understanding of society 
being all of humanity as one great conglomerate of people that share one 
overarching general attribute – they are all human beings10. For greater clarity, and 
to avoid confusion, the greater human society will be referred to as ‘Society’. 
Secondly, I distinguish civil society that will be referred to as ‘society’, or 
‘societies’. I make the distinction because I wish to make the case that Society and 
societies each have a different role in propagating human norms and values. There 
are obviously many groupings that can each qualify as a society. Civil society is 
often understood as referring to states, but this would be too restrictive and thus not 
always correct. I propose to delineate societies as being sub-formations of humans 
within Society, with their distinguishing characteristic being that they are each 
politically organised in one way or another. 
Each society thus represents a group of people, a polity, living under some 
constitutional framework, formal or informal, that organises the collective power of 
the group internally in a structure of governance, which structure also represents and 
wields the group’s collective power in dealings with other similar groups. This 
includes the regulation of the principal economic arrangements within the group and 
in its dealings with others. 
These are of course many sub-groupings of Society which overlap with other, 
differently defined sub-groupings. There are, for example, sub-groupings of people 
                                            
10 But that single attribute covers a great deal of essential similarities: not only do we all share 
the opposing thumb, we are all able to speak complex languages, use complex tools, make music and 
we all react similarly to danger, joy and pain, to mention but a very few basic attributes. Some further 
shared human characteristics, essential to the idea of social justice, will be discussed later. 
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based on culture, which may overlap with sub-groups of civil societies. For my 
present purposes, I shall refer to groupings based on culture as cultural 
communities. This can be illustrated by the example of the French cultural 
community. It is a community comprised of many people spread across the globe, 
but they do not share one society. Thus, the French cultural community overlaps 
many civil societies. There are many other similar examples. 
By ‘Society’, then, I mean all of humanity taken together, consisting of the 
aggregate of all human beings concurrently living at any one point in time, but seen 
as a current incarnation of a continuing historical evolutionary process. There is an 
important sense in which it can be seen as prior to the individual. To say that 
humans are social animals is to say that they depend on others for psychological 
sustenance, including the formation of their personalities (Selznick 1987, 447).  
Because social animals depend for their survival on group living, the survival 
of the group is as important as the survival of the individual, if not more so, because 
the human group survives indefinitely whereas the lifetime of the individual is limited. 
Society thus appears to be, both logically and temporally, a sine-qua-non for each 
individual person ever alive. Without pre-existing society, no individual human being 
could exist. All language, culture and knowledge is conveyed and inculcated into 
individuals by a process of social learning (Boyd 1985) (Dawkins 2006), of 
knowledge available only within Society and effected, for better or worse, through the 
institutions of societies. 
The importance of the group for human survival is demonstrated also by the 
now generally accepted, but erstwhile contentious11, fact that evolutionary genetic 
selection takes place at group level12 as well as at individual level13. This means that 
                                            
11 cf. The discussion by Gintis, Henrich et al in “Strong Reciprocity and the Roots of Human 
Morality” (Gintis 2008, 246-247). 
12 Where the main source of non-random interactions in a population is the reproductive 
isolation of groups larger than families, and where the main selective pressures operating on 
individuals are competition for group survival, it is referred to as group selection, or more precisely 
and less confusingly, multi-level selection (Bowles 2011), (Nowak 2011), (Richerson 2005), and (Boyd 
1985). Multi-level selection works because members of predominantly altruistic groups have above-
average fitness and thus contribute disproportionately to the next generation. 
13 Group level selection is, however, always expressed at individual level (Nowak 2011). 
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a human group of sufficient size will always have a mix of genetic qualities and 
personality types that, ceteris paribus, make survival possible (Wilson 1975), and 
(Boehm 1997). Every society appears, then, in many ways to be a microcosm of 
Society. While many societies have failed, and morphed into other societies, or 
disappeared altogether (Diamond 2013), Society has never failed. If it had, you and I 
would not be here. But this does not mean that it cannot fail. It is just highly unlikely 
to fail, due to its wide geographic spread and the evolutionary stable mix of genetic 
and memetic14 material that make up Society. 
I do not contend that Society is therefore an organic whole separate from, 
independent of, and greater than the sum of its parts. However, I do suggest that it 
can be viewed as an organic system composed of the individuals who comprise it. It 
binds together the individuals within it through the historically shared human 
condition in an unbroken chain of succession. 
Society is not only composed of individuals with a group-level selected mix of  
human traits; it is also the crucible and tutor of their culture, morals and norms which 
are carried forward within Society in an evolutionary dynamic (Bowles 2011), 
(Chudek 2011), (Laland 1995), (Lumsden 1981), (Mesoudi 2008), and (Narvaez 
2014). It is dynamic because it is forever adapting to the changing human 
circumstance so that Society, in all its genetic and cultural diversity, is at any point 
really the culmination and the outcome of human history. It is also dynamic because 
individuals are the products of Society as well its producers, for they directly, or 
indirectly, knowingly, and unknowingly influence and determine its development. 
‘Justice’ on the other hand, is a term less readily defined. There is an 
extensive body of work on justice apart from John Rawls’s justice as fairness, and 
some important ones that have been used as criticisms of Rawls are discussed in 
Chapter 2 above. But the question that I will now attempt to deal with is what the 
subject matter of justice is, particularly for my purposes. 
                                            
14 ‘Meme,’ is the term for an evolutionary replicator, a noun that conveys the idea of a unit of 
cultural transmission, or a unit of imitation (Dawkins 2006, 192). This is a unit of information that can 
be conveyed (transmitted) to generation after generation through culture (the process of social 
learning). 
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It is as well to remind ourselves now that we are guided by principles of justice 
in the Rawlsian sense, i.e. principles providing a way of assigning rights and duties 
in the basic institutions of society and defining the appropriate distribution of the 
benefits and burdens of social cooperation (Rawls 2009, 4). Consequently, I am 
drawn to consider Frankena (Frankena 1962, 9) who characterised the idea of 
justice as follows: 
Justice, whether social or not, seems to involve at its centre the 
notion of an allotment of something to persons – duties, goods, 
offices, opportunities, penalties, punishments, privileges, roles, 
status, and so on. Moreover, at least in the case of distributive 
justice, it seems centrally to involve the notion of comparative 
allotment.15 
For the purposes of this project, I accept Frankena’s characterization of 
justice. It is a characterisation supported also by Rawls (Rawls 2009, 7). I would only 
propose that this characterisation, as formulated, lacks the ethical norm of fairness, 
or at least the perception between the parties that the allotment is morally justified. 
Social justice, for my purposes, thus involves the central notion of an 
allotment of social goods, as per Frankena, in a way that can be morally justified. An 
allotment will be morally justifiable, in terms of the given hypothesis I suggest, when 
the reasons for the allotment are in accordance with, and match our evolved notions 
of justice – linking with our intuitive perception of rightness. 
7. The Subject of Justice 
Social justice, to the extent that it features at all, would be a distinctive feature 
of societies, not of the individuals within it. Thus, the primary subject for this 
approach is our evolutionarily developed, gene-culturally, and socially embedded 
                                            
15 A notable element of Frankena’s characterisation is that it entails relationships between 
persons. It concerns an allotment made to one or more individuals by one or more individuals, who 
seemingly have a choice in the matter, or at least choice is not excluded. Thus, it describes 
relationships between individuals, between an individual and a group of individuals, between groups 
of individuals and obviously, but not incidentally, Society and the individuals comprising it. 
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notions of justice, of right and wrong, and more particularly, notions of how social 
goods ought to be distributed in societies to accord with these embedded notions.  
Today, in fact, it is quite widely accepted that evolutionary forces probably 
underlie all human morals and ethics, including our ideas of justice (Gintis 2008). 
This is because in recent years there has been an increasing interest in two related 
fields: ‘‘evolutionary ethics’’ and ‘‘moral psychology’’ (Mesoudi 2008, 229), and (Haidt 
2001). The former has its origin primarily in Sociobiology and philosophy, and the 
latter in psychology (evolutionary, social, and cognitive) and neuroscience. Although 
comprising a quite diverse range of theoretical  positions, all of this recent work is 
unified by two common themes: (1) an empirical basis, in which data from 
experimental psychology, neuroscience, primatology and anthropology are used to 
describe and explain people’s folk theories, intuitions and beliefs regarding what is 
right and wrong, rather than taking people’s stated beliefs at face value or relying on 
philosophers’ intuitions, introspection or reasoned arguments regarding those 
beliefs; and (2) an evolutionary basis, in which evolutionary principles are used to 
predict and explain why people hold the ethical norms and beliefs that they do. 
But, while the notion of justice is ubiquitously expressed in social life, it very 
often does not concern social justice as understood above, but rather concerns the 
norms according to which humans interact within Society, within societies, and 
societies inter se.  
Justice is a multi-faceted concept. There are facets such as personal justice, 
penal justice, procedural justice and the like. These facets of justice relate to 
questions such as how do we do justice to others; to my neighbour; my kin? What 
would be a just act, given present circumstances? What justice can I expect to be 
done to me, and how ought I to deal with anti-social people, people who do not 
adhere to the norms of our society? The notion of justice at this level is aptly 
captured by the golden rule: do unto others as you would have them do unto you, 
which is not a fundamental remove from the Kantian imperative of duty, which may 
be expressed as: “Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a 
universal law of nature” (Kant 2013, 13476-13477). 
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On the other hand, the notion of social justice is related to another set of 
questions. It asks how we all, unencumbered by our personal agendas, interests and 
purposes, taken together as society, should interact with each individual within it. 
What do we as Society owe to each individual member? What do the individual 
members of society owe - what do I owe, to all of us together, thus to Society? 
Approaching the question of social justice from this point of view is what I would call 
the Societal approach. In fact, evolutionary psychology invites the Societal approach 
due to the seminal role Society plays in human existence, as discussed above. 
There does not appear to be an extant golden rule for guidance to answer 
these societal questions. I believe that they, however, appear to lend themselves 
quite well to an evolutionary approach, as I hope to demonstrate in this project. 
But it may be asked what is meant by the term ‘owe’ in these contexts, and 
why should we owe each other anything? I suggest that ‘owe’ at the individual level 
means the reciprocal obligation to consider and regard one another in our 
communal, cooperative life. Successful cooperation, which can take place only in the 
context of group living within Society and societies, appears to require and demand 
communal prosocial values such as reciprocity, empathy, care, and other forms of 
altruistic behaviour. Being Social animals places us in a context of either cooperating 
for survival as a group or dying out. 
This does not imply that we only have prosocial values and that all individuals 
always behave cooperatively. Clearly, we have contrary and competing emotions as 
individuals. As individuals we have self-regarding values, social dominance 
orientations, inclinations to self-aggrandizement and so on, that may often conflict 
with our cooperative inclinations, and they often outdo and override our prosocial 
values. 
But the point of the societal argument is to characterise and understand 
human behaviour in groups and as groups. Despite individual aberrations, 
exceptions, and variations, humans tend within groups to behave cooperatively. I 
consequently suggest that cooperativeness is the dominant behavioural norm of 
individuals that tend to kick-in under social group circumstances. Were it not for 
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these traits we could never have the pyramids, or Roman roads and aqueducts, nor 
the Golden Gate Bridge, the Hoover Dam and many other public works marvels 
created by humans cooperating. 
In this context, then, the human species, in tandem with other social species, 
can be said to be cooperative by nature, only more so. “Cooperation evolves, not 
because it is “nice” but because it confers survival advantage (Greene 2013, 24). 
Thus, it is safe to suggest that our inclination to cooperate with each other is due to a 
predisposition provided by our genes and memes making us to sometimes appear 
even as super co-operators compared to our hominid cousins (Bowles 2011), 
(Chudek 2011), (Gintis 2004), (Nowak 2011), and (Richerson 2005). 
However, a further argument is made by Joshua Greene (Greene 2013). He 
argues that human morality developed to avert the tragedy of the commons. It 
evolved he argues, “to enable cooperation, but this conclusion comes with an 
important caveat, he warns. Biologically speaking, humans were designed for 
cooperation, but only with some people. Our moral brains evolved for cooperation 
within groups, and perhaps only within the context of personal relationships” (Greene 
2013, 23). Van Schaik seems to agree with this “tribal” interpretation when he quotes 
Schaller and Neuburg as authority for the proposition that the most fundamental 
human psychological predisposition is the in-group/out-group differentiation 
expressed in a psychological predisposition for easy adoption of intergroup 
stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination, while hostility toward strangers is 
probably ancient, given its presence in most primates (Van Schaik 2016). 
Because human groups had to compete with one another for resources, 
groups developed within group cooperation which bestowed a competitive 
advantage on the group: it allowed some cooperative groups to outcompete other 
less cooperative groups. This psychologically embedded moral thinking, he 
suggests, undermines cooperation between groups in the modern world. 
The development of within group morality appears to be the origin of the 
human “Us” and “Them” antagonism and why we struggle to develop a universal 
morality that is inclusive of all groups. Nevertheless, Greene also recounts how the 
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human emotions of empathy, sympathy and caring for complete strangers, without 
any expectation of reciprocity, are also part and parcel of our evolved human nature. 
He thus concludes that 
we are a caring species, albeit in a limited way, and we probably 
inherited at least some of our caring capacity from our primate 
ancestors, if not our more distant ancestors. We care most of all 
about our relatives and friends, but we also care about 
acquaintances and strangers. Under ordinary circumstances, 
we’re highly reluctant to harm strangers, so much so that even 
pretending to do so causes our veins to constrict. We’re also 
willing to help strangers, expecting nothing in return, so long as 
it’s not too costly. Because we care about one another, because 
our individual payoffs are not the only ones that matter to us, we 
can more easily get ourselves into the magic corner [of mutually 
advantageous cooperation]. (Greene 2013, 39) 
Thus, humans can be said to have the embedded capacity for humanity-wide 
cooperation and empathy, although we are in many ways ambivalent and vulnerable 
to “us” vs. “them” urgings and arguments. Greene argues that we need a 
metamorality that would be a moral system that can resolve disagreements among 
groups with different moral ideals. But clearly, such a metamorality must be 
developed from human beings as they are, with the evolutionarily embedded 
moralities that they have. Thus, it appears that a good base to proceed from in 
developing such a metamorality would be the evolutionarily embedded principles of 
social justice, the understanding of which is the purpose of my present project. 
I thus propose to further advance the discussion from a point of view I refer to 
as the societal approach. The societal approach proceeds from the consideration 
that there are evolutionary advantages to group living - in Society and in societies. 
We don’t just by happenstance live in close proximity to other human beings; the 
proximity of other humans is an inextricable part of being human. Group living can 
provide, inter alia, better security from predators and other threats, better 
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information, better mate choice, and more reliable food, to mention but a few. But 
there is also a downside, a cost to group living, as Pinker (Pinker 1998) argues: 
social animals risk theft, cannibalism, cuckoldry, infanticide, extortion and other 
forms of treachery. 
Although the natural advantages of group living outweigh the costs (otherwise 
there would not be such a variety of highly successful social animals, including 
humans), I suggest that what societies owe their members is to maximise the 
advantages, and minimise the costs of group living.16 Furthermore, Society and 
societies owe it to their members to distribute, through their institutions, the 
advantages and the costs of group living among them. I will argue, the details yet to 
come, that the distribution will be just when it accords with our evolutionarily 
developed, gene-culturally, and socially embedded notions of justice, and more 
particularly, our notions of how social goods ought to be distributed in societies in 
order to accord with these embedded notions  
But if the advantages of group living flow naturally from the group situation, 
and cooperativeness is evolutionarily embedded in us, as the hypothesis suggests, 
one might wonder why there arises an obligation to act prosocially at all. It could be 
suggested that if we all just act according to our natural inclinations we will live in a 
perfectly harmonious, cooperative way with ourselves and within societies. 
However, we are not solely cooperative by nature and we are not slaves to 
our genes. The evidence suggests that as individuals we are also endowed with 
certain anti-social tendencies, such as those towards selfishness, cheating, 
domineering others, and lying. Just as group living in society requires inter-personal 
                                            
16 [Society does not act, and humans seem to be short on instinct,] by dint of which many social 
animals and insects regulate their communal lives. But William James (James 1890). argued that 
human behaviour is more flexibly intelligent than that of other animals because we have more 
instincts than they do, not fewer. We tend to be instinct blind because our instincts work so well we 
just regard their workings as “normal” (Cosmides 2006, 1) and we take normal for granted. Our 
communal lives are thus probably also influenced by our complex instincts. Thus, actions within 
society are taken by people following their instincts, or through the institutionalised powers that be in a 
society.  
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pro-social attitudes for the survival of a group, individual survival has in our 
evolutionary past also demanded that we look after ourselves first. All viable 
organisms must have a selfish streak; they must be concerned about their own 
survival and well-being or they will not be leaving many offspring. Human 
cooperativeness and helpfulness are, as it were, laid on top of this primary, self-
interested foundation (Tomasello 2009, 142-143). 
Of course, when such anti-social tendencies proliferate they undermine the 
advantages to be gained from group living and increase the cost, and that would 
lead to unstable, fissiparous social groupings. 
But it might be objected that after such a long evolutionary period, the anti-
social tendencies would have been driven out by the growth of pro-social qualities as 
Darwin proposed. After all, Darwin already saw the limits of selfishness, when he 
wrote that 
selfish and contentious people will not cohere, and without 
coherence, nothing can be effected. A tribe possessing…a 
greater number of courageous, sympathetic and faithful members 
who were always ready to warn each other of danger, to aid and 
defend each other… would spread and be victorious over other 
tribes… Thus the social and moral qualities would tend slowly to 
advance and be diffused throughout the world (Darwin 
1998[1873], 134-135). 
On the other hand, there is the important consideration that, given these 
complex tendencies in Society, neither one would likely take over the whole 
population. Any such takeover would likely be unstable and eventually gravitate back 
to some equilibrium.17 Neither always acting anti-socially, nor always acting pro-
socially, is an evolutionary stable strategy18 on their own, because neither strategy is 
immune to treachery from within (Dawkins 2006, 72). Consequently, we should not 
                                            
17 The genetic technical term for this state is stable polymorphism (Dawkins 2006, 73). 
18 An evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS is defined as a strategy which, if most members of a 
population adopt it, cannot be bettered by an alternative strategy (Dawkins 2006, 69). 
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expect either of them to evolve into the universal social strategy.19 Society, and 
societies, will therefore presumably always contain a mix of pro-social and anti-social 
actors, since we appear to have both strong prosocial (as social animals) and 
antisocial (as individuals) proclivities. 
This does not necessarily imply that some people are singularly pro-social 
actors and others singularly anti-social. Society is not a polymorphism in which every 
individual always displays only one strategy or another. Each individual could display 
a complex mixture of various pro-social attributes and anti-social ones, depending 
upon a host of other factors.  However, for a multiplicity of reasons, some individuals 
may display a consistent bias to act either pro- or anti-socially. 
This conclusion suggests the likely origin of an enforceable obligation on 
every individual to act pro-socially (obey the laws, respect each other’s persons and 
property, pay a share of the cost of group living, etc.), since not all individuals will by 
nature act accordingly all the time. On the other hand, it might then be possible to 
reach an agreement, cemented in a political constitution, between all the individuals 
to act pro-socially, because this would ostensibly be to every individual’s advantage 
in the longer term. However, such an agreement would only be possible because 
every individual uses her conscious foresight, and is able to see that it is in her own 
long-term interests to obey the rules of the pact 
But Dawkins (op. cit.73) points out that in human agreements “there is a 
constant danger that individuals will stand to gain so much in the short term by 
breaking the pact that the temptation to do so will be overwhelming.” Hence the 
perpetual need for vigilance and enforcement of the obligation to act pro-socially. 
Research also suggests that these prosocial and ant-social proclivities were 
evolutionarily instilled in our genes through our environmental circumstances during 
the Pleistocene period and further developed by cultural evolution thereafter (Boehm 
                                            
19 The general conclusions which are important are that ESS is will tend to evolve through the 
interaction of strategies within societies. Any ‘conspiracy’ of ‘good’ guys, would not be stable because 
it would be liable to invasion by ‘bad’ guys and vice versa. An ESS is not the same as the optimum 
that could be achieved by a group conspiracy (Dawkins 2006, 75). 
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1997). The ecological context within which the human collaborative skills and 
motivations developed was a sort of cooperative foraging. Humans must have been 
put under some kind of selective pressure to collaborate in their gathering of food — 
they became obligate collaborators — in a way that their closest primate relatives 
were not (Tomasello 2009). 
Through such selective pressures that enforced cooperation and collaboration 
for survival, the human notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, as well as 
the need to punish recalcitrant members were hardwired into our emotional structure 
(Pinker 1998). This indicates why we regard non-cooperation and non-reciprocation 
as cheating and unfair; why we get angry with people who do not reciprocate or who 
violate the norms of fairness and cooperation. People who refuse to cooperate, 
collaborate and reciprocate fairly are therefore seen as people who put the survival 
of the human group at risk. 
What we see as unjust therefore angers us. We are primed to react this way 
because there have always been norm violators in every human society. Steven 
Pinker argues that 
Anger protects a person whose niceness has left her vulnerable 
to being cheated. When the exploitation is discovered, the person 
classifies the offending act as unjust and experiences indignation 
and a desire to respond with moralistic aggression: punishing the 
cheater by severing the relationship and sometimes hurting him 
(Pinker 1998, 404). 
Emotions vary widely in their functions, origins and neural instantiations. They 
are automatic processes that promote the achieving of behavioural efficiency 
(Greene 2013, 134).  More specifically, there appear to be strong emotional benefits 
to acting prosocially and being prosocially inclined (Keltner 2014). Prosocial 
emotions such as compassion (Frederickson 2001), (Goetz 2010), (McCullough 
2004) may give rise to numerous social and personal benefits, including greater 
social support and purpose in life (Frederickson 2008) and feelings of being close to 
friends (Waugh 2006). Prosocial behaviour also tends to trigger affective responses, 
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such as gratitude, that engage neurophysiological processes known to have 
beneficial regulatory effects on basic systems such as the immune and cortisol 
systems (Keltner 2014). 
There is further evidence that propose that the human notions of justice are 
biologically based (Copranzano 2011). Research in primatology suggests that the 
human emotion of disgust in the face of injustice has an evolutionary origin (Folger 
2008). This conjecture is seemingly supported by research in neuroscience which 
focussed on brain functioning. This suggests that human decisions about justice and 
injustice are made in the same regions of the brain associated with negative 
emotional responses, such as the insular cortex (Hsu 2008), and (Sanfey 2002). 
These empirical results thus tend to lend support to the present hypothesis that 
human beings generally have a psyche attuned to prosocial norms and values such 
as justice, and that we have emotional responses associated with justice and 
injustice. Consequently, it is argued that our basic notions of justice and injustice are 
embedded in our psyche. 
Prosocial and anti-social behaviours, together with their associated emotional 
responses, are thus evidently closely connected to our notions of justice and 
injustice respectively. The entanglement of our notions of justice and injustice with 
our emotions suggests why, at a population level, anger at perceived unjust 
treatment through laws, policies and systems often turn into violent action. The latter 
apparently reflects a lack of social justice.  
Research further suggests that the most parsimonious proximal explanation of 
human cooperation, which is supported by extensive experimental and other 
evidence, is that people gain pleasure from, or feel morally obligated to cooperate 
with like-minded people (Bowles 2011). People also enjoy punishing those who 
exploit the cooperation of others, or feel morally obligated to punish exploiters. Free-
riders frequently feel guilty, and when sanctioned by others, they may experience 
shame (Bowles 2011). The involvement of emotion with cooperative behaviour and 
punishment is a clear indication that it all stems from an adaptive genetic-
evolutionary prime cause (Pinker 1998), and (Trivers 1971). 
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Greene argues that “[m]orality evolved as a solution to the problem of 
cooperation, as a way of averting the Tragedy of the Commons.” It is a set of 
psychological adaptations, he argues, that allow otherwise selfish individuals to reap 
the benefits of cooperation (Greene 2013, 23). Although morality is clearly involved 
with cooperative behaviour, this argument by Green is contentious. Insofar as it 
suggests that cooperation developed as a way of averting the tragedy of the 
commons, it is correct that it is a trait that allows us to avoid the tragedy of the 
commons, but it is not therefore necessarily a driver of the development of 
cooperation. Cooperativeness is found in many animals (Dugatkin 1997) (Van 
Schaik 2016), and especially among primates, where it can be found in a bewildering 
variety of configurations (Van Schaik 2016, 335). 
This means that if Greene’s argument is correct, at least all primates have 
moral values, since they also overcame the challenge of cooperation. This would be 
in line with the reasoning of Frans de Waal who contends that animals show 
behaviour that parallels the benevolence as well as the rules and regulations of 
human moral conduct (De Waal 1996). But the resolution of this question lies outside 
the scope of this project 
Van Schaik says that cooperation in primates is found whenever mechanisms 
exist that remove the threat that free riders parasitize on the efforts of co-operators. 
Among non-human primates, he observes, most dyadic cooperation takes place 
within the framework of friendships or social bonds, which may or may not be based 
on kinship. Thus, he concludes, kin selection and individual selection suffice to 
explain the evolution of cooperation among primates. 
The discussion thus far suggests that the human notions of justice and 
injustice are not only evolutionarily embedded, but are accessed intuitively, since 
emotional responses such as enjoyment, anger, shame, and so on, are instinctive; 
they are not usually called forth at will. But it also suggests that there may be a 
psychological need for justice. Humans would not likely respond emotionally to the 
absence of something like justice, were it not for an underlying psychological need. I 
thus suggest that justice in society is most likely an evolutionarily embedded 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 108 
 
psychological need of humans, an essential requirement of human social life. This 
proposition then further supports the hypothesis that human beings generally have a 
psyche attuned to upholding the norms and values associated with right and wrong, 
justice and injustice, and that the great majority of people consequently would uphold 
most of them, and very few would likely find any of them repugnant. 
However, intuition alone would be a very unreliable, tenuous, and most 
probably a misleading guide (Kahneman 2011) to the principles of justice, since our 
intuitive emotional responses can arise from selfish as well as from altruistic feelings. 
Anger may equally arise from feelings of either real, or imagined personal injustice 
suffered, or such an injustice to the people I identify with, or a perceived injustice to 
others, not involving myself, or perhaps merely from my own thwarted expectations. 
Also, what amounts to injustice for any individual under particular circumstances can 
often be very subjective. How misleading our intuitive grasp of justice in our social 
context can be, is illustrated by research done among the broad American population 
to determine their preference for just distributions of wealth (Norton 2011). 
In their research, Norton and Ariely (Norton 2011) found that in a 
representative sample of the US population, participants greatly underestimated the 
actual inequality of the wealth distribution in their country. In their estimation wealth 
was substantially more equally distributed than it actually was at the time of the 
survey. This attitude held across all demographics. Even more significant, when the 
authors requested the panellists to construct a distribution over five percentiles of 
what they would view as the ideal distribution, they gave the top 20% of the 
population 32% of all the wealth compared to the 84% that they have in reality. The 
bottom 20% of the population they would ideally give just more than 10% of the 
wealth as against the 0.01% they actually have. The disparity between perception 
and reality is thus strikingly disproportionate. I suggest that this also implicitly 
supports a human psychological bias towards more egalitarian distributions. 
By implication this also suggests that a civil society founded on principles 
derived from our evolved notions of justice will be a well-ordered society. Since the 
embedded notions of justice seem to constitute a psychological need of humans, it 
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appears very likely that the closer a society comes to fully meeting that need, the 
better ordered it will be. 
8. The Notions of Justice 
This raises the question of what exactly the embedded notions of justice might 
be. If the foregoing discussion is in essence correct, one could already derive some 
general categories of what humans might commonly experience as just and unjust. 
These categories would probably bring the prosocial values of cooperative, 
supportive, empathic, and caring behaviour under the umbrella of just conduct. 
Displays of selfishness, lack of empathy, cruelty, egoism, and uncooperative 
behaviour would likely be experienced as unjust and reprehensible. Behaviour 
leading to distributions that are experienced as unjust would be met with moralistic 
sanction and chastisement. I suggest that the discussion indicates that our evolved 
notions of justice and injustice are essentially related to reinforcing the fabric of 
Social life; encouraging that which will keep societies living together in peace and 
harmony, while discouraging actions that, if left unchecked, would be fissiparous for 
society. This applies to the actions of people within societies, but obviously also to 
actions of the powers-that-be in societies as they relate to one, some, or all the 
members of those societies. 
But how does all that translate into notions of distributive justice in Society? 
This question involves a further consideration of our evolutionarily developed human 
disposition. The theory postulated in this project holds that the derived principles of 
social justice might be expected to involve an appositely egalitarian distribution of 
social goods among the members of society. This is because there is some 
persuasive research suggesting that the fundamental human disposition favours 
egalitarianism. This I will now attempt to demonstrate, but to deal properly with this 
fundamental20 consideration it will be necessary to traverse some ground covered by 
the pro- and anti-egalitarian arguments. 
                                            
20 Fundamental to the development of this evolutionary theory of social justice. It is 
fundamental because what will be seen as just from an egalitarian point of view will, at least in 
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8.1. An Egalitarian Mind? 
In this section, I shall discuss the possible human disposition as it 
fundamentally views other human beings. Do humans fundamentally view other 
humans as equals, or are we by nature inclined to look down on some and up to 
others? Modern societies are complex societies, which means that they are all highly 
stratified with levels of dominance, coercion and preferment. This is obviously not a 
new development: as the European feudal societies and their immediate 
predecessors were stratified, so modern societies are stratified, but on a different 
technological and social basis. This leads one to suppose that social stratification 
with high levels of coercion are the norm for humans, that that is actually the way 
they are supposed to be. But there is an alternative view that I wish to discuss, 
namely the possibility that humans actually have an egalitarian mind. 
It is true that the idea of egalitarianism is a highly contested one (Nowak 
2011, 81-94). However, my interest in the debate between egalitarianism and social 
hierarchy is focussed not on whether the one is more desirable than the other. My 
interest is to attempt to determine whether the evolutionarily developed human 
psyche is more inclined to social egalitarianism or to social dominance, the latter 
being a driver of stratified, hierarchical societies. 
The dominator model of humans (humans over nature and human over 
human) has captured much imagination in recent centuries and is considered 
natural, normal, and necessary by many thinkers (Eisler 1988), and (Korten 2007). 
Social hierarchies are ubiquitous but variable in animal and human societies (Fisher 
2013, 1107). Fisher notes that one set of theories suggests that hierarchical 
organisation provides an evolutionary advantage and increases survival value for 
                                                                                                                                       
distributive justice, vary greatly from what will be regarded as just from an inegalitarian standpoint. 
Given the premise of this project that societies should be structured to accord with the human psyche, 
it would be unjust to impose egalitarian principles on a fundamentally inegalitarian population, and 
vice versa. Whether the human psyche is fundamentally egalitarian or not is thus a fundamental 
question. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 111 
 
species, as they allow for more efficient resource extraction (e.g. production of food) 
through greater specialization of roles. 
But anthropologists have also noted that greater complexity in small-scale 
societies is associated with increases in social inequality and unequal wealth 
distribution (Borgerhoff Mulder. 2009, 686-687). According to Fisher this strongly 
suggests that increased social complexity is associated with greater social 
stratification (hierarchy) and that in the long run more hierarchical groups survive and 
have access to more resources (Fisher 2013, 1108). 
In modern societies, Fisher concludes, there seems to be significant variation 
in the support and endorsement of hierarchical organisation. Although social 
dominance and hierarchy values are present in all modern societies, the extent to 
which groups are socially stratified and group members endorse and support 
hierarchical values and beliefs differs dramatically around the world. His hypothesis 
is that there may be a genetic predisposition to the formation of hierarchical societies 
due to the influence of the short allele of 5-HTT21. If a group has a biological 
vulnerability (higher probability of short-alleles) to react more negatively to 
environmental threats and stressors, and the environment is likely to trigger these 
negative clinical symptoms due to greater number of various such threats and 
stressors, then the group faces a greater risk of becoming dysfunctional and unable 
to meet survival challenges, unless a strong hierarchy provides an efficient way for 
organizing social life. 
This hypothesis, although unproven, is credible in general outline at least. An 
apparently compatible argument is made by Joan Chiao et al when they suggest that 
a fundamental way that individuals differ is in the degree to which they prefer social 
dominance hierarchy over egalitarianism as a guiding principle of societal structure, 
a phenomenon they describe as social dominance orientation (SDO) (Chiao 2009). 
They argue that SDO is a core value underlying social structure across the animal 
                                            
21 An allele is one of two or more alternative forms of a gene that arise by mutation and are found at 
the same place on a chromosome. An allele is just the locus on a gene – it can arise due to mutation 
or due to ordinary reproduction. 5-HTT is the identifier of a gene with a role as a serotonin transporter. 
The short allele is therefore one particular version of the 5-HTT gene. 
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kingdom. Across species and human cultures, dominant social groups and 
individuals within the hierarchy often have primary access to precious resources 
(e.g., territory, food, mates) relative to those of lower rank. Modern social 
psychologists, they observe, have discovered that people vary in the degree to which 
they prefer their own social group to dominate others, which is to say that they vary 
in their degrees of SDO (Chiao 2009). 
But, as Sidanius and Pratto have found, empathic22 concern is an important 
attenuator of preference for social hierarchy (Pratto 1994).  Individuals who exhibit 
strong empathic concern, a capacity to both share and feel concern for other 
people’s emotion, tend to prefer egalitarian rather than hierarchical social relations 
between groups (Sidanius 1999). This is not all due to genes; cultures have a great 
deal to do with the type of moral personality that their members foster (Fry 2006), 
and (Narvaez 2014). Cultures emphasize and promote different characteristics, like 
empathy, affecting everything from individual personality to worldview and 
perspectives on human nature (Narvaez 2014, Loc. 1259-1261). But little is known 
about the neurobiological mechanisms underlying an individual’s preference for 
social dominance hierarchy versus egalitarianism. 
The near omnipresence of social hierarchy across social species in the animal 
world and in modern human cultures suggests that the ability to successfully 
navigate hierarchical social interaction arises from adaptive mechanisms in the mind 
and brain that support the emergence and maintenance of social hierarchies within 
and across social groups (Chiao 2009, 175), (Boehm 1999). Empathy, on the other 
hand, is supported by a distinct neural matrix of limbic and paralimbic brain regions, 
including the anterior insula (AI), the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the lateral 
cerebellum, and the brainstem (Decety 2004), (Hein 2008). AI and ACC are two 
major regions of the pain matrix thought to code the autonomic and affective 
                                            
22 Empathy is a term that can refer to several distinct affective and cognitive processes. Here the 
term ‘empathy’ is used to refer to individuals’ ability to understand another person’s feelings, 
experience, etc. 
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dimension of pain, and, in particular, the subjective experience of empathy when 
perceiving pain or distress in others (Decety 2004), (Hein 2008). 
In laboratory experiments, Chiao et al therefore used functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine the association between SDO and emphatic 
neural responses in humans during perception of pain in others. Their hypothesis 
was that the degree of preference for social dominance hierarchy would significantly 
vary as a function of neural responses associated with empathy, when controlled for 
other known modulatory factors such a gender, age, and disposition. Their results 
show that insular cortex activity of the brain is associated not only with aversion to 
inequity during economic exchanges (e.g., whether one accepts a fair or unfair 
monetary allocation for oneself or another person), as described by Sanfey et al 
(Sanfey 2003), but more generally with an aversion for any kind of group-level social 
inequality (e.g., whether different social groups should have equal right to vote or 
equal access to educational opportunities). 
Empathy can therefore be said to be a human emotion that stems from neural 
activity located in the insular cortex, but the same neural activity is associated with 
feelings of aversion to any social inequality within the responder’s group. Empathy, 
which is seemingly encoded in the insular cortex, is thus strongly associated with 
egalitarian preferences, which supports the suggestion that these preferences are 
probably evolutionary adaptations embedded in the human brain through thousands 
of generations of enforced egalitarianism, which is what would be required for a trait 
like egalitarianism to be biologically embedded. It further suggests that modern 
egalitarian behaviour and judgments are not solely due to socialising forces but are 
part of human biology and are thus genetically transferred from one generation to the 
next (Boehm 1997). 
Although there are some ambiguities in the data, Boehm asserts that there is 
enough convincing evidence to believe that as of some 40,000 years ago, with 
anatomically modern humans living in small groups and before plant and animal 
domestication, all human societies practised deliberate egalitarian behaviour, and 
that most of the time they did it very successfully (Boehm 1993, 236). Dentan, 
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reviewing Boehm’s article (Boehm 1993, 241), agrees that Boehm's argument 
suggests that egalitarianism is chronologically prior to stratification - also cf. (Knauft 
1991). Boehm’s argument is that the genetic basis for the ambivalence we find in 
human nature was structured long ago, at a time when the egalitarian syndrome 
reigned universally and therefore cultural conditions were favourable to increased 
genetic selection of generically altruistic traits. 
But other writers, e.g., (Mitchell 1988, 638), (Cohen 1985, 100), (Dumont 
1970), and  (Sahlins 1959), either imply or state outright that human dispositions that 
abet hierarchy formation may also be innate (Boehm 1993, 237). Thus, there 
appears to have been selection forces, acting on individuals, favouring social 
dominance and social hierarchy formation, while at the same time there were strong 
egalitarian and dominance aversion forces operating at the group level. According to 
Boehm (Boehm 1997), this selection scenario remained in place for thousands of 
generations, and the result was a shift in the balance of power between individual 
and group selection in favour of selection for group effects. This balance is reflected 
in the current ambivalent human nature that exhibits substantial altruism in addition 
to dominance, selfishness and nepotism. 
Boehm therefore postulates that human societies are ambivalent to social 
dominance and we may be better off thinking about coevolved genetic 
predispositions that go in contradictory directions (Boehm 1993, 238). Boehm says 
that human nature is structured to be ambivalent. It explains to why humans are 
attracted to social ideologies that are altruistic – ranging from egalitarian hunter-
gatherer codes to modern state welfarism and idealistic communist blueprints - while 
others can set aside their altruistic preferences to go with the other side of this basic 
ambivalence: they favour societal blueprints that openly or implicitly espouse 
individual selfishness (Boehm, 1997, S117) – cf. “The Virtue of Selfishness” (Rand 
1964). 
If we accept Boehm’s postulates, it appears that we cannot characterise the 
human mind fundamentally either as egalitarian or as socially dominant: it is both. 
Thus, every human being experiences, to varying degrees, feelings of generic 
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altruism in addition to feelings of selfishness and nepotism. Every human being then 
has an ambivalent mind – he has egalitarian as well as social dominance traits. 
Which of the two traits may be dominant in any particular individual is a complex 
matter, but probably depends on an interaction between his socialisation (culture) 
and his individually varying genetic heritage (Boehm 1997, S117). Generally, 
however, we can accept a human mind being fundamentally ambivalent with regard 
to an egalitarian or unequal, stratified social structure, but determined by 
socialisation within the ruling cultural environment. 
This suggests many other questions, such as how much stratification and how 
much social dominance humans can tolerate without social disruption and 
breakdown ensuing. But those are matters for a different study. For the purposes of 
this project I suggest that it is sufficient to accept the ambivalence of the human mind 
and to rather focus on such evidence of structural and distributional preferences as 
we can discover in the literature. 
In the next section, I therefore wish to discuss the research and evidence 
regarding our distributional preferences. I suggest that the question resolves itself 
into a question of whether humans prefer an egalitarian distribution of social goods, 
or a distribution based on laissez faire, or on some other principle. 
8.2. Our Distributional Preferences  
Before discussing the possible human distributive preferences, which 
amounts to finding what distributions human beings would find to be just, I find it 
necessary to examine what exactly the term ‘egalitarian’ and ‘egalitarian distribution’ 
means in the context of the EP approach. The evidence certainly does not seem to 
suggest that the evolutionarily developed human disposition requires a 
mathematically equal distribution of goods whereby everybody gets exactly the same 
amount of everything (Speth 1990), (Kent 1993). Indeed, there seems to be enough 
evidence on the ethnographic record to indicate that there are degrees of 
egalitarianism; on the face of it there does not appear to be any absolute preference 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 116 
 
of distributary shares (Kent 1993), except to the extent that it takes place within an 
egalitarian ethos. 
Greene (Greene 1998, xxxviii) argues, correctly in my view, that “Equitable or 
fair treatment … does not always mean equal treatment – certainly when that means 
treating people with widely disparate needs in the same way.” This appears to be 
exactly the same idea that Aristotle (Aristotle 2012 [350 BC], 50) advanced when he 
wrote that distributional justice is proportional; “the unjust is what violates the 
proportion.” He makes it clear that he is referring to a geometrical proportion. 
Hence, he says, one term of the equation becomes too great, and the other 
too small, as indeed happens in practice; for the man who acts unjustly, he says, has 
too much, and the man who is unjustly treated too little, of what is good. Equality as 
such is thus not denied, but proportional equality is confirmed. Determining the just 
proportion, and the values to be applied in the determination of a just proportion, I 
suggest, are thus questions that must be considered within particular cultural 
contexts. 
There is too much paucity of the ethnographic record to allow us to detail 
specific distributions among, for example, Pleistocene-age foragers, but we can 
probably derive some broad principles from relevant research that has been done of 
the ethnographic record and among modern day foraging peoples. There is, for 
example, a reported pervasiveness and variability of food sharing among hunting 
and gathering groups and the observation that some resources are shared more 
than others (Binford 1978), (Bose 1964), (Damas 1975), (Gould 1981), (Lee 1979), 
and (Marshall 1961). Thus, studies of human foragers should provide some context 
for isolating a sample of the main factors in the evolutionary development of sharing 
among humans. 
In this section, I wish to discuss the evidence collected and the research that 
has been done regarding the distribution of resources among early humans, 
especially during the Pleistocene. During this time our fundamentally egalitarian 
minds were formed and I shall argue that their distributary practices probably form 
the foundation of the distributive value system that lurk subliminally in the minds of 
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latter day humans. This subliminal value system, I suggest, is the default value to 
which our distributional justice notion defers. 
I thus focus on the sharing practices of humans, especially early ones, 
because sharing is an early system of distribution. It may be the best example we 
can have of the basis of any inherent human distributive preferences. It appears, as I 
shall argue below, that through the sharing of food as well as most other life 
necessaries, early humans practised an egalitarian distribution system. Food sharing 
is ubiquitous in human societies, but I intend to argue that the sharing fundamentally 
takes place within a cultural context of gift giving. This will appear from the 
discussion that follows. 
The sharing of food, especially meat, is believed by many anthropologists to 
be so basic a part of the forager way-of-life that archaeological evidence for its 
apparent emergence more than one-and-a-half to two million years ago in the Plio-
Pleistocene has been taken as one of the first clear signs of true “humanness” (Isaac 
1978).  
Much has been written about human resource sharing and there has been 
considerable debate about the driving forces that underlie this phenomenon. It has 
been widely suggested that sharing mitigates variation in meat acquisition in many 
foraging groups to this day. This is basically an economic explanation, and not the 
only economically based one that is currently still popular among some 
anthropologists. (Bird-David 1992), (Cashdan 1985), and (Kaplan 1985). 
One corollary of economic explanations is the assumption that because all 
adult members participate in the sharing network, all must therefore be receiving 
portions of more or less equivalent nutritional value. Speth (Speth 1990) challenges 
this assumption. He suggests that the emphasis that anthropologists place on the 
sharing of food, especially meat, is a perspective that may obscure rather than 
enhance our understanding of the origins and functioning of foraging (i.e., so-called 
“band” or “immediate return”) societies. Consequently, they underemphasize, or 
ignore entirely the fact that foragers actually share a much broader spectrum of 
social, political, economic, and even sexual rights and privileges. Food and other 
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material items, in fact, form only a small component within this much larger array of 
reciprocal exchanges and interactions (Speth 1990, 174). Accepting Speth’s critique 
therefore leads one to conjecture that “sharing” is the important concept, of which the 
sharing of food is only one part. 
The research of Susan Kent (Kent 1993, 498) supports the contention that 
sharing is a much wider practice in forager societies than merely the sharing of food. 
She argues that in staunchly egalitarian societies, egalitarian sharing includes their 
politics, economics, gender relations and social organization - cf. (Lee 1979). The 
motive for the type and pervasiveness of sharing in the societies on which Kent 
focusses is a fiercely egalitarian ethic. But she adds that egalitarianism is a 
continuum, not an absolute value; societies are only more or less egalitarian. 
Sharing, she observes, is deliberately manipulated to maintain social bonds. The 
latter finding also supports Boehm’s conclusion that political egalitarianism was 
achieved by deliberate social policy (op. cit.).  
Sharing evens out that which is unequal. It equalises those situations that are 
inherently unequal, such as those related to success and skill in hunting - cf. also 
(Hill 1989), and (Howell 1986, 164). Sharing maintains and reinforces social 
relationships. Speth agrees with what he says is the current view in anthropology at 
the time of his writing, that sharing is a key factor in forming and maintaining social 
bonds (Speth 1990, 149), and (Richerson 1999). Consequently, sharing nullifies the 
social and economic significance of variations in hunting skill and success. Kent 
contends that egalitarianism is necessary for the cohesiveness of these egalitarian 
societies and sharing is necessary for that egalitarianism. 
One must obviously be careful not to generalise too widely from these 
observations, but a broad outline of human sharing behaviour does seem to be 
evident.  It appears that although sharing does have important economic effects, it is 
not primarily an economic or a social security driven institution. Kent argues that 
while social solidarity, underpinned by a culture of sharing, may be necessary for 
group or social survival, sharing is unnecessary for an individual family's physical 
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survival. In other words, without sharing, a family can survive and even thrive 
economically. Clearly then, sharing is not an overtly economic or charitable activity. 
Kent reports that sharing still takes place even while there is an abundance of 
food. It is important to note that sharing is not restricted to “haves” sharing with “have 
nots”. Everybody shares with everybody else; goodwill is reciprocally demonstrated. 
Therefore, everyone in the sharing network benefits socially, although not everyone 
benefits economically (Kent 1993, 493). Rather than seeing these practices as food 
sharing, one might also see it as reciprocal gift giving on particular occasions, which 
is a goodwill-inducing human practice to this day. 
Although these conclusions relate specifically to what are generally described 
as egalitarian societies, i.e. societies that practice and enforce egalitarianism as 
social policy, it must be considered that according to Boehm’s (op. cit.) persuasive 
study, this was the condition of all human societies during most of our evolutionary 
past.23 It was therefore the milieu wherein our human psyche was developed and 
nurtured for millennia. 
In consequence of these considerations, I propose that the following 
conclusions appropriately recapitulates the essence of the discussion: 
8.2.1. Sharing is a hallmark of egalitarian societies; and 
8.2.2. During the Pleistocene era humans universally engaged in sharing 
practices; and 
8.2.3. The human mind was shaped during the Pleistocene period to prefer 
egalitarian distributions. 
Consequently, I suggest it would not be inappropriate to propose that a 
broadly egalitarian distribution of goods will be generally pleasant and acceptable to 
most humans.  
I have already suggested that our evolved notions of justice and injustice are 
essentially related to behaviours that tend either to reinforce, or alternatively to rend 
                                            
23 Since approximately 40,000 years ago until the present, with complex hierarchical societies 
only beginning to appear from about 10,000 years ago (Boehm, Hierarchy in the Forest: The 
Evolution of Egalitarian Behavior 1999), and (Richerson 1999). 
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the fabric of Social life; just behaviour most likely encouraging that which will deepen 
social bonding and keep societies living together in peace and harmony, while 
discouraging actions that, if left unchecked, would be fissiparous for society. It now 
appears that the human notion of justice and the sharing of resources serve the 
same social purpose. Therefore, the two notions must be reasonably closely 
associated and perhaps intertwined. More egalitarian distributions will thus likely be 
seen as just and more inegalitarian ones as unjust. 
But, as is suggested by the research dealt with above, there does not seem to 
be any meticulous accounting of the sharing to ensure a total equality of net receipts 
by all concerned. Sharing, Speth maintains (Speth 1990, 149)24, effects a social and 
economic levelling, but not necessarily a precise equality of outcomes. Speth 
questions the assumption that equality in the right to participate in the act of sharing 
necessarily implies equity in the nutritional benefits that accrue from sharing - see 
also (Flanagan 1989, 248). 
 There are several factors that create inequality in some forager communities, 
such as food taboos and preferential treatment of hunters, but it is still a sharing that 
reciprocally demonstrates goodwill and inter-personal solidarity, rather than 
achieving any formulaic equality. Speth’s point is that the single term – egalitarian – 
probably obscures the very observational and behavioural variability and complexity 
that it is sought to identify and explain, because there is so much variation in the 
practices between bands that he doubts that the term ‘egalitarian’ can be 
indiscriminately applied to all foragers. He maintains that foragers actually share a 
much broader spectrum of social, political, economic and even sexual rights. He 
argues that the nutritional impact of food sharing is not necessarily equal between all 
sharers, but that it must be seen as part of a total culture of sharing (op. cit. p.174). It 
is crucial, Kent thus argues, to study sharing within the context of the whole culture, 
including how it articulates with the social, political and economic organization of the 
                                            
24 Speth questions the assumption that equality in the right to participate in the act of sharing 
necessarily implies equity in the nutritional benefits that accrue from sharing - see also (Flanagan 
1989, 248) 
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society (Kent 1993, 506). Speth’s argument thus supports the contention that 
although there might be ambivalence in some foraging communities to strict 
egalitarianism, there is nevertheless important social and economic results from 
sharing as an apparently psychologically driven behaviour pattern, even though the 
outcomes are not always strictly egalitarian. 
But sharing is also not merely symbolic; it is substantial, with substantial 
socio-economic effects. It seems unlikely that such sharing societies could ever 
produce poverty side-by-side with affluence. The practice, despite sometimes having 
some inegalitarian features, appears probably to reflect some measure of 
proportionality, “roughly equivalent amounts”, in the distribution of especially meat - 
those with a lot to give giving more than they receive and vice versa, but nobody 
ever receives nothing and never gives anything. 
What exactly the basis and measure of such rough proportionality might be, it 
will be a loose measure, and, I suggest, one that will likely vary from culture to 
culture and from good to good, as described by Kent and Speth. There is thus not 
likely a universal human measure of just distributions, except to say that distributions 
are particularly and fundamentally subject to evaluations based on justness. Just 
distributions of consumer goods would in any human culture, I suggest, be broadly 
egalitarian within the parameters of some culturally defined measures of 
proportionality. But this all relates mostly to the sharing of food, and other consumer 
goods. 
What also appears to be of importance for this project is how humans, during 
their evolutionarily formative epochs fundamentally distributed other social goods 
apart from consumer goods. An indication of this might be gleaned from Kent’s 
statement that egalitarian societies are not structured by division into social roles. In 
highly non-stratified societies, she says, social roles are organized by the absence of 
rigid status, age, and gender differentiation; that is, by egalitarianism. Egalitarianism 
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in social relations can be seen in the flexibility of social roles within the society (Kent 
1993, 480).25  
This seems to indicate the nature of the egalitarian psyche. There are no 
apparent specially advantaged people, enjoying more rights and privileges than 
other people. Thus, it appears that as far as rights, liberties and privileges are 
concerned there is no basis in any of these societies for a stratified differentiation 
between individuals, or groups of individuals. Therefore, regarding social goods, 
excluding consumer goods, it seems that strict equality is the likely rule. 
I therefore propose that social goods, as opposed to material social goods 
(consumer goods and services), were distributed on a basis of strict equality during 
our long forager history wherein our basic egalitarian minds developed. The basic 
human psyche, I suggest, is structured to accept and prefer an egalitarian 
distribution of social goods – a distribution thus based on principles of strict equality. 
But we do not have to focus only on ancient societies to discern human 
distributional preferences. In modern societies, certain very egalitarian distributions 
are also widely accepted and maintained. In this regard we should consider, for 
example, the modern history of the worldwide expansion of the suffrage after the 
American and French Revolutions of 1776 and 1789. Although many societies have 
not yet been so empowered, it is still a demand that exists everywhere, and where it 
has been achieved, it was done by popular demand and support, to the point of 
engendering popular revolutions. The very idea that government should be for the 
benefit of all the people is a further indication of a very wide acceptance of a more 
egalitarian distribution of social goods. 
The political right to participate in, and benefit from the power system of 
society can be classified as positive liberty (Berlin 1969), and (Constant 2010 
[1819]). The history of the spreading enfranchisement of people is thus the history of 
                                            
25 This quite strongly suggests that all social roles are open to everybody. Any person who 
takes the lead in, for example, going on a hunt, becomes the leader pro-tem if others follow him, or 
her. I suggest that such will also be the case in, inter alia, food preparation, shelter building, and 
moving on to new locations. 
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an increasingly egalitarian distribution of positive liberty, and although increasing 
enfranchisement was bitterly opposed virtually everywhere, once it was achieved 
there seems to have been no popular reaction to overturn it. At the very least this 
means that that high SDO individuals in those societies are unable to raise any 
popular support for a more inegalitarian distribution of these rights. 
Kameda et al (Kameda 2010) also argue that although income inequality 
sharply divides industrialised societies all over the world, material egalitarianism26 
may even today still operate as a fundamental principle affecting social sharing and 
exchange under uncertainty in many domains of human activity. They reviewed four 
sets of empirical and theoretical results with implications for the adaptive bases of 
material egalitarianism. They presented Japanese students in seven different 
schools with two sets of a division of material goods: The first division allocated the 
goods on a basis proportional to individual production levels, while the second 
division follows an egalitarian rule.  
The question asked of the students about their preferences for resource 
allocation beyond direct self-interest – it sought their preferences for a desirable 
social state, rather than a desirable personal state. Among a total of 1,322 students 
who answered the question, 73% chose the egalitarian allocation. The proportion of 
egalitarian-ideology endorsers differed substantively across the seven schools, 
ranging from 63% to 83%. 
Only one factor was correlated with the differences in the proportion of 
egalitarian endorsers – the social rank of the university. Students in the less 
prestigious schools, who tended to be from working-class families, endorsed the 
egalitarian ideology at higher rates. The authors argue that egalitarian ideology, as 
endorsed by blue-collar, working-class citizens, may be seen as a collective solution 
to cope with life uncertainties, when personal solutions (e.g., wealth, education) are 
unavailable. They also think that this type of collective solution for life uncertainties 
may have operated in many human societies until quite recently, possibly supporting 
the evolution of psychological algorithms designed to deal with resource uncertainty 
                                            
26 Meaning an egalitarian approach to the distribution of material goods. 
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and sharing. They then continue to develop this argument with several lines of 
evidence, including ethnographies in anthropology, evolutionary computer 
simulations, and behavioural experiments. 
They then surmise that, given that uncertainty in resource supply was a 
recurrent adaptive problem in the Environments of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA) 
and that most humans have been unable to solve this problem individually until quite 
recently, our minds may have been built, by evolution, as egalitarian sharers. An 
egalitarian psychology could be an evolved adaptation to high uncertainty in the EEA 
and, if so, should be a panhuman universal. Ethnographies of hunter-gatherer 
groups, evolutionary game analyses of communal sharing, and the operation of a 
windfall psychology all support this conjecture. 
Eventually they conclude from all the evidence analysed through their 
research, and importantly for this project, that social justice systems that exist in our 
modern world may be highly complex and varied, yet they can all be understood as 
adaptations to respective social and natural ecologies where people live, that is, as 
adjustments to local ecologies on top of the fundamentally egalitarian mind (Kameda 
2010, 19). 
But consider also the results of the research of Norton and Ariely among 
Americans (Norton 2011). Their results suggest that there exists a modern human 
bias to more egalitarian distributions. The United States is the country in the modern 
world with a society one would expect to have the highest toleration for the inequality 
of wealth (Osberg 2006), given their strong cultural meritocratic orientation. The 
panellists were first asked to indicate their preference for three sets of anonymous 
wealth distributions: one of strict equality; one reflecting the Swedish distribution and 
one reflecting the actual US distribution, all unbeknown to them. The panellists 
preferred the Swedish distribution to the US one by 92% to 8%. But the Swedish 
distribution to the strictly equal distribution was preferred only by 51% to 49% - a 
close run thing. 
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If we consider that the Swedish wealth distribution put to the panellists gives a 
Gini coefficient27 of 0.225 it is quite enlightening to find that the ideal distribution, as 
given by the panellists when they were asked to indicate that, gives a Gini of 0.2 – 
even more egalitarian than Sweden. It suggests that even among Americans, there 
exists a psychological bias to “more egalitarian” distributions. It also suggests that 
the reason for their misjudgement of the actual US distribution might be that they 
were misled by their egalitarian bias to suppose that the reality was more egalitarian 
by far, than it actually is. It is also significant, from the psychological point of view, 
that when the panellists were asked to construct an ideal distribution, they 
universally adopted an even more egalitarian position than the one they wrongly 
perceived to be the case. Essentially they are saying that they would ideally prefer to 
live in a society which is more egalitarian by far than even the one they perceive they 
are living in. This appears to further support the proposition that we have an evolved 
psychology favouring a more egalitarian environment over a less egalitarian one.28 
Consequently, I suggest that the evolutionarily developed human disposition 
fundamentally favours a more egalitarian distribution of social goods, even under the 
current very inegalitarian circumstances. It therefore seems suitable to conclude that 
the principles of social justice derived from an EP perspective will likely involve an 
appositely egalitarian distribution, understood as proportional equality of material 
social goods, among the members of a well-ordered society. 
                                            
27 The Gini Coefficient is the accepted best measurement of the distribution of income within a 
discrete group, usually, but not always, a society. The lower the Gini, the more equal the distribution. 
A totally equal distribution would equate to 0. 
28 But Norton and Ariely conclude that Americans actually prefer some inequality to perfect 
equality, which is true, but that conclusion is not the only one supported by the results as reported. 
What might equally be indicated is that Americans prefer a more proportional equality to a strict, 
objective equality. Thus the research might be interpreted to mean that their actual preference is for 
proportional equality, probably based on a proportionality of expended effort, rather than objective 
equality. 
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8.3. Egalitarian or Hierarchical Societies? 
The fact that social dominance and egalitarian social preferences both appear 
to be evolutionarily embedded in the human brain, begs the question as to what 
could cause either egalitarian or social dominance behaviour to arise in a group, and 
for such a hegemony to be sustained in any particular society. Boehm hypothesised, 
when he undertook his global survey of some 200 politically autonomous societies 
reported in the ethnographic record, that the primary and most immediate cause of 
egalitarian behaviour is a moralistic determination on the part of a local group's main 
political actors that no one of its members should be allowed to dominate the others 
(Boehm 1993, 228). 
What seems clear, however, is that since individuals vary in their SDO, it 
appears likely for an inherent tension to exist within human groups due to the 
presence of individuals with higher SDO who strongly prefer a dominant hierarchy (in 
which their group dominates), mixed together with other individuals with a more 
empathic, egalitarian disposition as Boehm proposes. It also does not follow that 
there will be only two groupings within one complex social group, which may consist 
of several bands. 
There may be more than one sub-group of high SDO individuals, each group 
competing to dominate the whole group. This is especially to be expected where the 
whole group (Richerson 1999) consists of a number of constituent bands. Should no 
sub-group be able to outcompete the others for domination, it may well be that a 
more egalitarian social structure results, with the support and assistance of those 
tribe members with a more empathic, egalitarian bent. 
Because humans developed the capacity for systematic moralistic 
punishment we are all susceptible to moral suasion by others and inclined to punish 
within-group norm violators (Milgram 1965), and (Nuttin 1975). Punishment can be 
seen as a public good for which the punished pays the cost and everyone benefits – 
the so-called second-order problem of altruism (Tomasello 2009, 516). These traits 
made it possible to sustain a within-group egalitarian structure. Boehm’s postulates 
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support the hypothesis that an egalitarian relation between followers and their leader 
is deliberately made to happen by collectively assertive followers.  
In 1979, Lee (Lee 1979) had already found the strong tendency of followers to 
restrict the development of personal ascendancy among adult males, including 
leaders, to be an important levelling mechanism in societies, causing and sustaining 
the existence of egalitarian socio-political structures. Another significant levelling 
mechanism is public opinion. It can act as a check on leadership, as in Tikopia (Firth 
1949), and at some point always limits autocratic behaviour in any society (Lowie 
1940, 284). Other important levelling mechanisms include criticism and ridicule.  
Boehm also theorises that the intentional curbing of power abuse may itself 
be universal (Boehm 1993, 234). It definitely takes place, he says, in societies 
devoid of egalitarian ideology, as in modern despotic states in the form of revolution 
(Lopreato 1990) and in highly centralized kingdoms or authoritative chiefdoms cf. 
(Gluckman 1965). Beattie (Beattie 1967, 364-365), dispelled the myth that African 
kings or chiefs possessed "absolute power," and outlined several behaviours by 
which various well-stratified groups controlled the authority of their own legitimately 
strong rulers.  
If one assumes, Boehm argues, that both types of chiefdom and all band and 
tribal societies designated as "acephalous"29 or "egalitarian" are capable of curbing 
power abuse and that in every society at least certain individuals at times will try to 
use power abusively, then it can be argued that some degree of intentional power 
curbing by coalitions of subordinates regularly takes place, and at times at least 
occasionally, in every human society. These examples are a further demonstration of 
an existing human ambivalence concerning social dominance and egalitarianism, 
and that despite existing social stratification in a society, there are still latent 
egalitarian preferences at work.  
But it seems likely that levelling behaviour also arises from other factors that 
favour it. It seems possible that the requirements of cooperative behaviour by 
                                            
29 Groups or societies that lack leaders or chiefs. 
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themselves favour the development of egalitarian, levelling behaviour. For example, 
this postulate finds support from three hypotheses according to which monogamy 
evolved from polygyny as a human mating strategy. Chapais (Chapais 2013, 60) 
asserts that the three hypotheses are the most parsimonious explanations of the rise 
of monogamy and are not mutually exclusive. The three hypotheses postulate that 
the use of weapons that mitigate individual male physical power disparity, a greater 
reliance on economic, or coalitionary cooperation among males, and an ecology-
based increase in the costs of female guarding, may have had a cumulative impact 
on both the feasibility and profitability of polygyny. 
Monogamy, as maximally constrained polygyny, thus resulted. It is noteworthy 
that Human societies are the only multilevel societies in which reproductive units are 
entirely, or primarily monogamous, which trait, given the three hypotheses, appears 
to be directly linked to our highly cooperative nature. The need to reduce costly 
aggressive competition within Society is a levelling and cooperative driver. Although 
Chapais deals only with costly competition for females, it is likely that the levelling 
behaviour would extend outward to all issues that cause costly aggressive 
competition, such as competition for food, water, territory, as well as political power. 
These matters would all have been resolved through cooperative aggression-
avoiding mechanisms, which in turn, would support egalitarian distributive outcomes. 
None of the levelling practices would likely be perfect. So, within the 
egalitarian structure there would inevitably be some conflict of opinion and of 
purpose. But this would not easily result in the break-up of such societies, since 
fortunately, humans are adapted to tolerate a system in which there is conflict among 
the co-operators. This is evidenced, inter alia, by such behaviour as the patient 
search for consensus in forager communities where both SDO and social dominance 
aversion (SDA) would most likely have been present, although egalitarian social 
practices held sway. 
“Institutions that minimize the conflict inherent in the gene-culture system will 
be favoured by the processes of cultural evolution, but these institutions cannot, in 
the nature of the situation, be perfect” (Richerson 1999, 258). This adaption of 
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tolerance for conflict makes life in society possible. It is thus suggested that the 
inclination of egalitarian levelling behaviour is diffused throughout the whole range of 
human interactions in societies.  
Underlining all this is Fry et al (Fry 2013), who contend that the vast majority 
of human societies in the past and present do not display a dominator model. 
Instead, hunter-gatherer groups, which Narvaez (Narvaez 2014) uses as a baseline 
for human normality, display traits like “band-wide food sharing; high levels of 
allomaternal30 child care; daily cooperative food acquisition, construction, and 
maintenance of living spaces and transportation of children and possessions; and 
provisioning of public goods on a daily basis” (Hill 2011, 1286). 
This combination of traits is not only common among human groups but 
unique to human beings. Moreover, most people living together in these groups are 
not related, so genetic consanguinity factors in the usual sense are not the hidden 
drivers of their cooperation (Narvaez 2014, 5137-5141).  
Such a degree of cooperation again indicates a levelling of the social structure 
where everybody helps and everyone is helped. It appears to be the antithesis of an 
inegalitarian stratified society where some people are always servants and others 
are always served. I suggest that the social and material outcomes of such a highly 
sharing, cooperative society will be largely egalitarian. 
Further important considerations are provided by the case made by Boehm 
that egalitarian behaviour also arises in a group from the dislike of being dominated 
(Boehm, Egalitarian Society and Reverse Dominance Hierarchy 1993, 236), which 
can be termed Social Dominance Aversion, or SDA in contradistinction to SDO. 
Although this aversion would appear at the individual level, Boehm approaches it in 
terms of group values, or ethos and political coalition formation. He argues that 
individuals’ dislike of being dominated is reflected in the group ethos, which 
                                            
30 Also known as non-maternal infant care. It is a social practice where infants are taken care 
of by anyone who is not their mother. It is a characteristic found in most social animals and all primate 
societies. 
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reinforces it, and in small communities it is thereby transformed into what amounts to 
social policy 
Socially egalitarian groups were thus formed and sustained because followers 
discovered that by forming a single political coalition they could decisively control the 
domination proclivities of highly assertive individuals, even their chosen leaders. The 
question then arises as to what factors gave rise to the opposite, namely complex, 
socially stratified societies, and how could they have dislodged the egalitarian social 
mindset that sustained the egalitarian policies of the past? 
The political direction of egalitarianism was, according to Boehm, somehow 
reversed after the invention of agriculture, and an "orthodox" version of social 
dominance hierarchy reappeared. The reversal might be as a result of the suggested 
consideration that hierarchical organisation presumably provides an evolutionary 
advantage and increases survival value for species, as argued by Fisher, or 
alternatively, because communities tied to the land might have been unable to resist 
strong, dominant groups and impose an egalitarian structure. 
Furthermore, Fisher’s thesis is largely contradicted by the thousands of 
generations of enforced human egalitarianism as recorded by Boehm. If there were a 
evolutionary advantages to stratified societies, the uniformly egalitarian societies 
would not have survived so successfully for so long. 
However, social stratification and hierarchy formation appear to be inevitable 
in complex societies. Although Society is not complex per se, the societies we live in 
have become complex, probably during the changeover to agriculture that required 
closer group living. Complex societies, distinguished usually by technological 
development, dense populations and multi-layered social stratification, only arose 
over the past 10,000 years out of a probable >40,000 years of modern human 
expansion.  
Societies gradually grew in complexity as technology and productivity fuelled 
agricultural and industrial production. The advantages offered by societies of 
expanding complexity that could produce public goods such as better defence and 
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economic security, as well as intangibles like an interesting lifestyle, were immense. 
But it also engendered elites, political and economic, out to secure special privileges 
for themselves (Campbell 1975), (Freud 1930), (Maryanski 1992) and resulted in 
large underclasses of people. 
But we must take serious note of very important elements that are inherent in 
all human societies and which are especially crucial to complex societies. All the 
evidence seems to point to the likelihood that dissent and coercion, and 
consequently punishment, are important elements of all human societies. But in 
complex societies coercion becomes particularly important. 
The institution of government is essentially a coercive institution as Rawls 
states - “political power is always coercive power” (Rawls 2011, 68 and 136); a 
sentiment with which I also associate myself. Given the variable importance of 
coercion and punishment in simpler and in more complex societies, it is not 
surprising that both the desire for fairness and the reaction of punishment of violators 
should be stronger in complex societies than in simpler ones.  
The correctness of this postulate seems to be borne out by the findings of 
Joseph Henrich et al (Henrich 2010) in their very extensive study using three 
behavioural experiments administered across 15 diverse populations. They showed 
that market integration of the population (measured as the percentage of purchased 
calories in a population) positively covaries with expectations of fairness, while 
community size positively covaries with a reaction to punish norm violators. 
Members of complex human societies seem to positively expect and require effective 
means of coercion to enforce community norms.  
This increased expectation of punishment, I suggest, probably arises from the 
fact that in modern complex societies we are subjected to social systems whose 
size, frequency of interaction with strangers, degree of status differences, and so on, 
are very far removed from even the most complex foraging societies. Consequently, 
it seems that the degree of coercion, division of labour, and requirements for 
subordination to ensure social order, are so much greater than in the simpler 
societies in which our fundamental psychology was formed. The consequent social 
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institutions that developed in complex societies that allow deep social hierarchy, 
strong leadership, inegalitarian social relations, and an extensive division of labour 
sit uneasily on top of a social psychology that was originally adapted to a simpler 
world. 
Preliminary Principles 
The discussion in this section is intended to put forward some preliminary 
principles of social justice that could be seen to result from the theory outlined at the 
start of this chapter. The discussion so far leads to the preliminary conclusion that 
our notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, are norms and values 
evolutionarily instilled into the human psyche during the process of our development 
as modern human beings, and that they favour egalitarian social structures and 
equal distributions of social goods. Furthermore, these norms and values have 
added survival value for our ancestors, since they are the norms and values that 
facilitate and enhance group living for a sapient, social species such as modern 
humans. 
The importance of identifying the principles of social justice is established by 
the way they predicate how the political constitution and the principal economic and 
social arrangements of a society should most satisfactorily31 distribute citizens’ 
fundamental rights and duties. Furthermore, they would also define the most 
acceptable32 division of advantages derived from group living. 
I have previously indicated that it would be advantageous to approach this 
question from the point of view of Society, not that of any of the individual members, 
which is what I now propose to do. The previously discussed notions of justice with 
the concomitant egalitarian disposition are evidently genetically and memetically 
embedded in Society. That is to say, human beings taken together as a population 
                                            
31 In accordance with the idea that the closer the principles of our founding civil institutions 
match our evolved notions of justice, the greater the satisfaction experienced by citizens will be. 
32 A corollary is that the closer a distribution of goods are to our evolved notions of justice, the 
more acceptable they will be to the great majority of people. 
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will display these traits; not every human being will. Individuals with these traits will 
have left, and will still leave more of their genes in the gene pool than those who do 
not have these traits. The population, constituting all of Society, and displaying these 
traits will be inclined, ceteris paribus, to develop cultures that underwrite, support 
and strengthen these traits. 
By cultural transmission these traits evolve to adapt to environmental changes 
much faster than genetic evolution could (Dawkins 2006), (Lumsden 1981), 
(Maryanski 1992), (Boyd 1985), thereby making the survival of the species that more 
robust. Cultural transmission is analogous to genetic transmission in that, although 
basically conservative, it can give rise to a form of evolution (Dawkins 2006, 189). 
Dawkins postulates Memes as cultural ideas that replicate like genes, but through 
the interaction of humans in Society. Like genes they are also subject to copying 
errors and other variations, but importantly, they are selected for their fitness to 
current circumstances. Thus we have cultural development. Nevertheless, there is 
nothing to prevent, under many circumstances, maladaptations forming within 
cultures. 
The gene pool is thus the long-term environment of the gene, but also the 
guarantor of human gene survival. Individuals are the mortal ‘survival machines’ that 
genes, in cooperation with successive groups of companion genes drawn from the 
gene pool, build one after another, the more the better to ensure survival (Dawkins 
2006, 45). Society, by definition encompasses the gene pool and consequently one 
can be persuaded to view individuals from the societal perspective as the ‘survival 
machines’ of the gene pool. Accordingly, what promotes survival of individuals, 
promotes the survival of the gene pool in all its genetic diversity. Our developed 
notions of justice, the previous discussion suggests, have most likely developed 
precisely to support behaviours that promote Social cohesion and cooperation, and 
are consequently in harmony with, and supportive of the requirements of the gene 
pool. 
This analysis may sound very cold and dispassionate, almost callous in 
viewing individuals as machines, but the approach does suggest some conclusions 
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that resonate with many human passions. It resonates firstly with the passions of 
liberty and equality. As I shall argue below, the societal perspective places all 
individuals on an equal footing, and their liberty is a necessary precondition for 
Society fulfilling its natural functions most effectively and efficiently. Thus, the 
question that arises in the context of this project, is whether, and to what extent from 
the societal perspective, social justice demands equality and liberty for the individual. 
8.4. Regarding Liberty and Equality 
The previous discussion has already suggested quite strongly that the human 
disposition is egalitarian and as far as distributions are concerned, it favours equality. 
The main rubric suggested by the Societal approach is that of liberty. In this section I 
shall attempt to discern more clearly the nature of the liberty indicated by the 
Societal approach and how that liberty ought to be distributed among the members 
of Society and thus of societies. I shall argue that our evolutionarily embedded 
pursuit of liberty is founded on evolutionary grounds in our psyche and is 
fundamental to the fulfilment of the human existential purpose. 
Like JS Mill (Mill 2015), I lay claim only to a discussion of the subject of civil, 
or social liberty: the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately 
exercised by Society, and thus a society over the individual. Unlike Mill, however, I 
approach the question of liberty from the Societal perspective: to discover what the 
interest of Society is in the liberty or otherwise of the individual. I suggest that 
Society’s limits on its legitimate power over the individual, if any, will coincide with 
what confers survival advantage, which is all that could constitute its legitimate 
interest in the matter. 
But before discussing the subject of Liberty as such, it is necessary to discuss 
the question of equality, or the distribution of liberty. The question really is whether 
from Society’s point of view, all individuals would have the same level of liberty, 
whatever it might be, or whether there would be some basis for giving certain 
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individuals more liberty than others, so creating stratified classes of people with 
different degrees of liberty33. 
Given Society’s fundamental role of acting as guarantor of human survival, 
and individuals all being the ‘survival machines’ of the gene pool, this means, for 
example, that from the societal perspective all humans are equal, each being of 
equal value to the gene pool: they are all equally products of the gene pool and 
carriers of the whole human DNA strand, which is a gene’s primary focus. This 
means all individuals rank equally. As previously argued, there does not appear to 
be any basis upon which individuals can be ranked ab initio in principle.  
It also means that Society, the human embodiment of the whole gene pool, 
should treat each individual as equally valuable. It should thus firstly, allow the full 
advantages and costs of group living to flow freely and equally to each individual. 
That seems to ensure as far as possible the realisation of the full benefit of the 
human genetic endowment, which will, I suggest, be a result most beneficial to 
society and the gene pool. 
To achieve such a result however, Society seems unavoidably to have to 
foster as much human interaction within itself as possible. It is only through free 
human interaction in Society that individuals can benefit most from social learning, 
discover and develop their innate skills and talents, meet up with opportunities, 
experiment with lifestyles, and generally learn how to successfully deal with life in 
Society. I suggest that from these considerations it follows that within Society, 
maximum liberty is advantageous both to individuals and to Society and therefore to 
the gene pool. 
But there are complications here. It might be objected that although 
individuals all carry the full human DNA strand, each individual’s genetic code is 
uniquely configured to the point where no two individuals have exactly the same 
genome.34 Each person’s genome appears to be unique (Pennisi 2001), (Kruglyak 
2001), except perhaps for identical twins. This simply points to the common 
                                            
33 Such as existed in Europe in feudal times and still exist in many societies today. 
34 The complete set of genes or genetic material present in a cell or organism. 
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observation that people do not have the same abilities and talents, physically, 
emotionally, and mentally. Thus, some individuals will be able to make better use of 
the advantages of group living than others, while some others will again be better 
capable of absorbing the costs compared to yet others. Consequently, if all are 
treated equally, there will likely be growing inequality from generation to generation, 
with possible fissiparous consequences, given the human egalitarian disposition. 
These considerations appear to argue against the equality contention. 
But these considerations do not invalidate or qualify the contention of an 
equality of liberty. While it is true that every individual’s genome is unique, the 
differences seem to arise from random factors such as copying errors, mutations, 
and genetic recombination on the DNA strand (Kruglyak 2001). The differences are 
in fact minute, although clearly the effects can be quite substantial. But being the 
result of fairly random evolutionary factors, such as mutations, copying errors and 
the like, there is no way of predicting with any certainty who will have what specific 
traits beforehand. Nor can we predict what the success ceiling of any individual will 
be, even if we know a person’s full genome at birth. Nothing will tell you whether and 
to what extent the person will successfully navigate the vagaries of life in Society or 
any particular society. Consequently, those who gain more from group living and 
suffer less of the costs can only be known on the basis of self-selection, meaning 
that it will only become evident who gets what as individuals themselves navigate the 
shoals and shallows of life in society. In a sense, every person selects for herself the 
advantages she gains from group living by availing them and in how far she absorbs 
its costs, by suffering them. 
It also therefore seems evident that fair self-selection is only possible under 
circumstances where the costs and advantages of group living are allowed to flow 
freely through Society, thus creating as near as possible equal opportunities for 
every individual to gain maximum advantages and to maximally mitigate the costs of 
living in Society. It therefore follows that there is no way, and no need, in principle to 
distinguish between individuals in order to discriminate the liberties available to each. 
Consequently, maximum liberty must be equally available to all. 
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Based on the same reasoning of equality of value to the gene pool, it also 
appears to be necessary to allow each individual maximum positive liberty, being the 
liberty to participate and contribute. Every person should in principle be allowed and 
empowered to make as much of a contribution to life in Society as he is capable of. It 
might be political, academic, scientific, economic or cultural, but from the societal 
perspective the input and participation of every individual is potentially important in 
every area of social life, since Society would evidently find all the latent skills, talents, 
and insights lying available in the gene pool potentially valuable to achieve the latent 
capability that its group level selection empowers it to achieve. I suggest that this 
follows logically from the fact that all these skills, talents, and abilities have 
evolutionarily developed in the gene and meme pool to meet and accommodate 
ecological and social pressures. None are therefore superfluous and so the exercise 
of all is important in the constant and continuing enterprise of survival. Participation 
would thus also seem to be important for Society to remain dynamically adaptive to 
the natural and social ecology of the day. 
Thus, it appears that no individual should in principle be excluded from 
making whatever contribution she is capable of under her life circumstances, indeed 
every individual should in principle be empowered to do so. However, who 
contributes what will again become evident only based on self-selection and 
therefore every individual should in principle be allowed to contribute to Society 
without any in principle constraints. The extent to which any particular individual 
contributes, or not, is clearly a matter of personal ability, preference and 
circumstances. 
The discussion thus far suggests that what is fundamentally just is liberty, 
distributed equally to every individual. Liberty, both in the sense of negative liberty,35 
and of positive liberty,36 as discussed by Isaiah Berlin (Berlin 1969) is thus affirmed 
                                            
35 Freedom from restraint and the freedom generally to live one’s life according to one’s own 
lights, subject to everybody else’s right to do the same. 
36 Positive liberty is especially important if it is correctly understood as empowerment, and not 
as coercion to act or believe in any particular way. 
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by the societal approach. Its equal distribution is because from the societal 
perspective there does not appear to be any basis upon which any one individual 
can be preferred above another and thus be entitled to enjoy more liberty and 
greater empowerment than others. As one might expect, this also appears to be 
exactly in line with the evolutionarily developed human psyche of equality. Liberty, 
being a social good, ought thus to be distributed equally to accord with our 
evolutionarily developed sense of social justice. 
But it needs to be said that positive liberty is meaningless without social 
learning. It is only social learning that can develop an individual to becoming a fully 
functional member of Society, able to contribute to her potential. This is due to the 
fact that an individual’s genetic inheritance is only a potential until it is actualised 
through social learning. If the unconstrained possibility of the exercise of each 
individual’s genetically inherited talents and abilities is important for the enterprise of 
survival of the gene pool, as previously argued, then it follows firstly, that every 
individual should also have free and equal access to the accumulated intellectual 
property of Society, and secondly, that social teaching is not only a function of 
Society, but also its natural duty to each of its members. 
It might be objected that so many people don’t exercise at least some (and 
often most) of their genetically inherited talents (for the good of ‘Society’), 
nevertheless the human gene pool has reached extreme numbers. The point of the 
argument is not that all people should exercise all their talents all the time. There is 
no pre-determination who will exercise what talents at any time. Therefore, it is 
important that all people should in principle be enabled to exercise any one, more, or 
all their talents at any time. There is clearly great redundancy in numbers in the 
gene-pool, exactly because there are no selection criteria for who will exercise their 
talents all the time. Some people will exercise some of their talents some of the time. 
For that to happen all the people need to be enabled to exercise their talents at any 
time. 
People also don’t often exercise their talents for the good of Society as such. 
It is merely advantageous for society to have people exercise and place their 
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multiplicity of talents into the great enterprise of society. If these talents were not of 
value to society and the procreation of human beings, they would never have been 
selected for at all. 
Education, which is really institutionalised social learning, thus appears to be, 
from the societal perspective, a fundamental precondition of liberty. Like all social 
goods appear to be, education should thus be a good equally distributed and 
available to all. Self-selection will determine what individuals absorb and to what use 
the knowledge is put. 
But if justice is thus seen to be done by the exercise of those values and 
actions that tend to foster Social cohesion, as has been argued, then the 
enforcement of levelling behaviour, or behaviour that promotes social cohesion can 
be seen as a legitimate power of Society over the individual and a limit for individual 
liberty. Society’s legitimate interest in the liberty of the individual might thus be said 
to be generally the attainment and promotion of justice. The limits of its legitimate 
power would then appear to be to such powers as are necessary to promote 
prosocial values and behaviour as well as those required to limit and discourage 
anti-social behaviour and values, which obviously places limits on liberty. The 
concept of liberty in the context of society cannot include the liberty to commit 
injustice. 
Liberty, understood as above, appears to be so central to the human 
circumstance that it might be argued that it is a condition that cannot be abrogated. I 
suggest that although that is probably generally true, and it is certainly true of 
mankind as a whole, liberty for individuals seem to be to some extent conditional. It 
seems that although liberty cannot be abrogated, it needs, for certain individuals at 
certain times and under certain circumstances, to be subject to suspension for a 
determinate period37. This is because of the perceived need to punish offenders 
against certain norms that are regarded as so fundamental to a society that their 
contraventions are classed as crimes. Although the ultimate punishment during the 
                                            
37 Logically, suspension cannot be for an indeterminate period, since that would amount to the 
abrogation of the liberty of an individual. 
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Pleistocene and among Holocene hunter gatherers was probably ostracism and 
even banishment upon pain of death, this is not feasible in highly complex societies, 
where persons who pose a threat to the lives and property of the members of 
society, need to be isolated from society. Consequently, the institution of prisons and 
sentences of detention seems unavoidable in modern complex societies and the 
fundamental conditionality of the liberty of individuals (personal liberty) also follows. 
There are many considerations regarding the issues of what actions can justly be 
regarded as punishable, but those are matters for a different project. For the present 
project it is only necessary to note that there are such actions that constitute crimes 
and delicts and that just punishment is a fundamental constraint on the concept of 
personal liberty. 
A just society could almost certainly never exist without a just system of 
punishment, which means that the threat of punishment for malfeasance, like all 
social goods, should apply equally to all members of society, but obviously meted 
out only to those fairly judged to be in need of it. 
9. Tentative Principles of Distributive Justice 
Consequent upon the discussion in this chapter it is possible to suggest some 
preliminary principles of social justice that result from the evolutionary psychology 
approach. First, the societal perspective presents itself as a most advantageous 
point of departure to evaluate the principles, since the human notions of social 
justice appear to be evolutionary adaptations to meet the survival needs of human 
beings during the formative era of the Pleistocene and the early part of the 
Holocene. 
It follows, I suggest, that the inculcated notions result not from merely 
individual selection, but from group level selection, which gives the group the 
necessary mix of genetic material to promote survival for all. It also means that 
although the human experience during the formative eras were fairly uniform, the 
later cultural adaptations to specific circumstances would be culture-specific, and it 
would be wrong to ascribe exactly the same values to all cultural groups. This 
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feature appears to be specifically related to the sharing, or distributive practices 
found in different cultures relating to food and consumer goods. 
This principle would make it incumbent upon a society to use and develop a 
general distribution system of material goods that is premised on achieving 
reasonable equality, rather than mere want satisfaction. From the discussion, it 
appears that neither ‘need’ nor ‘want’38 is a distributional requirement of our 
developed sense of justice. Justice is not needs- or wants–driven; it is driven by the 
subliminal desire to broadly equalise the outcomes of that what is not equal (Kent 
1993), and (Speth 1990). Justice thus appears to demand a broadly proportional 
equality of goods and services, meaning a distribution that is within the acceptable 
limits of what each individual could comparatively demand from his fellows within 
that society. What that measure is, would be subject to cultural variation as 
anthropology researchers have found. 
The same principle would ostensibly then apply also to consumer goods. In 
the result, the proportional equality principle might be stated as follows: 
• The produce39 of society should be distributed throughout a society 
according to the principle of proportional equality, the proportion 
dictated by the cultural values of the people, and taking into account 
the necessaries of life based on differing individual requirements and 
capacities. 
To realise this principle in practice would be extremely difficult, but not 
impossible. I am of course dealing with ideal theory, in the same sense that Rawls 
does (Rawls 2009, 9), and therefore my conclusions as framed do not necessarily 
represent pragmatically implementable solutions. Yet they do present a goal of 
human justice that all could aspire to, and I suggest that their advance ought to be 
one of the prioritised goals of social development studies and research, for there 
surely cannot be social development without social justice and its deeper 
understanding. 
                                            
38 ‘Want’ in the economic sense as driving demand, not meaning lack of goods. 
39 Including all services, foods, consumables and other consumer goods. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 142 
 
 As far as other social goods are concerned, justice requires strict equality, as 
discussed above. All the various liberties identified under the concept of Liberty, 
subject only to criminal law, and education, as well as justice itself must be 
distributed to all members equally. This principle might be framed as follows: 
• The most extensive liberty compatible with a similar liberty for all, as 
well as full access to the intellectual property of Society should be 
extended to every member of society subject only to temporary 
suspension under fairly administered laws, in pursuance of which fair 
adjudication should be open and available to all. 
These principles are not intended to supplant or in any way derogate from 
principles of social justice already identified by other authors. They are not intended 
as preferred alternatives. Rather, they are intended to serve as supplementary to 
well-known principles, but they can hopefully add to our understanding of the depth 
of the human commitment to social justice and the nature of their underlying ratio. 
Furthermore, by giving what is a solid base in human psychology for the origin and 
social role of justice, they may contribute to the further development and 
understanding of our notions of justice and act as reference for the development of 
social policies in future. 
10. Conclusion 
In conclusion, we can assess whether the hypothesis proposed at the start of 
the chapter is successfully proven. The result of such an assessment ultimately 
depends on the degree of proof required. In a project such as the present one, it 
would be far too much to expect any conclusive proof of this very complex subject. 
However, I suggest that proof on a balance of probabilities is achievable. 
The first part of the hypothesis as set out in heading 5.1 is likely the least 
problematic. There is a great weight of evidence which indicates that our notions of 
right and wrong, justice and injustice, are norms and values instilled into the human 
psyche during the process of our evolutionary development as modern human 
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beings. It is also a proposition that is met with reasonably wide acceptance within the 
scientific community. 
The second part of the hypothesis, as set out in 5.2, namely that the closer 
the principles of our founding civil institutions match our evolved notions of justice, 
the stronger our social bonding, the more peaceful our society, and the greater the 
potential health and happiness that can be experienced by every individual will be, 
appears to be supported by uncontroversial evidence and is largely self-evident. 
The most controversial, and probably most challenging argument, is that of 
the supposed fundamental egalitarian preference of humans, argued for in the 
chapter. A great deal of evidence and arguments were adduced to support the 
contention that humans are fundamentally egalitarian, and it may be objected that 
there is a striking neglect of the extensive literature on the breakdown of cooperation 
resulting from peoples’ group orientation and inter-group antagonisms. There is 
indeed a plethora of studies of in-group, out-group conflict and attitudinal 
antagonism, many of the studies involving research by Sidanius and Pratto (Sidanius 
2000), (Sidanius 1999), (Sidanius 1994), and others (Tajfel 1979), (Tajfel 1982), 
(Hawley 1999), (Goette 2006). This is understandable, given the modern social 
problems engendered by racism, misogyny, religious zealotry, class conflict, 
xenophobia, isolationism, and protectionism in international politics. 
The reason for my focus on cooperation, however, is that I believe 
cooperativeness to be the key to the fundamental nature of humans. This is not to 
deny all our anti-social and uncooperative inclinations, especially since culture plays 
a determining role in how people behave ( (Narvaez 2014), and Narvaez makes a 
persuasive argument that our modern, neoliberal culture is a severe maladaptation 
to the human norm. 
But cooperation, I suggest, is the fundamental norm. It is a hallmark of 
successful societies. Cooperation confers survival advantage (Greene 2013, 24). He 
says that “biologically speaking, humans were designed for cooperation, but only 
with some people. Our moral brains evolved for cooperation within groups” (Greene 
2013, 23). And he adds that we have not evolved for universal cooperation. 
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Universal cooperation, he holds, would be inconsistent with the principles of 
evolution by natural selection, although he says that this does not mean we are 
doomed to not be universally cooperative. He argues that what we lack for 
universality is a metamorality, although he is not sanguine about that possibility. I am 
also not convinced that we are yet moving toward a metamorality, although I would 
not discount it entirely. However, I shall argue that we are moving toward a meta-
identity, driven by our fundamental cooperative, egalitarian nature, as revealed by 
EP.  
We know from Boehm’s studies (Boehm 1999), and (Boehm 1997) that as of 
40,000 years ago all human groups practiced egalitarian behaviour. Boehm 
postulates that this egalitarian behaviour syndrome over thousands of generations 
caused selection pressure on genes so that egalitarian preferences in humans 
became an embedded fundamental psychological characteristic. It therefore seems, 
on a preponderance of probabilities, that cooperation and egalitarianism are 
genetically fundamental characteristics of humans, albeit conterminous with certain 
group identities. 
But groups appear to be mutable. Every individual is linked to any number of 
groups, ranging from the nation state, the language group, the cultural group, the 
local church, the neighbourhood, the tennis club, and so forth. In prehistory groups 
were also mutable: they grew larger by absorption, amalgamation, assimilation and 
incorporation of other groups through conquest, or agreement, or grew smaller 
through defection, or fissiparousness due to a multitude of factors. Therefore, the 
human devotion to groups is not such an insurmountable problem to wider 
cooperation and egalitarianism. 
The system of nation states that is prevalent in the modern world only took 
shape in Europe after 990 A.D. and then began to extend its influence over all of 
Europe over the next 500 years. Eventually this form of political organisation came to 
dominate the whole planet (Bowles 2000). 
Like all groups are, a nation state is a cultural construct. They were created 
out of an amalgamation of smaller groups, but identification with and cooperation 
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within them soon spread to include the larger groupings. According to Bowles, this 
process was driven by the war-making success of the nation state compared to that 
of other forms of organisation. However, the emergence and early diffusion of the 
nation state “may have relied critically on group-advantageous but individually costly 
norms” (Bowles 2000, 13). The process of nation state formation described by him is 
akin to a process of cultural evolution due to the selection pressures of war. 
This widening of identity groupings is an ongoing process. Nancy Buchan et al 
finds support for the proposition that globalisation strengthens cosmopolitan attitudes 
and weakens the relevance of ethnicity, locality and nationhood as sources of 
identification. They find that globalisation extends the boundaries of the groups to 
which people believe they belong, and this is followed by an increase in individual 
cooperation at the global compared to that at the local level (Buchan 2009). I would 
argue that this is a further confirmation of the cooperative nature of human beings at 
the fundamental psychological level. As soon as circumstances and the ruling culture 
allow, humans naturally gravitate to greater inclusivity in their cooperativeness. 
If cooperativeness and egalitarian preferences go together, as suggested 
above, it means that if cooperative groups can radiate out to assimilate smaller 
groups (for which there is sufficient evidence), egalitarian behaviour can follow as 
well. That this may be so is further evidenced by the studies mentioned in this 
chapter. The most likely result of 40,000 years of gene-culture coevolution under 
egalitarianism is a fundamental human predisposition preferring egalitarian social 
structures and distributions in the identity group.  
Already in a 2014 study by the World Economic Forum (WEF 2014), global 
inequality is identified as the second greatest challenge facing the world community, 
after the rising societal tensions in the Middle East and North Africa. These tensions 
themselves are not unrelated to the global inequality of wealth and income. 
There is thus sufficient evidence, I suggest, to conclude on a balance of 
probabilities, that the fundamental human disposition is that of cooperative 
egalitarianism. From the discussion in this chapter it thus follows that an EP theory of 
social justice is well-founded on those sentiments. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 146 
 
In the next chapter, the theory developed in this chapter will be relationally 
compared with, and analysed next to justice as fairness as proposed by John Rawls. 
This will be attempted to discover and discuss whether the evolutionary psychology 
approach can comparatively lead to further insights and perhaps a potentially richer 
understanding of the human value of social justice. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Two Approaches: A Relational Analysis 
“SOCRATES…men are only agreed to a certain extent about justice, and 
then they begin to disagree.”      (Plato 2010, 7360) 
1. Introduction 
Justice as fairness is the result of a lifetime’s work by the unique talent of 
John Rawls. As such it is a mature, well traversed theory that has seen numerous 
evaluations, revisions and developments over the decades that it has been available 
and actively studied. Against this, the societal approach to social justice, developed 
from the EP perspective is no more than a preliminary development of a theory that 
will require substantial further analysis and reflection to reach comparable maturity. 
Nevertheless, at this stage it appears possible to identify and discuss some 
higher-level congruencies and divergences between the two approaches. To 
distinguish and discuss them relationally under different rubrics will be attempted in 
this chapter.  
The purpose is to reach some broader understanding of the EP approach 
while simultaneously exploring how some of its elements relate to different aspects 
of justice as fairness. In the process, opportunities to further iterate and flesh out 
some of the perceptions of the EP approach will present themselves. 
To achieve these purposes, I propose to discuss the two approaches topically 
to relate them within the same topical context. It is important to keep in mind that the 
two approaches are very different, and this not always compatible. Yet there is an 
important congruence which relates to the role that intuition plays in both. However, I 
shall take care to avoid begging the question against either approach. 
Given the above considerations, it is important to discuss the premises of 
each approach to discern the fundamental differences that arise between a theory 
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conceived from within the Kantian paradigm, albeit the Rawlsian interpretation of that 
paradigm, and one conceived within the EP paradigm. 
This discussion is intended to be followed by a closer inspection of the aims of 
each of the theories. The initial aim of justice as fairness, it will be argued, was 
different, more universal, from its final aim which is limited to the political, and I will 
contrast this with the aim of my project. 
Following that, I propose to analyse the two conceptions of justice involved in 
the two approaches. The Rawlsian concept, being founded on universal agreement, 
eventually ran into difficulties when he seriously considered the implications of 
people in society having contradictory and incompatible beliefs. I discuss his remedy 
and contrast it to the fundamentals of the EP approach. 
It is clear that in both approaches intuition plays an important role. I discuss 
the role, the nature and the source of intuition in each, before I turn to a relational 
analysis of the basic principles of justice that result from each of the approaches. 
Rawls states that one of his major purposes in developing his theory was to 
provide a better alternative to the then generally dominant theories of Utilitarianism 
and Intuitionism. In fact, he makes a strong argument against teleological theories in 
principle and proposes his deontological approach to theory as superior. In this 
chapter I then discuss the teleological nature of the EP approach relationally within 
that context and attempt also to draw some parallels with Mill’s equally teleological 
Utilitarianism.  
The discussion of teleology versus deontology leads into the question of 
maintaining neutrality on moral questions that arise in a democratic polity. Rawls 
maintains that the state must remain morally neutral, which is also a result of the 
disagreement avoiding contractual framework of his agreement-based theory. I 
contrast this with the EP approach which has no underlying conscious agreement 
requirement, before discussing some conclusions from this chapter. 
In the first section, I shall deal with a divergence of premises between the two 
approaches. 
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2. A Divergence of Premises 
I will argue that there is a fundamental divergence of the premises of the two 
approaches. They diverge fundamentally in their respective attitudes to the natural 
sciences. Whereas Rawls specifically excludes reliance on any empirical research, 
the EP approach is founded on such research. Thus, justice as fairness is premised 
upon pure philosophy, while the EP approach is premised on the results of research 
in a multiplicity of the sciences, natural and social. But despite this divergence they 
are not completely at odds. The EP approach has a lot more to offer Rawls’s project 
than he allows, as I shall discuss later in this section. 
It is therefore not surprising, yet still edifying to note that an EP approach to 
the question of social justice was not beyond Rawls’s contemplation, although he 
rejected it outright, as I intend to show below. However, I propose to deal specifically 
with the arguments he does put forward, and to do so I shall consider in some depth 
what is in fact the fundamental difference between the Rawlsian approach and the 
approach I adopt in this project, while noting also to what extent the EP approach 
can in fact serve to vindicate his project. 
Rawls (Rawls 2011, 80-87) deals directly with the scientific psychological 
approach to the question of justice in §7 and §8 of Lecture 2 of Part One of Political 
Liberalism: Basic Elements. He sums up his argument with the general conclusion 
that political philosophy is autonomous, firstly because its family of “fundamental 
ideas is not analysable in terms of some natural basis, say the family of 
psychological and biological concepts, or even in terms of the family of social and 
economic concepts.” This is due to the fact, he says, that the political conception of 
justice is a normative scheme of thought. The presumption supporting his contention 
is evidently that normative schemes of thought are not analysable in terms of any 
natural basis. This is further supported by his later statement on p. 88, that political 
philosophy is autonomous in that “we need not explain its role and content 
scientifically, in terms of natural selection, for instance.” 
At first blush, this may be interpreted as Rawls being mindful of the so-called 
“naturalistic fallacy” (cf. the discussion in Chapter 3 heading 4, above). But Rawls 
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does not read Hume to underwrite or invent the NF. Not only does he never mention 
NF, he reads Hume to say the opposite. In his lectures on Hume, Rawls says: 
All along I have interpreted Hume as wanting to show that 
morality, and our practice of it, is the expression of our nature, 
given our place in the world and our dependence on society. It is 
part of Hume's fideism of nature to establish that morality is a 
natural phenomenon fully continuous with human psychology 
(Rawls 2003, 978-979). 
And again at 1021- 1025: 
[Hume] abandons entirely the idea of a theological basis of 
morality and proceeds to treat the virtues, both natural and 
artificial, as well as our moral sentiments as natural facts. It is of 
no concern to him that our moral beliefs should be peculiar to us. 
He treats our judgments of moral approval and disapproval as 
part of human psychology, and he observes the similarities 
between our psychology and that of animals. Why we have a 
morality, how we acquire it, and the way it works, is one of the 
moral subjects to which he is applying the experimental method 
of reasoning. 
I therefore suggest that the NF is not the source and cause of Rawls’s 
rejection of science, but it may rather be understood in terms of the Kantian nature of 
his project.  In TOJ he disclaims any originality for his theory on the basis that the 
result of his account of justice is highly Kantian in nature (Rawls 2009, 146). 
However, in the Dewey Lectures (DL) (Rawls 1980, 517) he points out that  
the adjective 'Kantian' expresses analogy and not identity; it 
means roughly that a doctrine sufficiently resembles Kant's in 
enough fundamental respects so that it is far closer to his view 
than to the other traditional moral conceptions that are 
appropriate for use as bench-marks of comparison. 
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Rawls then continues to discuss how Kantian Constructivism informs and 
influences justice as fairness. He argues that in justice as fairness the first principles 
of justice depend on such general beliefs about human nature and how society 
works, as are allowed to the parties in the original position. (Rawls 1980, 565). In 
justice as fairness, he states, the first principles of justice are not independent of 
such beliefs, and it follows that as the general beliefs about human nature and the 
working of society change, the first principles of justice may also change. 
But, he argues, these beliefs are distinct elements and enter the discussion at 
different places. The conception of the person as free and equal, he holds, is a 
companion moral ideal paired with the ideal of a well-ordered society wherein 
citizens “affirm their public conception of justice because it matches their considered 
convictions and coheres with the kind of persons they, on due reflection, want to be” 
(Rawls 1980, 568). Whether these ideals are feasible, whether they can be realised 
under normal conditions, is revealed by a theory of human nature and a view of the 
requirements of social life. Thus, he argues, 
Changes in the theory of human nature or in social theory 
generally which do not affect the feasibility of the ideals of the 
person and of a well-ordered society do not affect the agreement 
of the parties in the original position (Rawls 1980, 566). 
Rawls adds that it is hard to realistically imagine that there could be any 
convincing new knowledge that negates the feasibility of these ideals – the relevant 
information on these matters, he says, probably goes back a long time and is 
available to inform the common sense of any “thoughtful and reflective person.” Such 
advances in knowledge, he argues, may rather be used to implement the application 
of the first principles, and to suggest better designed institutions to realise them in 
practise. 
It seems clear that Rawls regards the relevance of scientific knowledge as 
relating only to the feasibility of the practical implementation of justice as fairness. It 
has nothing to do with the ascertainable or even probable truth of the conceptions. 
The first principles of justice, he states, may be said to be true “in the sense that they 
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would be agreed to if the parties in the original position were provided with all the 
relevant true general beliefs” (Rawls 1980, 569). Nevertheless, the notion of truth 
does have a natural use in moral reasoning, he suggests. In particular cases for 
example, particular judgments and secondary norms may be considered true when 
they follow from, or are sound applications of, reasonable first principles. 
This clearly indicates that for Rawls, neither science, nor truth are considered 
to play any role in the construction of first principles. Indeed, Rawls clearly says that 
first principles can be said to be “reasonable” or “unreasonable,” rather than “true” or 
“false,” because they are constructed via the constructivist procedure of the original 
position. First principles, he holds, are not to be derived “from the truths of science 
and adjusted in accordance advances in human psychology.” (Rawls 1980, 569,567, 
& 568) 
This view that Rawls takes is clearly derived from the Kantian view which is 
that the fundamental philosophical issues must be addressed a priori, without 
drawing on observations of human beings and their behaviour (Johnson 2014). 
Kant’s argument seems to be that moral requirements present themselves as 
being absolutely necessary (Kant 2013, 1251). But an a posteriori method seems 
ill-suited to discovering and establishing what we must do; surely it will only tell us 
what we actually do. So, an a posteriori method of seeking out and establishing 
the principle that generates such requirements will not support the presentation of 
moral ‘ought’s’ as necessities (Johnson 2014). 
According to Johnson, Kant’s argument seems to be that once we “seek 
out and establish” the fundamental principle of morality a priori, then we may 
consult facts drawn from experience, thus empirical facts, in order to determine 
how best to apply this principle to human beings and generate particular 
conclusions about how we ought to act. This seems to be precisely the reading 
Rawls gives Kant and is an argument on all fours with his application of empirical 
facts in justice as fairness, as discussed above. 
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However, Rawls’s does seemingly try to justify his rejection of empirical input 
also on non-Kantian considerations. He argues that “human nature and its natural 
psychology are permissive: they may limit the viable conceptions of persons and 
ideals of citizenship, and the moral psychologies that may support them, but do not 
dictate the ones we must adopt.” What he seems to be arguing is that human nature, 
being whatever it may be, may constrain the possible accurate conceptions of “the 
person”, the concomitant “ideals of citizenship” and the moral psychologies that 
support them, in that it leaves, by implication, per Rawls, a constrained pool of 
possible conceptions of the person, of ideals of citizenship and of supporting moral 
psychologies one may adopt. 
This argument is echoed by Ken Binmore when he says that any decision 
problem can be divided into two parts: 
One first determines what is feasible, and then chooses the 
optimal alternative from the set of feasible possibilities. Feasibility 
is a scientific question that can be settled independently of our 
cultural biases if we try sufficiently hard. It is only when we get to 
choosing an optimal social contract from those that are feasible 
that science ceases to guide our path. (Binmore 2005, 52) 
But, Rawls seems to argue, given this pool of concepts, human nature, as 
understood in psychology, would still not tell you which specific one(s) ought to be 
adopted. One would still require some form of moral guidance to adopt the truly 
moral one. It appears that what he is saying is that the natural psychology 
understanding of human nature includes a wide range of possible conceptions of the 
person; it may support a wide array of possible ideals of citizenship and supporting 
moral psychologies, but human nature as such has no real moral content, no moral 
compass. 
The natural psychology of human nature, Rawls appears to say, will not guide 
you to adopt any particular one of these conceptions as the uniquely moral one. It is 
with this second part of the Rawlsian argument, seemingly supported by Binmore, 
that I take issue in this project. My point is that there will probably not be a unique 
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single moral conception of the person, but probably numerous moral conceptions, 
each one being appropriate, depending upon how it fits with the culture of the people 
adopting it. However, if we understand the role of moral beliefs and behaviour in the 
evolutionary process, there will be a similarity in the deep structure of all the truly 
moral conceptions. Science therefore still guides our path even after we discover 
feasibility. 
 How Rawls comes to his conclusion is not directly made apparent in TOJ or 
in Political Liberalism, but given the Kantian context of justice as fairness, Rawls’s 
position is that moral guidance must come from a priori first principles, not from 
empirical experience. 
But as far as Binmore is concerned one must keep in mind that his definition 
of a social contract is quite far removed from Rawls’s understanding of the contract: 
being the institutional embodiment of the agreed principles of justice, incorporated 
into the basic structure of society. According to Binmore a “social contract is the set 
of common understandings that allow the citizens of a society to coordinate their 
efforts” (Binmore 2005, 3). 
But accepting, for the sake of argument, the correctness of Rawls’s argument, 
it still raises the following question: If we do not investigate what limits human nature 
and its natural psychology place on the viable conceptions of persons, the ideals of 
citizenship, and their supporting moral psychologies, how can we be sure, acting in 
ignorance, that the conceptions and ideals we do adopt are viable ones? There is no 
real reply to such questions in justice as fairness. Rather the reply would seem to be 
locked in the Kantian logic that moral principles draw on knowledge that transcends 
the limits of experience and therefore cannot be contested by the criterion of 
experience. 
I therefore suggest that to the extent that Rawls tries to justify his rejection of 
scientific input by non-Kantian arguments, it is unsuccessful. It seems to indicate that 
Rawls never seriously considered the objections to his theory to the effect, as he 
puts it, “that our account is unscientific,” (Rawls 2011, 86) for he does not meet the 
objections head-on. Rawls cannot accept scientific facts into his project without 
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destroying its Kantian roots. To do so would undermine the whole structure of the 
original position and the status of its results. 
Justice as fairness is meant to be a real-world solution to a real-world problem 
of a lack of social justice. It therefore must deal with real world persons. An idealised 
conception of the person, idealized without reference to any scientifically valid 
considerations, can surely never found a valid theory of how people would react to, 
for example, the veil of ignorance, or to the presentation of justice as fairness in that 
situation of the original position. A proper conception of the person, I suggest, should 
be founded on scientifically valid considerations, if we are to conceive of real world 
persons. 
There is nothing in Rawls’s argument that convincingly puts philosophical 
theory beyond the reach of scientific input, unless one accepts a Kantian moral 
position ab initio. From the EP point of view there does not appear to be any valid 
considerations to reject its scientific foundation in favour of philosophic argument in 
principle. As is argued below, there has always been a virtuous dynamic between 
philosophic insights and scientific discovery. I therefore suggest that Rawls’s 
rejection of scientific input is unfounded and unfortunate, but seemingly unavoidable 
because of its philosophic roots. His project might otherwise have gained much from 
accepting scientific input. This argument will be further developed in §5 below. 
The EP view, however, is better presented in the words of Edward O. Wilson, 
who pinpointed the biological foundation of ethical intuitions: 
These centres [the hypothalamus and limbic system] flood our 
consciousness with all the emotions - hate, love, guilt, fear, and 
others - that are consulted by ethical philosophers who wish to 
intuit the standards of good and evil. What, we are then 
compelled to ask, made the hypothalamus and limbic system? 
They evolved by natural selection. That simple biological 
statement must be pursued to explain ethics and ethical 
philosophers.... (Wilson 1975) 
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As will be argued later in more detail, there is a clear implication in Rawls’s 
theory and his arguments that there exists some common human understanding, 
perhaps intuition, of justice. He struggles to put his finger on exactly how this deeper 
understanding might be accessed and realised, but that is because he does not 
incorporate psychology into his theory. 
The deep recesses of the human mind can be understood only based on 
natural psychology, and justice as fairness could have gained much from introducing 
that knowledge into the project. EP provides even more. It could have provided 
Rawls with an understanding of how it comes about that people have similar notions 
of justice embedded in their psyche and how that might explain the agreement that 
he wanted to achieve through the mechanism of the original position. 
Rawls’s relatively easy dismissal of scientific investigation seems to place him 
at one end of a spectrum of academic opinion that finds the likes of Stephen 
Hawking and others at the other end. Hawking and Mlodinow hold that philosophy is 
dead (Hawking 2010, 13). It has not kept up, they say, with modern developments in 
science, particularly physics. They maintain that scientists have consequently 
become the bearers of the torch of discovery in the human quest for knowledge. 
I think there are grounds for accepting a position in the middle-ground 
between Rawls and Hawking - a position wherein the relative merits of scientific 
rigour and philosophic insight both come into their own in mutually supportive roles. 
Philosophical insights can be, and are regularly, derived from science and vice 
versa. 
The interaction between philosophy and real-world experience has been 
acknowledged for many years by different schools of thought. American pragmatism 
and German hermeneutics, for example, share an important assumption that I also 
adopt, namely that philosophy must find its home in, and preserve its link with, 
everyday life. Philosophical theories and concepts must pay their way by making a 
difference to the lives and the experience of real people in the actual world 
(Finlayson 2005, 18). Empirical science plays a similar role in the real world, so that 
the most efficient outcome would generally be when the one discipline feeds off the 
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other. I therefore argue that there can be a virtuous cycle of interaction between 
philosophy and natural science, particularly so in the instance of my project. 
Thus, to put the divergence of the premises of justice as fairness and the EP 
approach more plainly, one could state that whereas Rawls ignores and rejects the 
value and importance of the sciences for his political conceptualisation of justice, the 
EP approach accepts the contributions of the sciences as foundational for its theory 
development. 
It attempts to make use of such multiple premises about human 
understanding and behaviour that science and research can provide, to inform us 
about the human psyche, how it was formed, and its role and functions in the 
modern world. This puts us in a position where we can reason deductively and 
inductively about the most likely concepts, or understandings of social justice that 
would be most widely found to be generally amenable to human beings in the social 
context. The EP approach tries to understand the evolutionarily developed human 
psyche and provide a scheme of precepts for social justice, taking account of human 
beings as they are, rather than as we would have them be. 
In the following section, I shall attempt to deal with some of the divergences 
and congruencies that arise between justice as fairness and the evolutionary 
approach from the distinct aims of the two projects. 
3. A Departure on Aims 
The aim of Rawls’s project changed over time until it reached its final status of 
being limited to a political conception of justice, which it was not at the outset. His 
aim is in general to articulate our considered principles of justice, while the general 
aim of my project is articulate the principles of justice as they have been embedded 
in the human psyche through the process of evolution. I try to understand as well as 
articulate the human notion of justice, rather than to define precise principles. In this 
section, I try to evaluate the difference this departure on aims makes to the 
respective final results. 
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Rawls (Rawls, 1987) states that the aims of political philosophy depend on the 
society it addresses. In his essay on Kantian Constructivism he makes clear what 
society he is addressing in justice as fairness: 
… we are not trying to find a conception of justice suitable for all 
societies regardless of their particular social or historical 
circumstances. We want to settle a fundamental disagreement 
over the just form of basic institutions within a democratic society 
under modern conditions (Rawls 1980, 518). 
A constitutional democracy, he contends, needs a regulative conception of 
justice that can articulate and order in a principled way the political ideals and values 
of a democratic regime, thereby specifying the aims the constitution is meant to 
achieve and the limits it must respect. It is in this context, I suggest, that justice as 
fairness must be seen and evaluated. Justice as fairness is evidently addressed to 
the citizens of a constitutional democracy. 
In his reply to Alexander and Musgrave (Rawls, 1974) Rawls formulates the 
aim of justice as fairness as being to clarify and organize our considered judgments 
about the justice and injustice of social forms. Thus, any account of these judgments, 
when fully presented, expresses an underlying conception of human society, that is, 
a conception of the person, of the relations between persons, and of the general 
structure and ends of social cooperation.40 
Relatively late in the project’s development, Rawls reiterates the aim of his 
project as follows: 
The aim of justice as fairness, then, is practical: it presents itself 
as a conception of justice that may be shared by citizens as a 
basis of a reasoned, informed, and willing political agreement. It 
                                            
40 In fact, according to Samuel (Freeman 2007a), the justificatory force of social contract views depends 
only in part on the idea of agreement; even more essential is the conception of the person and the conception of 
practical reason that are built into particular views. Rawls’s idea of agreement, he says, is closely tied to his 
conceptions of public reason, justification, and autonomy – p.p.122-123. 
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expresses their shared and public political reason (Rawls 2011, 
9). 
To clarify the essence of what Rawls is saying one might suggest that he 
argues first that a constitutional democracy needs a regulative conception of justice, 
that is, a conception of justice, to be provided by political philosophy, that will in 
practice act as an enforced, binding regulator of political life through its incorporation 
into a constitution. It thus appears to be a prescriptive conception of justice that he is 
aiming for.41 Second, the specific aim of justice as fairness is to clearly formulate that 
conception of justice to capture our considered judgment resulting from reflective 
equilibrium. However, he says this conception of justice may be shared by citizens 
as a basis of the constitution. 
Rawls’s aim seems not to be to determine what is just and unjust in any 
objective sense, his aim is to gain a consensus judgment in a modern democratic 
society on the subject of social justice from the people involved. Only after 
agreement on the principles do they become prescriptive. They are prescriptive 
because it is what would have been agreed to in the original position. 
If people in a society should all agree, then the agreement reflects a proper 
conception of justice on which to base their constitution.42 But, while discussing the 
concept of reflective equilibrium (Rawls 2009, 50), Rawls says that for the purposes 
of his (TOJ) book, “the views of the reader and the author are the only ones that 
count.” In the view of R. M. Hare (Hare 1973) Rawls, is “here advocating a kind of 
subjectivism, in the narrowest and most old-fashioned sense. He is making the 
answer to the question "Am I right in what I say about moral questions?" depend on 
the answer to the question "Do you, the reader, and I agree in what I say?" In doing 
                                            
41 Rawls says: “By way of general comment, these principles primarily apply, as I have said, to the basic 
structure of society (the constitution). They are to govern the assignment of rights and duties and to regulate 
the distribution of social and economic advantages (Rawls 2009, 61) (my bold Italics). 
42 Rawls contends that “the institutions of the basic structure are just provided they satisfy the principles 
that free and equal moral persons, in a situation that is fair between them, would adopt for the purpose of 
regulating that structure (Rawls 2011, 271).” 
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this, Hare argues, Rawls makes the truth of the theory depend on agreement with 
people’s opinions. 
Rawls would inevitably defend against Hare’s claim by arguing that despite 
the concept of justice reflecting our independently, but subjectively considered, 
judgment in equilibrium, the principles so agreed to will be objective. Our moral 
principles and convictions will be objective because “they have been arrived at and 
tested by assuming this [appropriate] general standpoint [as prescribed for the 
original position] and by assessing the arguments for them by the restrictions 
expressed by the conception of the original position” (Rawls 2009, 517). 
The EP approach, because of its incorporation of scientific principles, requires 
no subjective agreement at all.43 Its applicability is also not restricted to modern 
democratic societies, but may lay claim to more universal applicability. This is 
because it does not seek agreement from people based on their already socialised 
understanding of democratic values. Its principles are thus objective in the sense 
that they are not based on the opinion of any participants or members of society, but 
on the scientifically observed natural functioning of their psyche. The principles are 
embedded in the human psyche, and EP’s aim is to understand and isolate them 
objectively as functional elements of human behaviour. 
The aims of the two approaches are thus distinguishable by the difference in 
the fundamental veracities they each seek. But despite this difference, the EP 
approach does appear to support some of the Rawlsian argument. In justice as 
fairness Rawls argues that the principles of justice are revealed, fixed and validated 
by agreement between the parties. In a certain sense the EP approach supports the 
idea of principles based on general agreement, but the agreement emanates from 
the evolutionarily embedded notions of justice in the human psyche, not from 
                                            
43 This is where the EP approach fundamentally departs from social contract views and liberal intuition: 
social contract views work from the intuitive idea of agreement. There is a basic liberal idea that cooperation 
ought to be based in the individual’s consent and ought to be for their mutual benefit. EP for its part asserts that 
willing cooperation within society is spontaneous, being part of human nature and it redounds to the benefit of 
group living. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 161 
 
reliance on the supposed agreement of various parties which may or may not 
actually obtain. 
4. Two Conceptions of Justice and Society 
In this section, I analyse the conception of justice that Rawls puts forward; I 
raise a number of objections and identify some weaknesses in his conjectures from 
the EP point of view. I compare the contractually constrained conception of justice 
with the idea of justice as naturally perceived by human beings based on notions 
embedded in their psyche. I investigate what is fundamentally the difference 
between a constructed conception versus a discovered conception of social justice. 
Evidently there do appear to be areas of congruence between justice as 
fairness and the evolutionary approach. Both have the aim of being practically 
implementable, and to be just in execution. Although justice as fairness relies for its 
efficacy on a political agreement, understood as shared public reason, both 
approaches propose its principles to present a publicly shared conception of justice. 
In justice as fairness it comes about through the device of the original position, in EP 
the shared conception comes about because of the evolutionarily developed 
common human psyche. But whereas justice as fairness has the explicit aim of 
formulating principles to form the basis of a political constitution, the EP approach 
tries to reach an understanding of the human notion of social justice that can be 
used in a wide array of social purposes and policy formation, including the possible 
drawing of a political constitution. 
Rawls doubts that there exist many conceptions of justice and human society 
such as would serve his purposes, and insofar as they do exist, he argues that they 
are so disparate as to be basically irreconcilable (Rawls 2009, 633). Thus, he 
proposes to start afresh by specifying an underlying conception of society upon 
which he would build and formulate a theory of justice. According to Rawls, the result 
of this exercise is his notion of a well-ordered society. He then continues to define a 
well-ordered society as one that is, among other features, effectively regulated by a 
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public conception of justice (Rawls 2009, 634). By a society effectively regulated by 
a public conception of justice he means a society in which: 
1. Everyone accepts, and knows that others accept, the same principles 
(has the same conception) of justice. 
2. Basic social institutions and their arrangement into one scheme (the 
basic structure of society) satisfy, and are with reason believed by everyone 
to satisfy, these principles.44 
3. The public conception of justice is founded on reasonable beliefs that 
have been established by generally accepted methods of enquiry. 
The value of this notion, he argues, and therefore the persuasive power of the 
arguments that build upon it, depends on the assumption that those who appear to 
hold incompatible conceptions of justice will nevertheless find at least the 
fundamental features he proposes for a well-ordered society congenial to their moral 
convictions, or would do so after due consideration. 
A difficulty with this argument is that the fundamental features of a well-
ordered society, include, by Rawls’s own admission, features 1 to 3 above. This 
means that although those people who “appear to hold incompatible conceptions of 
justice” might accept propositions 1 to 3 above, they could only do so on the basis 
that everyone accepts their particular conception. Thus, if people with “incompatible 
conceptions of justice” all find themselves living within the same civil society, 
conditions 1 to 3 can never be satisfied. 
This might be one of the reasons why Rawls eventually re-evaluated the idea 
of a well-ordered society. In Political Liberalism, he admits that his original idea of a 
well-ordered society is unrealistic since, he argues, it is inconsistent with realizing its 
                                            
44 Rawls is really saying that the political constitution satisfies, and is with reason publicly acknowledged 
to satisfy the principles of justice referred to in (1). A well-ordered society is thus a constitutional polity – cf. 
(Rawls 2009, 7-8). He seems to leave open the question whether a society could be well-ordered even if it does 
not have a constitution with “its institutions all arranged into one scheme,” i.e. a written, single document 
constitution, like the UK. 
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own principles even under the best of foreseeable conditions. He accordingly 
developed the notion of an overlapping consensus (Rawls 2011, 177). He argues 
that he has thereby removed the ambiguity of TOJ and now presents justice as 
fairness from the outset as a political conception of justice, as opposed to a 
comprehensive doctrine or part thereof. 
The problem Rawls faces, given his premise that every element of the basic 
structure of society must be consensual, is how it could be “possible for there to exist 
over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly 
divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines” (Rawls 2011, 
191). He postulates that a political conception of justice, to be acceptable, must 
accord with our considered convictions, at all levels of generality, on due reflection, 
or in what he has called elsewhere “reflective equilibrium” (Rawls 2011, 4-8). 
The EP approach, as proposed in Chapter 3, avoids the inevitable 
complications of obtaining a conscious, overtly expressed consensus on the 
principles of justice, the nature of society, or the terms of social cooperation among 
millions of people. This reading of Rawls may not accord completely with the 
predominant reading of Rawls being that justice as fairness relies on a hypothetical 
agreement (i.e. not overtly expressed) amongst idealised parties. 
I do not disagree with this reading, but I stress that the outcome of the 
hypothetical agreement is not hypothetical. It is a concrete outcome that is 
encapsulated in the formulation of the two principles of justice. It seems to follow that 
justice as fairness requires a conscious, overtly expressed consensus by the citizens 
of a well-ordered society, from Rawls’s definition of a public conception of justice in a 
well-ordered society: “being a society in which everyone accepts, and knows that 
others accept the same conception of justice (my bold italics).” (Rawls 2009, 634) – 
cf. also (Rawls 2009, 16). 
Thus, in society at large, there must be an express public consensus about 
the conception of justice by all parties. This reading is further supported by the 
condition of publicity for principles of justice, which Rawls states is connoted by the 
phraseology of the contract. Rawls concludes that “if these principles are the 
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outcome of an agreement, citizens have a knowledge of the principles that others 
follow. It is characteristic of contract theories to stress the public nature of political 
principles.” (Rawls 2009, 16 and cf. also 56 and 84). 
The EP approach, by contrast, argues that the conditions of social 
cooperation and the principles of justice are part of the human psyche and people 
are inclined to intuitively react favourably to measures they perceive as just and 
unfavourably to those they perceive as unjust, in terms of whether, in their 
perception, the measures contribute to social cohesion or not. As discussed in 
Chapter 3 section 5, EP holds that people do share, without overt, or even conscious 
agreement, and despite variously founded disagreements, a broad notion of justice 
and an inclination for social cooperation that is ingrained in their psyche due to the 
common human experience during especially the Pleistocene, but also thereafter by 
cultural evolution through social learning. 
Rawls’s exclusion of natural science from his theory forces him to seek 
agreement among people without any scientific understanding of human motivation 
in coming to agreement. More specifically, he can therefore not take account of the 
psychological elements of agreement seeking, yet in many ways he strives to plumb 
the depths of the psyche through the process of finding an overlapping consensus 
through reflective equilibrium. It is as if he intuitively knows there must be some 
fundamental area of agreement among humans, but he cannot really identify it. He 
therefore seeks it in the merely rational procedure of reflective equilibrium. 
However, a fundamental and necessary implication of his argument is that we 
all actually know what justice is, despite our plurality of comprehensive doctrines. If 
only we can put to one side our own interests and agendas, our own beliefs and 
inclinations, he argues, we will all come to the same conception of justice; in fact, his 
presumption is that we all already hold the same conception of justice latently, 
specifically the justice conception embodied in his justice as fairness. This becomes 
abundantly clear when Rawls argues that basic agreements are made when the 
parties already know their social positions, their relative bargaining strengths, 
abilities and preferences (Rawls 2009, 141). 
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These contingencies and knowledge of them, he argues, cumulatively distort 
the social system. Rawls then argues that contract theory introduces the notion of 
the original position in an attempt to remedy this distorting situation, namely by 
introducing the veil of ignorance (Rawls 2009, 141). Thus, the weight of his argument 
is that we can only become aware of a true conception of justice under the strictures 
and constraints of the original position. 
However, because Rawls eschews the scientific approach he is unable to 
motivate or demonstrate how it comes about that we in fact all have the same 
conception of justice buried deep in the recesses of our minds. And if it could be 
demonstrated that we all do have the same conception of justice, why would it 
particularly be his conception of justice as fairness that is embedded in human 
beings? The EP approach, on the contrary, holds the promise to tell us exactly why 
people would tend to share a common conception of justice and why, through a 
process of gene-culture co-evolution, these conceptions would tend to be similar, but 
not necessarily identical. This again, is further support Rawls’s general argument 
potentially receives from the EP approach, although it does not support the ipsissima 
verba of his justice as fairness formulations. 
His purely rational approach puts these questions beyond reach of scientific 
analysis, but he does attempt to explain and justify the choice of justice as fairness 
by the parties in the original position, by reference to the rationale of the maximin 
criterion. He states that one can, as a heuristic device, think of the two principles of 
justice as the maximin rule for choice under conditions of uncertainty – cf. also the 
discussion of the maximin criterion in Chapter 1. However, in a later article (Rawls 
1974, 141) Rawls distinguishes the maximin equity criterion from the “so-called 
maximin rule for choice under uncertainty.” He states that they are two very different 
things, and then signals his intent to go on to formulate the reasons for the equity 
criterion so that they are independent from the rule. 
His argument thereafter in the article appears to depart from the argument in 
TOJ that uses the accepted mathematical basis for choice under conditions of 
uncertainty, but this is not specifically spelt out. Nevertheless, he maintains that the 
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original position pushes us toward maximin (Rawls 1974, 143). What the argument 
appears to be is that the difference principle is in fact the maximin equity criterion as 
formulated. This supposition is strengthened by Rawls’s response to Harsanyani 
(see below) in Political Liberalism (Rawls 2011, 260 note 297). Rawls states that the 
maximin principle, in the form of the difference principle, is merely one principle 
constrained by others.  It is uncertain where that leaves the maximin argument as 
utilised in TOJ. 
This seems rather out of place in a decision-making process relating to 
normative judgements, such as would be the case in the original position. The 
maximin principle is actually a statistical decision function (Wald 1950), (Savage 
1951), and cannot be said, therefore, to necessarily be a natural human decision 
making function. It is a function calculating the most advantageous worst case 
outcome of a number of given scenarios. It has however been adopted by 
economists for economic problems such as taxation to avoid the possibility of 
extremely negative taxation consequences (Phelps 1973), (Cooter 1974). Its use in 
TOJ tends to devalue the force of Rawls’s argument in justifying the choice of justice 
as fairness in the original position. 
John Harsanyani (Harsanyani 1975, 596) demonstrated that the maximin 
principle as used in TOJ often leads to highly irrational decisions, and in conjunction 
with the difference principle, morally questionable ones. He says that the rule ignores 
probability judgments by the decision maker, leading to possible absurd results. 
Therefore, it seems, Rawls is at pains to explain that a calculation of likelihoods in 
the original position is not really necessary or feasible (Rawls 2009, 155). He says 
that the rule is, in context, really a maxim and a rule of thumb 
that comes into its own in special circumstances. Its application 
depends upon the qualitative structure of the possible gains and 
losses in relation to one’s conception of the good, all this against 
a background in which it is reasonable to discount conjectural 
estimates of likelihoods. 
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The maximin rule, Rawls argues (Rawls 1974, 142), is a macro-principle, not 
a micro one and it is not a criterion meant to apply to small-scale situations. This 
latter argument, Rawls maintains, affects the force of Harsanyani’s above quoted 
critique. 
In TOJ Rawls admits that the maximin rule is not of general application, and 
adds that “Now, as I have suggested, the original position has been defined so that it 
is a situation in which the maximin rule applies” (Rawls 2009 155). This, I suggest, 
must be read in conjunction with Rawls’s claim that the maximin rule is not of general 
application and can only be used in special circumstances, while he simultaneously 
argues that the original position is just such a circumstance by design. Thus, in 
reading Rawls one must be careful not to generalize the maximin rule, as according 
to the argument in TOJ, it seems to be only applicable to the decisions made in the 
original position. But later it appears that the difference principle is itself a formulation 
of the maximin principle, not as a decision-making rule, but as the embodiment of the 
maximin equity principle. 
Within the context of a purpose-made situation, the maximin decision rule is 
probably sufficient to substantiate Rawls’s assertion that the two principles of justice 
as fairness would be chosen, but in fact the maximin rule, together with much of the 
rational choice, rational actor theory of economics on which the rule is based, have 
long been empirically discounted  (Bowles 1993), (Rabin 1998), (Gintis 2000), 
(Thaler 2000), and (Henrich 2001). There is thus no way in which Rawls can 
guarantee that the parties to the original position will select justice as fairness from 
among the possible choices presented to them. 
The EP approach avoids such theories of rules of choice, since there is no 
original position and choice does not come into the understanding of the principles of 
justice. Regarding the formulation of the difference principle, the EP approach views 
it as a public policy principle that is discussed in Chapter 5. 
The EP approach, by contrast, has the aim firstly, of identifying whether there 
are principles of social justice that could be universally applicable to human beings. 
Secondly, if there are such principles, what are they, and what was their role in 
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human evolution, if any? It aims to explain why we have notions of justice and why 
they would be any particular ones. To these questions the EP approach replies that 
there are indeed universal human principles of justice. They are universal because 
they developed as behavioural traits during the common human experience in the 
Pleistocene era. 
EP recognises that the Pleistocene presented the human population with 
common challenges to survival and it therefore elicited similar unsuccessful and 
successful responses from human groups. Groups with unsuccessful responses 
disappeared. Groups with the best mix of survival behaviours survived better than 
groups with less successful behaviours and therefore the most successful ones left 
more of their genes in the gene pool. Those behaviours most conducive to survival 
and that were experienced as essential for survival became more common in the 
human gene pool. These genetically evolved behaviours are associated with the 
idea of justice because ideas of right and wrong became naturally associated with 
behaviour that promote society versus those that threaten social cohesion; as social 
animals, we are already inherently biased to preserving human Society. Like all 
social animals, humans cannot exist outside, or without Society – cf. the discussion 
in Chapter 3 heading 3. Thus, what promotes the stability of Society promotes the 
stability of the existence of humans and to preserve humans in society is what is 
psychologically experienced as just without conscious intellectualisation. 
At a general level, cooperation within society is probably the most basic 
condition for human survival. Certain behaviours are so fundamental to the 
coherence and survival of human society that in our psyche they have become 
interwoven with our emotions so that we have emotional responses to justice: 
satisfaction at justice done, anger at injustice done and pleasure from doing what is 
seen as just. And these emotions are altruistic responses, they are not only 
responses to what is done to, or by us, or our kin – cf. the discussion in Chapter 3 
(Bowles 2011), (Gintis 2000), and (Gintis 2008). 
We can thus postulate that notions of justice are related to survival strategies, 
both group and individual. When in conflict though, group survival seems to trump 
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individual survival; uncooperative, self- serving, selfish and egotistical behaviour will 
generally be seen as unjust, especially if it weighs against group interests, while self-
sacrifice for the general good is lauded.45 On this basis EP can thus give an 
apparently cohesive account of and explain why we share common ideas and 
intuitions of justice and why they are regarded as so fundamentally important - cf. 
also the discussion in Chapter 3, heading 5. 
The EP approach also proposes that people will, if allowed to freely express 
themselves, cooperate willingly while chastising and punishing those individuals who 
persist in uncooperative and unjust behaviour. Putting this in contractual terms, if 
needs must, it might be said that the terms of the social agreement need not actually 
or even notionally46 be agreed to. 
Of course it could be argued, as I have indicated above, that these latent 
terms in fact amount to agreed terms, inasmuch as everybody then has intuitive 
reasons to assert them. They may reflect the reasons people have intuitively, but 
Rawls seems to imply that for justice as fairness, our exercise of political power is 
proper only when “we sincerely believe that the reasons we offer for our political 
action may reasonably be accepted by other citizens as a justification of those 
actions” (Rawls 2011,569). 
The evolutionary approach holds that people do not have to explicitly or even 
impliedly agree on the terms of their cooperation within Society; one might say they 
already have a general generic agreement regarding justice, being the terms of their 
cooperation, embedded in their psyche. People find themselves in a largely 
cooperative group since birth. What appears to be required is that under particular 
circumstances people need to agree on the terms of their governance. For example, 
when different cooperating groups of people come together voluntarily to form one 
larger society, I suggest they need to agree on the terms by which the conglomerate 
will be governed. The terms agreed to, I further suggest, will not, and need not 
specify the principles of justice; they will be agreed to by each group only on the 
                                            
45 Cf. the broad basis of the popularity of Christian belief. 
46 Notional agreement meaning implicit or implied agreement indicated by compliant behaviour. 
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basis that the terms are in accord with, or do not violate the precepts of the people’s 
intuitive sense and notion of justice, which will be broadly similar. 
I therefore contend that any inability to agree will therefore not likely be based 
on disagreement on the principles of justice, but probably on people’s respective 
notions of the good. This means that for groups to join up, agreement will need to be 
reached on matters such as where people will be allowed to live, what the hunting 
areas are to be and similar matters of governance. Clearly, the groups would have to 
consider the terms to be fair and not to disadvantage one group over the other, for 
agreement to ensue. 
I argue therefore that the EP approach allows that people from various 
cultural backgrounds, adhering to different and even incompatible comprehensive 
doctrines can reach such a political agreement, not based on an overlapping 
consensus of their comprehensive doctrines, but based on a broadly shared human 
embedded sense of cooperation and justice. 
But purely as intuition, EP also acknowledges that the notion of justice is 
extremely vulnerable to misapplication and misdirection, as argued in Chapter 3. 
Thus, within a society the evolutionarily developed principles of social justice, 
understood as proposed in Chapter 3, ought to be effected patently in its policy 
executions as reflected in its culture and institutions, and reasoned through the 
organisations of society. Consequently, the better a society’s institutions reflect in 
practice the broadly shared human intuitive sense of justice, fostering them through 
social learning while also taking account of the cultural notions of the society they 
are designed for, the more well-ordered the society will be. The perfectly just society, 
from the EP approach thus, is a well-ordered47 society where the society’s social 
institutions perfectly and patently reflect in practice the people’s intuitively grounded, 
but thoroughly reasoned notions of social justice as discussed in Chapter 3. 
Although the Evolutionary approach does not pretend to be a comprehensive 
doctrine, or even necessarily even part of one, unlike justice as fairness, it does not 
                                            
47 Well-ordered in the ordinary grammatical sense. 
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offer to be limited to merely a political conception of justice either. Its notional 
grounding in the human psyche linked to our emotional response mechanism, 
arguably makes it a value notion possibly of far wider social applicability than merely 
that of politics. 
5. The Role of Intuition 
Both approaches deal with the role of intuition in the understanding of social 
justice. Both recognise that intuition plays a major role in deciding what is just and 
unjust. But in this section I distinguish the role of intuition in each of the approaches, 
and I argue that in fact the role in each approach is fundamentally different: and that 
its role in the evolutionary approach is less problematic, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
I begin by noting that in fact Rawls’s proposition goes much further than 
merely the founding terms of civil government. He says he is intent upon working out 
which traditional conception of justice specifies the most appropriate principles for 
realising liberty and equality once society is viewed as a fair system of cooperation 
between free and equal citizens (Rawls 2011, 21). Rawls, like Kant, assumes a priori 
that human liberty and equality are just. There is thus no room for presenting any 
argument or adducing any evidence as to why this would be so. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, under the heading of Preliminary Principles, the EP approach gives a fair 
account of why both liberty and equality are the preferred human conditions from the 
societal point of view and from the interests of the genepool. 
Rawls might reply that human intuition suggests that both liberty and equality 
are presumed to be just, but that would still not explain why intuition presumes them 
to be just. Rawls maintains, 
in addressing the priority problem [of intuition derived principles] 
the task is that of reducing and not of eliminating entirely the 
reliance on intuitive judgments. There is no reason to suppose 
that we can avoid all appeals to intuition, of whatever kind, or that 
we should try to (Rawls1974, 44). Furthermore, Rawls argues 
that his objective is to formulate a conception of justice which, 
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“however much it may call upon intuition, whether ethical or 
prudential, tends to make our considered judgments of justice 
converge [with that of all other individuals]” (Rawls 2009, 45). 
There is thus doubtless a strong element of reliance on intuition in justice as 
fairness. Although Rawls does not call himself an intuitionist, he in fact sets out 
through TOJ specifically to disprove intuitionism, he apparently reserves the name 
‘intuitionist’ only for those who advocate a plurality of moral principles, each 
established by intuition, unrelated to each other in an ordered structure, with 
conflicting ones weighed against each other intuitively (Hare 1973, 146). 
Hare suggests that Rawls’s theory is no more firmly grounded than the 
intuitionists’: Rawls relies on “scores” of intuitions, he says (Hare 1973, 146). Hare 
states that he counted between pages TOJ 18 and 20, no less than thirty 
expressions implying a reliance on intuitions. In fact, intuition fulfils a fundamental 
role in Rawls’s whole theory.48 But Rawls does not offer any argument in support of 
whence intuition is derived, or what reliance one can place on it, and why. Thus, his 
argument raises, but does not answer important questions such as where our 
intuition comes from, how reliable and authoritative it can be, whether intuitions differ 
by culture or can be expected to be universal across all humans, and if so, why. 
The EP approach to justice, I contend, does go some way in answering these 
questions and tends to put the claim for liberty and equality on a much more secure 
and scientific footing. Liberty and equality, per the evolutionary approach, are notions 
embedded in the human psyche through our evolutionarily developed values of 
social justice since they encourage behaviour that contributes survival benefits to 
humans; they were further developed through levelling practices in early human 
societies. They allow humans to fully develop their genetic and memetic inheritance 
to the greater advantage of the gene pool and, the egalitarian ethos being embedded 
                                            
48 In TOJ (Rawls 2009, 21-22) Rawls specifically states that the conception of the original position is 
also an intuitive notion that suggests its own elaboration, so that led on by it we are drawn to define more clearly 
the standpoint from which we can best interpret moral relationships. We need a conception, he argues, that 
enables us to envision our objective from afar: the intuitive notion of the original position is to do this for us. 
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within the human psyche, both individuals and society can thereupon be allowed to 
attain their functional potential more fully when these two fundamentals are better 
realised. 
6. A Multiplicity of Principles 
In this section I discuss the derivation of Rawls’s principles and note certain 
fundamental problems with his different formulations, especially when viewed from 
the EP perspective. These give rise to anomalies and uncertainties which I highlight 
to bring the two approaches into better relational focus. 
We end up with a multiplicity of principles that are not particularly consistent 
within justice as fairness. But the differences with respect to the two approaches’ 
principles are more fundamental. In this section, after investigating some aspects of 
Rawls’s approach, I discuss the EP approach to the question of ‘principles’ of social 
justice and their conformity to the embedded human notions of justice. 
Given the aim of formulating principles for incorporation into a democratic 
constitution, justice as fairness in its later formulation (Rawls 2011, 5-6) results in 
two principles, presented as they might be for inclusion in a constitution: 
a. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme 
of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is 
compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme 
the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be 
guaranteed their fair value. 
b. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two 
conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions and 
offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged members of society. 
However, later, in PL (Rawls 2011, 271), Rawls restates the principles with a 
somewhat different formulation: 
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a. Each person has an equal right to the most extensive scheme of 
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties 
for all. 
b. Social and economic inequalities are permissible provided that 
they are: 
i. to the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged; 
and 
ii. ii) attached to positions and offices open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity. 
There is a substantial difference between the two formulations, specifically 
regarding the first principle. The real change is that in the first formulation principle a) 
is formulated as “a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties”, while it 
becomes “the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties”, in the second 
formulation. Whether the later formulation extends the list of possible liberties 
compared to the older one is moot. It could be argued that “fully adequate” is subject 
to debate about what may constitute “adequate” liberties as against what might be 
the “most extensive” scheme of liberties. But what I suggest is most remarkable 
about the reformulation is that in the first formulation every person has a claim to 
equal rights and liberties, whereas in the second formulation every person seems to 
have only one equal right, not rights (plural): namely the right to equal liberties. 
That change in wording appears, on reflection, to have a substantial impact 
on the sort of society Rawls envisages. Taking equal rights (plural) out of the 
equation almost destroys the liberal agenda, because rights and liberties are not the 
same thing. Some rights may be equated to liberties, such as the right to vote, which 
can be interpreted as the liberty to vote, although even that has different 
connotations. But one would be hard put to define, for example the right to life, the 
right to education, the right to health, and the right to shelter, as liberties. 
As against that problem, the EP approach does not strictly differentiate rights 
and liberties, since it focuses on the outcomes. Whether the outcomes are obtained 
through the working of rights, or liberties, or a combination for both, I suggest, is not 
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important for the formulation of the principles at this stage. The approach is rather 
one of identifying in a general way those actions and outcomes that are required to 
fully realise the human potential within society, which may variously be called rights, 
duties and liberties. 
The derived principles are thus intended to be descriptive of a society that is 
just in terms of our evolutionarily developed psyche. It is not prescriptive of how 
things ought to be, but descriptive of how things would be in a just society as defined 
by the EP approach. Thus, although there is nothing particularly objectionable in the 
formulation of the liberties in justice as fairness, in EP terms it would be more 
accurate to state that humans have all the rights, duties, and liberties necessary to 
enable each to be a fully functional member of Society, thereby achieving for each 
the full benefit of group living.49 
Of course, if a particular society would wish to transform, or maintain itself as 
a just society, it would have to formulate policies and institutions designed to achieve 
that end, based on an approach to the outcomes required by the EP approach. 
Those institutions and policies would then be prescriptive and legally binding on that 
society and its members. The question as to whether or not these principles are 
universally morally binding will be dealt with later on. 
As a result, the EP approach naturally lends itself to accommodate a 
multiplicity of legislative formulations, each with the same object, namely of allowing 
and empowering each member of society to attain full socio-economic functionality 
while garnering the full benefit of group living, but each formulation framed to suit the 
circumstances and cultural particularities of the society it is designed for. But I 
                                            
49 What full functionality means must to a large extent depend on the society in question, and therefore 
the notion has a cultural perspective as well as a technological one, but the ideal is that we are all fully functional 
members of a global Society. It is only when every individual is allowed and empowered to be fully functional in 
his society, that the genetic and memetic endowment of the whole gene pool can come to fruition and the full 
benefits of group living become actual for the members of that society. 
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suggest that the generic formulation of the liberty principle from the EP approach, for 
guidance for social and political policy purposes, might be as follows:50 
1. There exists the most extensive individual liberty compatible with a similar 
liberty for all, including the liberty and concomitant rights of full and equal 
adult political and social participation, as well as full and free access to, and 
instruction in the intellectual property of Society. These social goods are 
extended to every member of society, subject only to temporary suspension 
for malfeasant individuals convicted under fairly administered laws, in 
pursuance of which fair adjudication of all disputes are free, open and equally 
available to all.51 
 As appears from the above, this formulation does not recognise a strict 
differentiation between rights and liberties: they are both subsumed under one 
descriptive formulation. The description also acknowledges the need for law 
enforcement and fair adjudication as part of a just social structure. EP does not allow 
us to suffer from the illusion that any human society will ever consist of people who 
act lawfully and prosocially all the time;52 in fact EP affirms that there will always be 
anti-social behaviour – it is part of our developed psyche. That is why to chastise 
perpetrators is part of our embedded nature. The EP approach is not the first or only 
one to raise punishment as a principle of justice. That this is a more general 
conclusion is illustrated by J S Mill.53 
                                            
50 What follows is a further iteration of a formulation found in Chapter 3. 
51 The idea of punishment is also central to Mill’s notion of justice: 
the idea of justice supposes two things; a rule of conduct, and a sentiment which sanctions the 
rule. The first must be supposed common to all mankind, and intended for their good. The other 
(the sentiment) is a desire that punishment may be suffered by those who infringe the rule (Mill 
1879, 59). 
52 Cf. the discussion in Chapter 3 under “Justice and Society,” “The Subject of Justice,” “An 
Egalitarian Mind” and “Regarding Liberty and Equality.” 
53 J. S. Mill (Mill 1879, 57) argues that the two essential ingredients in the sentiment of justice are, the 
desire to punish a person who has done harm, and the knowledge or belief that there is some definite 
individual or individuals to whom harm has been done. 
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But, to be fair, Rawls recognised that there may well be people who do not 
have the same sense of justice as the rest of society and who therefore act unjustly. 
This ties into his partial compliance theory, when he argues that even in a just 
society there must be certain constraining arrangement to ensure compliance. 
The main point then is that to justify a conception of justice we do 
not have to contend that everyone, whatever his capacities and 
desires, has a sufficient reason (as defined by the thin theory) to 
preserve his sense of justice. For our good depends upon the 
sorts of persons we are, the kinds of wants and aspirations we 
have and are capable of. It can even happen that there are many 
who do not find a sense of justice for their good; but if so, the 
forces making for stability are weaker. Under such conditions 
penal devices will play a much larger role in the social system 
(Rawls 2009, 576). 
However, Rawls goes on to argue that the main purpose of the penal devices 
is to underwrite citizen’s trust in one another. The mechanisms, he says, will be 
seldom invoked and will comprise only a minor part of the social scheme. 
It is unfortunate that Rawls does not consider human nature as understood in 
psychology in any of these arguments, although his allowance for there being non-
compliant individuals does go some way toward acknowledging it. Nevertheless, 
Rawls’s concession falls far short of the EP approach which recognises the urge to 
punish offenders as fundamental to a cooperative, just society, and therefore 
punishment itself as an integral part of and a principle of justice. 
Despite the sentiment of punishment being part of the notion of social justice, 
I agree with Rawls that in a well-ordered society, also as envisaged by the EP 
approach, where the just institutions of society are tempered and supported by a pro-
social cultural endowment, anti-social behaviour might very well be kept to a 
minimum and then only at a much lower gravity of transgression. But this would be 
the promise of aligning the institutions and cultures of societies with the evolutionary 
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developed human notions of justice, and not the result of a shared public conception 
of justice through an overlapping consensus. 
When it comes to social and economic inequalities to which Rawls’s principle 
b) relates, there appears to be an implication of inequality in society that requires 
adjustment. Justice as fairness is an egalitarian conception of justice (Rawls 2011, 
6), and therefore the society that results from the original position, I would argue, can 
rightfully be expected to be egalitarian ab initio. The difference principle would then 
be a principle of public policy to maintain equality. It can be seen to be a principle 
introducing levelling behaviour, through public policy, into a modern society. 
From the discussion of levelling behaviour in Chapter 3, paragraph 5, it seems 
inevitable that an egalitarian society must be deliberately kept egalitarian by levelling 
behaviour. An ab initio egalitarian constituted society would become less egalitarian 
over time due to several factors, including the behaviour of SDO groups and 
individuals, as well as continuing natural contingencies, such as accidents of birth or 
other physical and mental impairments through happenstance. The difference 
principle, which is predicated on rectifying inequality, is therefore a principle of public 
policy to achieve justice (equality), rather than a principle of justice per se. Rawls 
himself suggests that this is a correct understanding of the difference principle. He 
says (Rawls 2011, Loc 603) that 
a. [he] would simply be unreasonable if [he] denied that there were 
other reasonable conceptions satisfying that definition, for 
example, one that substitutes for the difference principle, a 
principle to improve social well-being subject to a constraint 
guaranteeing for everyone a sufficient level of adequate all-
purpose means. 
EP on the other hand, does not prescribe any socio-economic policy, but it 
does also require the maintenance of egalitarianism through levelling behaviour, 
constituted by a combination of levelling institutions and the development of 
egalitarian cultural values through formal education and social learning. Additionally, 
the economic distribution system is so designed that it has a proportionately equal 
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result for every member of society. The following formulation of the distributive 
requirement is again descriptive, rather than prescriptive, of the conditions within a 
just society, and the generic formulation might be as follows: 
2. The product54 of society is distributed throughout society according to the 
principle of proportional equality, the proportion being dictated by the cultural 
values of the people, but taking into account the necessaries of individual life 
based on differing individual circumstances, requirements and capacities.55 
This formulation is based on the fundamentals of systems of distribution of 
such goods as have been observed in studies and is supported by much research, 
as discussed in Chapter 3, paragraph 6. It appears also, despite possible inferences 
from anecdotal data to the contrary, that even modern first world people prefer more, 
arguably proportional, egalitarian distributions of wealth rather than lesser ones – cf. 
for example Norton (2011). The above tenets of social justice induced from EP are 
thus descriptions of how a just society functions, or would function with its institutions 
more perfectly aligned with the developed human psyche, and not of how it could 
and ought to be achieved in any given society. The latter question is more readily 
and effectively addressed from the point of view of the culture and starting socio-
economic conditions of a particular society. 
But such functional descriptions of a just society do not address the moral 
issue. Can the citizens of a society claim from the collective the rights required to 
make the society into a just society? Conversely, is Society morally bound to effect a 
just society? Although I suggest that what the human psyche would recognise and 
likely prefer as a just state of affairs has in broad outline been established, and 
although the cause and role of notions of justice in human affairs have been 
generally identified, it must still be in doubt how all this can lead to rights for citizens 
and obligations for Society, or societies. Even if it can be shown unequivocally that 
what I have described as the functioning of a just society is correct, does it make the 
                                            
54 Including all consumer services, health goods and services, foods, consumables and other consumer 
goods. 
55 This is a further iteration of the principle found in Chapter 3 under “Conclusions.” 
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just society anything more than a preferred society – a nice to have? The question 
could thus be resolved into one which asks what the difference might be between the 
just and the merely expedient. On what basis might coercion be justified to enforce 
compliance with the principles of justice as suggested by the EP approach? 
I shall attempt to deal with these questions in the following section. 
7. Deontological or Teleological 
In this section, I investigate the nature of the principles of justice derived from 
the EP approach, after canvassing the issues raised by Rawlsian deontology, 
Sandel’s criticisms, and Mill’s teleological views. I then attempt to distinguish Rawls’s 
criticisms of teleological theories from the principles derived from the EP approach. 
Rawls hold that the two main concepts of ethics are those of the right and of 
the good (Rawls 2009, 24). He states that the structure of an ethical theory is largely 
determined by how it defines and connects the two basic notions. He defines 
teleological theories as those theories that define the good (utility) independently 
from the right, and then go on to define the right as that which maximises the good. 
He says further (at 25) that he understands the principle of utility as defining the 
good as the satisfaction of rational desire. 
He argues, that by definition, justice as fairness is a deontological theory. It is 
so, because deontological theories are those that either do not specify the good 
independently from the right, or does not interpret the right as maximizing the good 
(Rawls 2009, 30). Rawls then carries on and defines deontological theories as being 
non-teleological ones. 
Sandel (Sandel 1998), on the other hand, argues that that Rawls, like Kant, is 
a deontological liberal since Rawls takes, what Sandel describes as the main thesis 
of the deontological ethic, as his central claim, which is the claim that justice is the 
first virtue of social institutions, as truth is to systems of thought. This claim thus 
asserts the priority of right, as against the claims of the good. 
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Rawls, for his part, argues that the priority of right is founded based on human 
nature. He contends that the desire to express our nature as “free and equal”56 
rational beings can be fulfilled only by acting on the principles of right and justice as 
having first priority. “. . . It is acting from this precedence that expresses our freedom 
from contingency and happenstance. Therefore, in order to realize our nature, we 
have no alternative but to plan to preserve our sense of justice as governing our 
other aims” (Rawls 2009, 574). 
But Sandel argues that there are two different senses of deontology: 
In its moral sense, deontology opposes consequentialism57; it 
describes a first-order ethic containing certain categorical duties 
and prohibitions which take unqualified precedence over other 
moral and practical concerns. In its foundational sense, 
deontology opposes teleology; it describes a form of justification 
in which first principles are derived in a way that does not 
presuppose any final human purposes or ends, nor any 
determinate conception of the human good (Sandel 1998, 3). 
Opposed to this deontological view is the teleological view, which Sandel 
holds as preferable. He challenges the priority of right to the extent that Rawls 
argues that the principles of justice that specify our rights “do not depend for their 
justification on any particular conception of the good life or, as Rawls has put it more 
recently, on any ‘comprehensive’ moral or religious conception” (Sandel 1998, 96). 
Sandel argues that justice is relative to the good and not independent of it. He 
argues that one way of linking justice with conceptions of the good holds that 
                                            
56 It must be noted that the phrase “free and equal” has a special Kantian connotation per 
Rawls. He argues that Kantian doctrine joins the content of justice with a certain conception of the 
person; and this conception regards persons as both free and equal, as capable of acting both 
reasonably and rationally, and therefore as capable of taking part in social cooperation among 
persons so conceived. (Rawls, 1980 p.518) 
57 The idea that actions should be judged solely by their consequences. The classic argument for the 
end justifies the means. 
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principles of justice depend for their justification on the moral worth or intrinsic good 
of the ends they serve. He states that this view is teleological since it “rests the case 
for rights on the moral importance of the purposes or the ends that rights promote” 
(Sandel 1998, 113). He summarises this as the more plausible in his view, being that 
“rights depend for their justification on the moral importance of the ends they serve.” 
But I suggest that it is not only the deontological view that holds justice in the 
highest regard, above the standing of other moral rules. For example, Mill, who holds 
a teleological utilitarian view, called justice “the chief part, and incomparably the 
most sacred and binding part, of all morality” (Mill 1879, 465), but he reserved that 
distinction for justice grounded on utility. However, how he grounds justice on utility 
is interesting. 
When Mill sets about to argue for justice having a higher standing than other 
moral ideas, he says that there is both a rational and an animal element to the 
sentiment of justice. It derives its intensity as well as its moral justification from the 
extraordinarily important and impressive kind of utility which is concerned. That utility 
he argues, is the utility of security, which is the most vital of all interests. Nearly all 
other earthly benefits, he says,  
are needed by one person, not needed by another; and many of 
them can, if necessary, be cheerfully foregone, or replaced by 
something else; but security no human being can possibly do 
without; on it we depend for all our immunity from evil, and for the 
whole value of all and every good, beyond the passing moment” 
(Mill 1879, 71). 
In this argument, he is supported by Hume who argues that 
The safety of the people is the supreme law: All other particular 
laws are subordinate to it, and dependent on it: And if, in the 
COMMON course of things, they be followed and regarded; it is 
only because the public safety and interest COMMONLY demand 
so equal and impartial an administration (Hume 1912 [1777], 16).  
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Our notion of justice, Mill suggests, is a claim on our fellows to join in making 
our existence safe, creates feelings so much more intense than other feelings 
concerned with any of the more common cases of utility, that the difference in 
degree becomes a difference in kind. There is quite evidently some common ground 
between Mill’s teleology and the EP approach, since to make our existence safe is 
conceptually very close to the idea of securing human survival. 
Based on Sandel and Mill’s exposition of teleology, it seems evident that the 
EP approach should likewise be regarded as a teleological one and which therefore 
places it at a distance from Rawls’s deontology. Social justice, as understood by the 
EP approach, has as its fundamental purpose, or telos, being the facilitation and 
promotion of the indefinite existence and survival of human beings as a social 
species. As argued in Chapter 3, this includes the survival of each individual human, 
since there is no basis upon which individuals can be differentiated in principle. 
Survival of the species is therefore predicated on the maximal survival of every 
individual, not only for procreative purposes, but because of the equally important 
purpose of cultural development and social learning, which are sine qua non for 
human survival. 
Despite the teleology of the EP approach I submit that it is in essence not 
wholly incompatible with Rawls’s deontology. To argue this, I find it necessary to 
distinguish the EP’s teleology from Rawls’s general critique of teleological theories. 
Rawls starts off by stating that the two main concepts of ethics are the right and the 
good (Rawls 2009, 23). And, he says, the simplest way of relating these two 
concepts is the way teleological theories do: the good is defined independently from 
the right, and then the right is defined as that which maximises the good. 
He argues that this hypothesis, namely that of defining the right as maximising 
the good, allows one to judge the goodness of things without referring to what is the 
right. Rawls goes further and says he understands the principle of utility in its 
classical form as defining the good as the satisfaction of rational desire (Rawls 2009, 
30). This means, Rawls argues (at 26), that it leads to a situation where “society 
must allocate its means of satisfaction whatever these are, rights and duties, 
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opportunities and privileges, and various forms of wealth, to achieve this maximum, if 
it can.” 
Rawls then shows how this view can lead on to unacceptable situations, 
because the idea of justice, being derived from the end of attaining the greatest 
balance of satisfaction, means that “there is no reason in principle why the greater 
gains of some should not compensate for the lesser losses of others; or more 
importantly, why the violation of the liberty of a few might not be made right by the 
greater good shared by many” (Rawls 2009, 26). This effect is due to another facet 
of what Rawls holds as a principle of utilitarian theories, namely that the right 
maximises the good aggregately, over society as a whole. It is thus the total sum of 
satisfaction in society that is of importance. Rawls specifically makes the point, on 
the same page, that:  
the striking feature of the utilitarian view of justice is that it does 
not matter, except indirectly, how this sum of satisfactions is 
distributed among individuals any more than it matters, except 
indirectly, how one man distributes his satisfactions over time. 
The correct distribution in either case is that which yields the 
maximum fulfilment. 
This contrasts, per Rawls, with the “convictions of common sense” that as a 
matter of principle we should distinguish between the claims of liberty and right on 
the one hand and increasing the aggregate social welfare on the other (Rawls 2009, 
27). “Justice,” Rawls says, “denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by 
a greater good shared by others.” According to Rawls then, teleological theories 
relate the right and the good in the wrong way: 
…the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it; even a 
dominant end must be chosen from among numerous 
possibilities. We should therefore reverse the relation between 
the right and the good proposed by teleological doctrines and 
view the right as prior (Rawls 2009, 560). 
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However, the theory of social justice suggested by the EP approach can be 
distinguished from what Rawls is dealing with and does not appear to fall prey to 
these objections. Upon reflection, the problem that Rawls has with teleological 
theories does not really seem to be what he suggests it is: how they relate the good 
and the right. It appears to fundamentally concern more the content of the good, how 
it is defined, coupled with the teleological hypothesis (on his interpretation) that the 
right is merely a maximisation of the good (meaning the satisfaction of rational 
desire), measured in aggregate over the population. 
Although this characterisation of teleological theories by Rawls may be true of 
some of them, I cannot find any evidence, or argument, to give support to the 
contention that such a view is either a necessary, or an inherent element of any 
teleological view. 
Taking Mill as an example, there is no evidence in his writing that he views 
justice, namely the bringing of security, in any other sense than bringing it to every 
individual equally. There is nothing which leads one to suppose that he is arguing 
that security should be maximised in aggregate over the population as a whole. On 
the contrary, he explicitly states (cf. quote above) that security (and by necessary 
inference justice) is the “one thing that no human being can do without.” (Mill 1879, 
61). Justice is thus a life ingredient for every single individual. 
Although one might argue that “security” is part of rational desire, it does not 
constitute “rational desire” generally and the extension of maximum security to every 
single individual cannot be said to be merely the maximisation of the satisfaction of 
rational desire. Thus, although justice may satisfy the rational desire for security, it 
does not do so in aggregate over the population as a whole, it is intended to 
maximise security for every individual equally, but subject to adequate measures to 
combat free- riding. 
Similarly, the EP approach holds that the derived ultimate “purpose” of our 
developed values of justice is the survival of humans. This is not an end that can be 
maximised in aggregate over a population. The discussion in Chapter 3 already 
suggests that on the societal view all individuals are equal, and equally important to 
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the genepool as a whole. Therefore, the telos of justice applies to all individuals 
equally, since there is no basis upon which some can in principle be preferred to 
others in the survival stakes. In this case, the good is defined independently from the 
right, but the good in this case has nothing to do with the satisfaction of rational 
desire generally. The right does not merely maximise the good, it secures, facilitates 
and achieves it. 
It is true that one might argue that although the ultimate telos of justice is 
survival, it promotes that purpose, inter alia, through the maximisation of social 
harmony and cohesion. It might then be argued that social harmony, unlike survival, 
is subject to maximisation. Theoretically at least, social cohesion and harmony might 
perhaps be maximised by the denial of certain goods to some members, or the 
systemisation of certain inequalities in society. 
This possibility is more apparent than real, for it is difficult to see how social 
cohesion and harmony can be advanced in its totality through discriminatory 
practices. Not only will the justice notions of those discriminated against be violated 
and the social cohesion of that group be thus jeopardised, but the empathic and 
altruistic instincts of many of the advantaged will be aroused, thus further disturbing 
social harmony and cohesion. 
But the true answer to the question is that any discriminatory practices and 
social inequalities in Society, which are not founded on the principle of due 
proportionality, will be a violation of the principle of egalitarianism, which is 
fundamental to the EP approach. 
Unlike the manifold possibilities included in rational desire, as criticised by 
Rawls, the telos of survival cannot be said to be a purpose that is subject to 
circumstance or happenstance, it is evidently an unrelinquishable fundamental 
purpose, dictated by the laws of nature that, for their part, seem predisposed to allow 
existing things to carry on existing if they are viable and adaptive within the larger 
ecosystem. The principles of justice so understood, should consequently rank higher 
in the moral hierarchy than any other moral principles, for it is difficult to conceive of 
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any moral principles that would surpass justice in serving the highest human good, 
or purpose. 
Furthermore, justice is also not a fickle end, that is dependent upon every 
individual’s life-plan, as Rawls criticises for its multifarious contingencies, that is thus 
endlessly variable like rational desire is in the utilitarian view. It is also not an end 
that is extinguished by its realisation; it has been realised for countless millennia and 
is still being realised at every moment (which is of course no guarantee that it will 
keep on being realised indefinitely). 
Our ability to self-destruct human society should not be underestimated. The 
EP approach accepts that maladjustment is as much part of nature as is balanced 
adjustment and therefore there are no guarantees that Society will always exist. It 
depends on multiple factors, manmade and natural, including perhaps the possibility 
of another extended volcanic winter sometime in the future. 
 I therefore suggest that the EP approach is not vulnerable to Rawls’s criticism 
that only a deontological theory “expresses our freedom from contingency and 
happenstance” (Rawls 2009, 574). Rawls argues further that to realize our nature we 
have no alternative but to plan to preserve our sense of justice as governing our 
other aims, i.e. give priority to justice, as deontology demands. The EP purpose of 
keeping human society in existence, promoting and enhancing its binding fabric 
cannot be said to be subject to contingency and happenstance. The values that 
sustain it, I suggest, should be regarded as evolutionary imperatives of such a high 
order that one can hardly foresee that there may be cases “in which some other 
social duty is so important as to overrule any one of the general maxims of justice” 
(Mill 1879, 70). Consequently, the teleology of the EP approach appears to be 
compatible with the requirements of justice as is argued by Rawls to be the sole 
preserve of deontological theories. 
Further we should consider that there is also a sense in which the EP derived 
principles of social justice (taken as “the right”) might be seen as being prior to the 
good, in that no other good could ever negate or override the purpose of social 
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justice. Social justice can consequently be said to represent and encompass the 
fundamental, or ultimate human social good. 
On the EP approach, the end that justice serves is thus prior to any other end, 
and justice therefore defines and regulates the parameters of other ends that people 
can choose. The ends of justice will, I suggest, always outweigh any other contrary 
moral or religious duty. 
But Mill (Mill 1879, 71) argues that particular cases may occur in which some 
other social duty is so important, as to overrule any one of the general maxims of 
justice. Thus, to save a life, he says, “it may not only be allowable, but a duty, to 
steal, or take by force, the necessary food or medicine, or to kidnap, and compel to 
officiate, the only qualified medical practitioner.” 
Although I do not discount Mills’s own answer to this problem, I do submit that 
the conundrum itself suggests its resolution. If the saving of a life is a moral duty as 
the conundrum suggests and I affirm, then it is not the duty only of one person, but 
the duty of all who can assist. Thus, it would be the duty also of the person whose 
property is taken, and of the qualified medical practitioner. Taking ‘the necessary 
food or medicine’ from a person who has a duty to give it, and forcing a person to 
assist who is under a duty to assist, cannot be an injustice to those individuals. On 
the contrary, I suggest that to do so would be an enforcement of the requirements of 
justice. 
Thus, the answer to the questions posed at the start of this section is that the 
principles of justice implied in the EP description of the just society are peremptory 
and morally binding on Society as well as on its members. Given the arguably 
existential importance of a just Society and therefore of just societies, it is not merely 
a question of citizens being able to rightfully claim the rights and liberties implicit in a 
just society; Society itself is morally obligated and should in fact be leading the way.  
Just as citizens have a moral right against societies to claim to live under just 
institutions, so societies have the moral obligation to ensure that their citizens live in 
just societies. This is a duty owed by Society to every member thereof, thus a duty 
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owed by all of us together to each of us. Society, and by necessary implication thus 
every society, should evidently itself be championing those actions, attitudes and 
behaviours that are just and consequently support the ultimate human end of 
cohesive, peaceful existence indeterminately into the future. 
But it appears that the debate about the priority of the right over the good or 
vice versa, is of more than academic interest; it also has public policy implications. 
This comes about since, according to Sandel’s analysis (Sandel 1998, 3715), 
Rawls’s argument concerning the priority of the right over the good is 
…not the application to politics of Kantian moral philosophy, but a 
practical response to the familiar fact that people in modern 
democratic societies typically disagree about the good. Since 
people’s moral and religious convictions are unlikely to converge, 
it is more reasonable to seek agreement on principles of justice 
that are neutral with respect to those controversies. 
Political liberalism thus also necessitates a politically neutral policy stance 
regarding the moral controversies that arise in a democratic society due to the 
existence of multiple, mutually incompatible comprehensive theories. This is 
essentially a question of public policy and whether the EP approach requires such a 
policy of neutrality will be discussed in the next chapter. 
8. Conclusion  
I suggest that the EP approach to the question of social justice has all the 
potential to present a fully, or partially comprehensive theory, in the Rawlsian sense, 
of social justice, at least as much as any contract based theory does. Although by 
itself the EP approach tends to exclude a contractual, or consensual basis, for the 
justice notion in society, it is compatible with Rawls’s approach in several ways. It is 
compatible at least because it does, like justice as fairness, imply a mutual “meeting 
of the minds” regarding justice between members of a society, although that 
“meeting” happens under vastly different circumstances. 
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The EP approach also obviates several complications that exist in justice as 
fairness, such as how the multiplicity of reasonable yet incompatible beliefs to be 
found in society is overcome by the fact of the shared human psyche. I therefore 
suggest that the EP approach can supplement the Rawlsian approach in many 
important ways by placing it on a more scientifically robust footing, as indicated in 
this chapter. 
Rawls’s approach as it stands does seem to suffer from a few fundamental 
objections when viewed from a scientific perspective. While Rawls relies heavily on 
intuition, he is silent on how that intuition comes about. He does not even try to 
explain why we would all have the same intuitions concerning justice which his 
theory requires. Against this the EP approach does explain the origins of our intuition 
and why there would be a general generic human intuition concerning the nature of 
justice.  
The evolutionary approach may even have more to offer, since it tries to deal 
with ideas of human motivation on a scientifically established basis, as well as with 
psychologically embedded and culturally evolved notions of right and wrong. This 
approach thus leads on to an understanding of the origins and socio-biological 
purposes of the notions of justice and injustice. Its scientific approach serves to deal 
with fundamental questions, such as the origins and survival role of intuition, which 
also helps to explain the often contradictory and unreliable nature of intuition. 
Contract based theories simply cannot do this and they are usually silent upon the 
nature and role of intuition, except to the extent that intuition is actually employed by 
them. 
In the next and final chapter, I shall attempt to synthesise the developed 
theory to reach some general conclusions about the possible socio-economic public 
policy implications of this theoretical understanding of the Justice idea, including the 
prospects for further study of the approach. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Public Policy Recommendations, General Conclusions and 
Prospects for Further Research. 
4.112 Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. 
Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. Without philosophy 
thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear 
and to give them sharp boundaries.      (Wittgenstein 2012, 
602-607) 
1. Introduction 
My purpose in this project is, inter alia, to clarify and understand the idea of 
social justice. In the 20th century no theory of justice was held in higher regard than 
that of John Rawls. It is for that reason that I chose to investigate to what extent it 
clarified the idea of social justice: not only as to its substance, but especially as to 
the justice idea’s origins and foundations. 
However, extant explanations of social justice, including that of John Rawls, 
always seemed to me to lack an answer to the question why – why do all of us 
humans seem to have notions of social justice in the first place, notions of right and 
wrong, and what could be their derivation, origin and social roles – and just as 
importantly, are the universal human values or are they wholly culture-dependant? I 
was sure that these notions could not exist in a cosmic vacuum of ‘just being there’ 
without cause or reason. To the extent that I may have contributed to clarifying and 
delineating these thoughts, to that extent this project could be deemed to have 
served its purpose. 
In this chapter, I shall consider the general implications of the evolutionary 
psychology approach to social justice and make some recommendations for public 
policy, before I draw some general conclusions from the discussions in this project. 
Thereafter I mention some issues of the theory that remain to be developed as well 
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as a few questions that are suggested to present good prospects for further 
research. 
2. Recommendations for Public Policy 
The evolutionary psychology approach to social justice does not result in any 
a priori, detailed public policy prescriptions. Public policy must, after all, be framed to 
suit particular circumstances for certain social purposes in particular societies. 
However, the approach does suggest certain attitudes that public policy makers 
should assume regarding social questions. There are consequently a great number 
of potential policy issues that can be informed by the evolutionary psychology 
approach, and in this section I will deal only with what I believe is the more general, 
overall approach to questions of public policy as is required by social justice.  
I will argue that all public policy programmes must be developed with social 
justice clearly in mind – either to be in sync with its requirements, or to promote it, or 
to achieve it, as the case may be. As discussions in the course of this project have 
suggested, human beings appear to have a psychological need for justice. It is a 
requirement of not only personal relationships, but also of group relationships; an 
essential in the very structure of people’s social lives. It is in regards to the building 
of a just social infrastructure that public policy is most important. Even though the 
fundamental institutions of a society might be just, this does not automatically make 
the society just, it will still require just public policies on a continuing basis. 
Dealing with the project of transforming an existing society into a just society 
stands a great body of research and academic work, which it seems unnecessary to 
go into here. But the outcomes of this project suggest that, given the human 
psychological need for justice, there can hardly be any real social development 
without social justice; lacking social justice, a society will most likely be maladjusted 
in one or more ways, in which event society is then experienced more as an 
imposition and a burden for most, if not all, of its members, rather than as the 
essential human life facilitator that it is supposed to be. 
Public policy ought therefore to be directed by three main considerations: 
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• Achieving egalitarian outcomes,58 and 
• Fostering a culture of pro-social attitudes, and 
• Providing sufficient guarantees and sanctions against free riders 
on the benefits of group living while making little or no contribution. 
Policy makers, it is accordingly suggested, in considering and framing socio-
political and economic policies, should consistently and unerringly keep in mind that 
one of the primary functions of Society is to equitably distribute the advantages of 
group living, being in the main security, access to food, shelter, clothing, health, 
knowledge and human interaction. Those are some of the most vital natural 
advantages that we get from being social animals living in a society. But ultimately 
Society is a function of the genepool that ensures the indefinite existence of human 
beings, therefore any strengthening of the fabric of Society amounts to the better 
securing of human life on earth. Given that the securing of human life is a social 
good, any and all public policy-making bodies should always be ready to answer the 
question of how any particular policy is designed to generally and particularly 
advance the benefits of group living to every person in society, and equally, how that 
purpose is, or will be made publicly manifest within society. 
But just public policies cannot be framed and executed unless there is a just 
institutional framework to support and enforce it (Dunn 1981). Many of the attributes 
of social justice cannot be accomplished by force of law and institutions alone. For 
that reason, all public representatives, decision makers, and all civil servants should 
be acutely aware of the importance and requirements of social justice. Although the 
judiciary is supposed only to speak the law and not make it, they too should take 
cognisance of the moral structure of the requirements of social justice. 
Public policy thus ought to be directed at fostering a culture of accepting the 
moral precepts of a just society, of expecting and doing justice; this being the 
required culture of all those who stand in the service of the public, whether as 
government employees or as service providers in the private sector. This means that 
                                            
58 This could give rise to a type of Rawlsian difference principle. 
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public policy should be so designed as to foster among the citizenry moral values 
and attitudes of egalitarianism, tolerance, cooperation, mutual empathy, making 
them secure in the knowledge of belonging to a society that is founded on moral 
principles, while it cares, nurtures and encourages each of its members to achieve 
their full human potential. Reform with the intention of enhancing equity requires 
macro action framed in terms of creating the appropriate micro environments in 
which the egalitarian instinct can best be gratified (Charlton 1997, p. 423-424). 
Such attitudes are suggested to be conducive to achieving social cohesion, 
growth and development and will consequently be experienced as just, on condition 
that there are also sufficiently credible guarantees and sanctions against free riding 
and due penalties in place for non-compliance and anti-social activities. Without 
these latter elements, social justice will not be secure in the public mind and the 
other objectives of public policy might therefore be problematic to attain.  
The discussion thus far seems to suggest that a just society, based on a 
moral understanding of justice, would not be able to justify a public policy attitude of 
neutrality on moral questions arising from the incompatible comprehensive doctrines 
present in society.59 As an example one can examine the issue of abortion. Justice 
as fairness requires more than merely a policy of neutrality, it requires us to abstain 
from using arguments based on comprehensive doctrines, as well as certain 
disputed economic precepts in political discussions. Rawls writes extensively about 
public reason and eventually says that it means  
…that in discussing constitutional essentials and matters of basic 
justice we are not to appeal to comprehensive religious and 
philosophical doctrines—to what we as individuals or members of 
associations see as the whole truth—nor to elaborate economic 
theories of general equilibrium, say, if these are in dispute. As far 
as possible, the knowledge and ways of reasoning that ground 
our affirming the principles of justice and their application to 
                                            
59 Cf. the discussion of a public policy of neutrality on moral questions in Chapter 2 under the 
heading “Priority of Right.” 
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constitutional essentials and basic justice are to rest on the plain 
truths now widely accepted, or available, to citizens generally. 
Otherwise, the political conception would not provide a public 
basis of justification (Rawls 2011, 224). 
Thus it happens that justice as fairness faces a dilemma on, for example, 
abortion, such as is discussed in Chapter 2. 
I suggest that one of the problems that Rawls’s political liberalism faces in this 
context, is that it does not ground its values of toleration and equal citizenship, upon 
which it founds its approach to such moral questions, on anything more than 
agreement, albeit supposedly universal agreement. It means that in any case where 
there is a lack of agreement resulting from principles of incompatible comprehensive 
doctrines, such as happens in the abortion debate, “the political conception [of 
justice as fairness] would not provide a public basis of justification.” (Rawls 2011, 
224). Thus the supposed political consensus breaks down in the face of a serious 
challenge by comprehensive theories.  
The pertinent question for this project then arises as to what policy stance, if 
any, the evolutionary psychology approach might recommend. There does not seem 
to be a reason why it should follow a policy of neutrality, but the question is whether 
the morality of its principles as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, and mindful of the 
discussion on the so-called “naturalistic fallacy”, would be robust enough to give a 
firm, defensible judgment on, for example, the abortion question, in the face of 
challenges by comprehensive doctrines. It therefore seems necessary to examine 
the moral arguments that might be raised from the evolutionary psychology 
perspective on this question. 
At first glance one might assume that the evolutionary psychology approach 
would at all costs favour the maintenance of whatever life comes into being, as this 
amounts to an expansion of the genepool. Abortion would then be an injustice 
against the foetus and the interests of society. But such an assumption would be 
wrong in the light of what is observed in nature. 
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Observing the natural cycle of hominid procreation in nature is only 
enlightening up to a point. This is because the intentional abortion of a foetus is not a 
truly viable option in nature, although an attack on a pregnant female may be fierce 
enough to cause the foetus to abort of its own accord. Thus, one is forced to look for 
examples of the evolutionary perspective on, for example, infanticide. Infanticide is 
described as the killing of dependent offspring, or more formally, to “any behaviour 
that makes a direct and significant contribution to the immediate death of an embryo 
or newly hatched or born member of the perpetrator’s own species” (Hrdy 1984). 
These authors also state that reviews of infanticide make it clear that it occurs across 
a wide variety of taxonomic groups and is regular and normal behaviour in many 
species, including that of humans, past and present – cf. also (Van Schaik 2000), 
(Trumbo 1990), (Williamson 1978), and (Wilson 1975). 
I make this point without intending in the least to argue that infanticide is 
therefore morally acceptable, but only to show that there is no natural or evolutionary 
prohibition on infanticidal behaviour. In fact, there may be some evolutionary 
advantages to this behaviour. But that does not indicate that a moral species ought 
to behave in such a manner. As discussed in Chapter 4, the “is” of science is highly 
relevant to the “ought” of ethics, but the translation of one into the other is subject to 
reason. The moral question must thus be approached not merely from the “is” of 
infanticide, but from the perspective of the reasoned moral principles of justice 
derived from the evolutionary psychology approach, which is what I propose to 
demonstrate in what follows. 
Throughout the discussion on policy, it must be kept in mind that the 
derivation of the principles of social justice is the evolutionary advantages implicit in 
them. The derivation of the policy prescriptions, on the other hand, are the principles 
of justice. Policy prescriptions are thus not directly related to evolutionarily selective 
advantages, but are derived from the principles of justice, which are directly so 
derived from evolutionary selective survival advantages. 
The moral principles of evolutionary psychology thus hold that Society should 
grant every individual equal liberty and equal rights to the greatest extent possible 
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and allow every individual to live his life as he pleases, subject only to the equal right 
of everyone else to do the same (cf. Chapters 3 and 4). Since all people are equal 
from the societal point of view, it follows necessarily that no person or group of 
persons can have the right to decree the use, or in any way control the body of any 
person without that person’s consent. Although society does have an interest in the 
health of every individual, it does not seem to follow that society even has the right to 
prescribe or impose its views on health on anyone. It has the power of education and 
persuasion only. This means that every person has sovereign rights over her own 
body and that that sovereignty ranks alongside and equal to everyone else’s right to 
their own bodies. 
However, the relationship between the mother and a foetus is more 
complicated, because suddenly, the mother’s body, her exclusive preserve, is being 
invaded by a second body. The second body is still only a potential human being, as 
against her fully developed60 humanity. I suggest that a full human being must be 
understood as an individual that is biologically developed to the point where he is 
biologically independent of the body of another person. It thus seems that a foetus, 
that is still in the process of biologically developing to the point of biological 
independence, is, although human, still only a potential fully human being. 
If the invasion of the mother’s body is welcome, then all is good and well, but 
still there is a physical and psychological price to pay by the mother – cf. Suzanne 
Sadedin’s Essay “War in the womb” (Sadedin 2014). Part of this problem is the 
“battle of the sexes” that takes place in the womb. There is a struggle between the 
genome donated by the father and the one donated by the mother – each is 
competing to gain the upper hand. The paternal genome wishes to use as much of 
the mother’s resources as possible to grow the foetus, to create an as large as 
possible birthling thereby maximally ensuring its survival to spread the father’s 
genes, while the maternal genome wishes to restrict use of her resources to protect 
her body for maximum further pregnancies. Both parents want to spread their 
respective genes as far as possible. The male strategy is to impregnate as many 
                                            
60 At least biologically and physically. 
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wombs as possible, while the female strategy is to realise as many as possible 
pregnancies from the same womb. This struggle has reached an evolutionary 
Mexican stand-off, per Carey (Carey 2011, 131).  
The human mother does not necessarily share the imprimatur of her genes 
consciously, and if she pays the physical and emotional price for this struggle 
willingly, even eagerly, then it must be her choice freely made; it is a choice only she 
can make. But if she does not, or no longer wishes to subject her body to that “war” 
and its aftermath, then surely it can be her sole choice also. If we do not wish to 
accept this argument, we would have to argue that the foetus, which is only a partly 
formed human being, has rights that take precedence over the rights of the mother. It 
is true that the foetus is human, but it is a human foetus, not yet a full human, who 
demands the right to use someone else’s body, someone who is only 50% 
genetically related to it, to launch its own independent life, without regard to 
whatever the consequences might be for the body it has commandeered.  
I suggest that there is no, and can be no basis upon which such a “better” 
right can be founded. The moral rights of the mother to her own body, as prior being, 
must enjoy priority over any rights of an incipient human being. I suggest that this 
amounts to a strong and defensible moral basis from which to assert the justifiable 
right to abortion.  
Consequently, it is arguably correct to say that from the moral point of view of 
the evolutionary psychology approach, it would be able to engage any incompatible 
comprehensive doctrines and rely on its own moral principles, such as discussed in 
this project. It is therefore indicated, I suggest, that the evolutionary psychology 
approach has the potential to deal on its own terms with challenges by 
comprehensive theories, although much development of the theory obviously still 
needs to be done. 
However, public policy must also be framed to maintain social justice where it 
has been achieved and achieve it where it has not. Thus, it must prevent socially 
disruptive behaviour and eliminate socially unacceptable conditions. But much of 
these objectives cannot be met in the face of poverty. 
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The evolutionary psychology approach to social justice suggests that relative 
poverty is an unnatural human condition. It certainly seems not to have existed 
during the 40,000 years of prehistory when egalitarianism and a culture of sharing 
was most likely the common human experience (see discussion in Chapter 3 under 
“The Gift Givers”). The human psyche is consequently ill adapted to deal with the 
privations of relative poverty. Poverty in the face of prosperity itself is an injustice 
and is most probably always the result of some systemic injustice in a society. Public 
policy must be aimed particularly at removing any such systemic injustices.  
The implications for public policy are furthermore that poverty alleviation is not 
a policy option, other than as a temporary palliative. Public policy needs to be 
directed at tackling poverty at its root causes and eradicating it. In doing away with 
systemic injustice and creating more egalitarian outcomes, one can do worse than to 
look at the public policy prescriptions followed over the years by the Nordic 
countries. 
The basic point of departure for public policy is therefore suggested to be to 
achieve congruence with the embedded values of justice in the human psyche. But 
the latter was formed to maximise human reproduction in an ancestral society; 
applying these insights under modern conditions will be difficult and complex. But, as 
Charlton states 
(t)he scope for success is necessarily partial; nonetheless, the best 
results are likely to come from acknowledging the strengths and 
limitations of human psychology, and from trying to frame social and 
political policy that cuts with the grain of evolved instincts, rather than 
ignoring human nature or deliberately thwarting it. (Charlton 1997, 424) 
3. General Conclusions 
The evolutionary psychology approach is not based on a surfeit of 
assumptions about human nature, the concept of the person, of society, the 
desirability of liberty and equality et cetera, as is many other theories, including 
justice as fairness. Through the evolutionary approach we can explain why liberty 
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and equality are important in society and why they are aims worthy of being striven 
for. It explains, for example, that the notions of liberty and equality are in complete 
accord with the ideal requirements of the genepool when viewed from the societal 
perspective. It can thus be said to offer a more parsimonious theory of social justice 
than is presented by justice as fairness. 
Moreover, the societal perspective in conjunction with the socio-biological 
understanding of social justice, suggests a basis for adjudicating between contrary 
and conflicting judgements of justice, whence also a multiplicity of social relationship 
questions can be deduced and reconcilable and justifiable answers produced. I 
therefore contend that the societal perspective, which is a direct consequence of the 
evolutionary psychology approach, is an advance in the understanding of some of 
the natural necessities of social development and cohesion. The societal 
perspective, I suggest, may thus serve as a basis for better understanding certain 
intuitions and as a guide for developing feasible social policies and institutions that 
might resonate more readily with the human spirit. 
4. Prospects for Further Research 
In this section, I will point to some matters and issues that arise from the 
evolutionary psychology approach and will require and merit research on their own at 
a later stage. There are firstly further essentials of the theory that should be 
researched and developed, such as its constitutional implications, implications for 
property law, for administrative law, health care, and education. 
A major project would be to research options for alternative economic 
systems of production and distribution, resulting in outcomes that would be more in 
accordance with the egalitarian predispositions of human beings, than the capitalist 
free market system, especially the current neo-liberal version of the system. Much 
modern research has already been done in respect of such possible egalitarian 
alternatives and it would probably be possible and advisable to build further on those 
– cf. (Sah 1986), (Pollin 1995), (Hall 2001), (Charlton 1997), and (Asutay 2007). 
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Considering the hypothesis of the EP approach, namely that the closer the 
principles of our founding civil institutions match our evolved notions of justice, the 
stronger our social bonding, the more peaceful our society, and the greater the 
potential health and happiness that can be experienced by every individual will be 
(Chapter 3 heading 2), some further study to validate or falsify that hypothesis could 
be undertaken. In order to reasonably test its validity, at least to some degree, 
research into the extent to which the institutions, laws and culture of the 
internationally recognised three or four happiest societies are in harmony with, 
depart from, or contradict the guidelines produced by the evolutionary psychology 
approach can be undertaken. Such a study could, within reasonable limits, falsify or 
validate the basic tenets of the theory, especially in so far as it attempts to define a 
well-ordered society, understood in the evolutionary psychology sense as described 
in Chapter 3. 
A particular subject that I suggest is also of importance in the light of the 
principles of the evolutionary psychology approach is that of penal law and penal 
policies and practices. According to Kent (Kent 1993) the role of punishment in 
egalitarian societies is strictly penal and not necessarily, or at least not intentionally 
calculated to alter behaviour or to rehabilitate offenders: it is essentially punitive in 
nature. This psychological tendency seems to be supported by some modern studies 
that discuss “moral outrage” and “just deserts” as major motivating factors that drive 
the psychological urge to punish offenders (Carlsmith 2002). These discussions 
countervail against both the Kantian and the Benthamite view on punishment. It may 
well be that the societal approach casts a different and perhaps a revitalizing light on 
the question.   
A further area of interest would be to discover to what extent indigenous 
societies had developed norms of social justice in harmony with the evolutionary 
psychology approach. In this respect the normative legal rules of indigenous South 
African peoples would probably form a very strong base for such research, but it 
would also have to include the normative rules of other indigenous peoples. 
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It would also be very interesting to reconsider the essentials of the democratic 
ideal in the light of the societal approach. Such a reconsideration needs to deal with 
questions such as what can be regarded as the essential elements of a truly 
democratic system, what the purposes and outcomes of such a democratic system 
should be, and whether current representative government models really meet these 
criteria and expectations cf. – (Rosanvallon 2013), (Manin 1997) and (Przeworski 
1999). The parallel question to this avenue of inquiry would be whether there are, or 
may be alternative systems of government, such as proposals for deliberative 
democracy (Bouricius 2013), (Dowlen 2008), (Manin 1997), that could be considered 
an improvement on present democratic systems based on representative 
government, in that they might align closer with the values of the evolved human 
psyche. As Mill reminds us, “[t]o inquire into the best form of government in the 
abstract (as it is called) is not a chimerical, but a highly practical employment of 
scientific intellect.” (Mill 2004). 
There are undoubtedly further areas of possible research, but I leave them for 
consideration at some future time. 
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